The Urban Book Series

Yonn Dierwechter

Urban Sustainability through Smart Growth

Intercurrence, Planning, and Geographies of Regional Development across Greater Seattle

Springer

The Urban Book Series

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/14773

Aims and Scope

The Urban Book Series is a resource for urban studies and geography research worldwide. It provides a unique and innovative resource for the latest developments in the field, nurturing a comprehensive and encompassing publication venue for urban studies, urban geography, planning and regional development.

The series publishes peer-reviewed volumes related to urbanization, sustainability, urban environments, sustainable urbanism, governance, globalization, urban and sustainable development, spatial and area studies, urban management, urban infrastructure, urban dynamics, green cities and urban landscapes. It also invites research which documents urbanization processes and urban dynamics on a national, regional and local level, welcoming case studies, as well as comparative and applied research.

The series will appeal to urbanists, geographers, planners, engineers, architects, policy makers, and to all of those interested in a wide-ranging overview of contemporary urban studies and innovations in the field. It accepts monographs, edited volumes and textbooks.

Yonn Dierwechter

Urban Sustainability through Smart Growth

Intercurrence, Planning, and Geographies of Regional Development across Greater Seattle

Springer

Yonn Dierwechter
Urban Studies Program
University of Washington, Tacoma
Tacoma, Washington, USA

ISSN 2365-757X ISSN 2365-7588 (electronic)
The Urban Book Series
ISBN 978-3-319-54447-2 ISBN 978-3-319-54448-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54448-9

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017932633

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Like other urban scholars of global city-regions and the politics, plans, and policies of the so-called new city-regionalism, I think more attention should be paid to how regional policies and wider development patterns influence urban-scale processes, and vice versa—including those related to "local" sustainability goals. The city of Seattle per se has long garnered attention for many impressive green initiatives, some of which are discussed at length in this book; but in my view Seattle is embedded within, and partially constituted by, *a wider relational setting* of housing, labor, and transport patterns. These structural realities are critical in thinking through how urban growth can (or cannot) be made smarter and thus, in principle, more ecologically, socially, and economically sustainable. In addition, smart growth is a regional planning theory, necessarily demanding a strong sensitivity to supra-local dynamics and relational questions across scales of authority.

Accordingly, this book is not just about Seattle but the wider city-region, with empirical attention paid to other communities (or "nodes") like Tacoma, Bellevue, Redmond, Fife, Spanaway, Snoqualmie, and so on. I believe that cities and their suburbs co-shape global city-regions. As they confront global problems they necessarily confront each other; they will "hang together," to borrow Ben Franklin's famous admonition, or they will "hang separately." My theoretical (and geographical) engagement with the political science concept of *intercurrence*, suggested originally by my colleague, Charles Williams, has proven particularly helpful to me in thinking about the kinds of spaces that smart growth makes over political time—sustainable or otherwise. The discussion on offer will hopefully interest not only geographers and planners but also political scientists as well as urban historians and, more generally, students of sustainability as both a theoretical problem and a practical strategy. As an urban studies scholar, I engage with themes resonant in political economy, planning theory, historical institutionalism, critical urban geography, and the economic and political history of city-regions. There are philosophical and methodological limits to such interdisciplinary travels. But the gains are worth the risks.

In executing (and just imagining) this project in this particular way, I am in debt to my immediate colleagues, notably Charles Williams, Mark Pendras, Anne Wessells, Brian Coffey, Britta Ricker, and Ali Modarres, as well as to more distance colleagues on other campuses all around the world, including Tassilo Herrschel (UK), Andy Thornley (UK), Andy Jonas (UK), Roger Behrens (South Africa), Eliot Tretter (Canada), Murat Yalçıntan (Turkey), Paolo Giaccaria (Italy), Stefano di Vita (Italy), and Gerd Linz (Germany). Whatever faults this book surely suffers, they are fewer than they would have been absent their positive influence. Sometimes this was through coauthoring previous research (e.g., with Pendras, Coffey, Modarres, Wessells, Thornley, Herrschel); at other times, it was a serendipitous comment or observation they made in passing about planning, geography, sustainability, or political economy. I am particularly thankful for repeated conversations about Tacoma, the region, politics, labor, and political economy with my friends, Mark Pendras and Charles Williams, though they would hardly agree with everything that follows here.

Finally, books about sustainability are books about future generations. And so, this book is affectionately dedicated to my daughter—lovely, inquisitive, amazing Amara, who at just six and a half years of age wants to live in a world populated by "a thousand million and twelve" elephants, *dassies*, meerkats . . . and one little bunny on a boat.

Tacoma, WA Yonn Dierwechter

Contents

Chapter 1
Introduction: Problem, Argument, Themes

Maybe we're not the only ones to hit a sustainability bottleneck.Maybe not everyone—maybe no one—makes it to the other side.

—Adam Frank (2015)

1.1 Approaching the Bottleneck

During a lunchtime conversation in the late 1940s a group of eminent physicists led by Enrico Fermi broached the possibility of future contact with extraterritorial life. As was typical of such chats, Fermi soon posed the now-famous "paradox" that bears his name. If most of the perhaps quarter-trillion stars just within our own galaxy—one of an estimated 100 billion trillion in the universe—appear to have a diverse range of planets, why was there no evidence yet of extraterritorial species? "Where are they?" Fermi wondered. Following Occam's razor, the most obvious answer to him was also, frankly, the least acceptable one for us. Fermi reasoned that, when all is said and done, perhaps there simply aren't any, or at least very few, highly advanced technological civilizations within our galaxy. This answer in turn raised its own questions. How could such an implausible, even counterintuitive, state of affairs be remotely logical? What might justify such strange reasoning? How could we be, in a word, potentially alone?

Many answers to "Fermi's paradox" are possible. One stands out here. As the astrobiologist Adam Frank (2015) has speculated: "Maybe we're not the only ones to hit a sustainability bottleneck. Maybe not everyone—maybe no one—makes it to the other side." As various forms of life steadily develop in cognitive and technological capabilities, from bacteria to bioengineers in our case, they cannot escape the universal laws of thermodynamics, especially the core reality of entropy, which traces the gradual transformation of order into disorder. We cannot burn a piece of coal, scatter sulfur dioxide into our fragile atmosphere, and then ever get the same work out of it again, whatever novel technologies await us (Rifkin, 1989). All forms of life harvest resources in search of energy. Over time they create entropic disorder, accelerating in loco ecological degradation long before they can self-

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Dierwechter, *Urban Sustainability through Smart Growth*, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54448-9_1

correct through reflexive eco-adaptations or extraplanetary colonization. They hit the sides of their own bottles. And so, they vanish before they can communicate their presence to distant others like us.

This thesis of galactic silence sounds rather like the gloomiest of science fictions. It may well be. But any sober rendering of history over the past 50,000 years or so, as Yuval Harari (2015, p. 74) has brilliantly contended, "makes Homo sapiens look like an ecological serial killer." Indeed, the destruction of the planet's natural resources and ecological systems predates the current certainty of anthropogenic global warming; the ozone "thinning" first observed in the 1980s; the carcinogenic pesticides of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* in the early 1960s; the "Dust Bowl" of the mid-1930s—that vast, terrifying wasteland "more nothing than something" (Egan, 2006); or the near-extermination of the American bison in the nineteenth century.

In truth, these are just recent stories, which call into question overly romantic retrospectives of various preindustrial societies. Harari notes, for example, that when hunter-gatherers first entered Australia 45,000 years ago, "they transformed the Australian ecosystem beyond recognition" (p. 72), principally through the annihilation of the continent's megafauna. Something eerily similar happened in the Americas 12–14,000 years ago. "North America lost thirty-four out of its forty-seven genera of large animals. South America lost fifty out of sixty" (p. 79). More depressing still, all this prehistoric carnage was wrought by only a few million "sapiens" on the entire planet, without deploying the most rudimentary agricultural economies and well before the advent of even the smallest of "cities" in ancient Sumer and adjacent regions (Lees, 2015). We have simply gotten more skilled at destruction.

Admittedly, framing the global crisis of unsustainability from such an ancient, profoundly existential perspective initially seems too far removed from the quotidian questions that occupy contemporary urban studies, human geography, and regional spatial planning—the disciplinary hearths of this book. Yet Frank not only warns that the search for sustainability is constrained by a (very) fast-narrowing passage in time. Mercifully, he suggests it still remains possible, if hardly easy or obvious. Our efforts, though, are still experimental and inchoate, sometimes just probes in the dark. In consequence, thinking harder about the nature of cities and their future development; about their past, current, and possible spatialities; about their role in harvesting and/or recycling vast amounts of energy as they transform various natures into economies and societies (and make vast amounts of waste)—all these resolutely urban themes actually constitute the essential concerns in how we might successfully locate and then politically negotiate the "bottleneck" to "the other side" of human history. Cities are increasingly located at what Levine and Yanarella (2011) call the "fulcrum" of the global search for a sustainable order. Or as I would put it here, we must solve the problem of the city in order to pass through the narrow bottleneck of entropic disorder.

1.2 Intercurrence as Description . . . and Explanation

This book explores urban sustainability within "Greater Seattle"—the four-county Central Puget Sound city-region in Washington State, USA (Fig. 1.1)—through a series of regulatory, discursive, and investment strategies and forms of territorial governance associated more narrowly with the "smart growth" planning doctrine. Why focus on smart growth to explore urban sustainability? The main answer is that for many (if not all) observers of US metropolitan affairs in recent years, the smart growth movement has been and largely remains today, "the most prominent planning approach for sustainable land use and urban development" (Green Leigh & Hoelzel, 2012, p. 90). Accordingly, this book investigates the search for urban sustainability by reflecting on the kinds of "spaces that smart growth makes" (Dierwechter, 2014, p. 1), drawing on and extending earlier themes that I and others have advanced about the emerging spatialities of city-regional planning across Greater Seattle (Carlson & Dierwechter, 2007; Dierwechter, 2008, 2010, 2013a, 2013b, 2014; Dierwechter & Coffey, 2010; Dierwechter & Wessells, 2013; Modarres & Dierwechter, 2015) as well as other major US regions (e.g. McEvoy, Gibbs, & Longhurst, 2000; Tretter, 2013).

The connections I seek to forge in the coming chapters between smart growth, which concomitantly tries to limit sprawl and revitalize cities, and the wider production of metropolitan space reflect, I hope, a tradition of research marked out by figures like Alan Altshuler (1965), Robert Beauregard (1990), Bent Flyvbjerg (1998), David Perry (1995), Margo Huxley (2008), and Susan Fainstein (2005), among many others. In my view, each of these scholars has explored "how planning shapes urban form, the political and economic forces constraining planning, and the distributional effects of planning decisions" (Fainstein, 2005, p. 122). Put another way, these scholars have each attempted, albeit in different ways, to address Phil Cooke's (1983, p. 9) argument that theories of planning—of which smart growth is one—should not be separated from theories of socio-spatial development shaped historically by political, cultural, and economic imperatives. Planning is a geopolitical-economic project.

The core argument developed in this book is that smart growth is spatially variegated across metropolitan space—i.e., unevenly taken up and differently deployed—because of what the American Political Development ("APD") scholars, Karen Orren and Steven Skowronek (1996), call "intercurrence." In simple terms, intercurrence refers to the coexistence of "multiple orders," typically originating at different times and in tension with one another at any given site (Stone and Whelan, 2009, p. 99). Intercurrence usefully captures, I shall repeatedly suggest, the constant "abrading" in metropolitan space produced by what Orren and Skowronek (2004) call "non-simultaneity" and "other-directness" of politico-economic institutions informed by various cultural values, societal norms, and overall ideals at different times. Hence political challenges in society like the search for urban sustainability reflect "engagements throughout the polity of the different norms embedded in institutions" (Orren and Skowronek, 1996, p. 112).



Fig. 1.1 Greater Seattle, Washington

Such thinking has influenced urban studies for many years (Burns, Evans, Gamm, & McConnaughy, 2009; Ethington, 1993). More recently, though, Richardson Dilworth (2009, p. 2) has redeployed APD themes to argue broadly that cities themselves "are exemplary [places] in their embodiment of multiple and contradictory authority relations." Clarence Stone (2015) has also embraced APD to address the limitations of urban regime theory. In short, APD is experiencing a

revival in several key disciplines within the urban studies family, but not yet urban geography and spatial planning as much as urban politics and political and cultural history.

That should change. This book's geographical application of intercurrence to planning signals its relevance, in my view, to theoretical (re)interpretations of the still-emerging spaces of urban sustainability, in general, and the empirical impacts of city-regional smart growth programs, in particular (Dierwechter, 2013b). Intercurrence challenges the supposition that we study smart growth only or always as a neoliberal, market-based adaptation of welfarist, growth management techniques *tout court*. Here my argument is informed by Stephen Amberg's (2008, p. 164) more general insight that "in the decentralized American polity, many combinations of state-market relationships have emerged." Territorial efforts by different kinds of state systems to institute smart(er) growth are "geopolitical" efforts to *forge policy converge*nce across fragmented jurisdictions. Yet this effort is shaped always by the intercurrence of multiple orders, by multi-scaled modes of governance typically incongruent *and in constant tension*, including past, present, and future(ist) discourses and regulatory practices.

Smart growth in search of urban sustainability, so theorized, is typically an inchoate effort to territorialize specific kinds of state-market relations within metropolitan regions as well as across them. One implication of this claim is that different types of models, about which we still know very little, are likely developing across the "varied planning policy landscapes" of the USA (Pendall & Puentes, 2008).

Intercurrence ultimately insists, in other words, on multiple "temporalities" and "layered" policy and material spatialities. Smart growth, already syncretic as theory, is shaped in practice by various ordering arrangements, including newer arrangements emerging from the state's legitimate concerns for the complex ecology rather than only tax-paying location of new rounds of growth, as important as this may be. As "carriers" of multiple, often contradictory orders through historic time and across metropolitan space and territorial scale, city-regional regimes experience friction due to their multi-institutional, other-directed, non-simultaneously developed nature. Their many competing institutions—i.e., "rules, organizations, laws, or practices that inform or delimit the actions that persons can take"—*each* carry forward objectives instilled at their time of origin, infusing the broader metropolitan environment with their own "durable norms and predictable rules of action" (Orren and Skowronek, 1996, p. 111). Put more lyrically, the inherited and embryonic "rules, organizations, laws and practices" that collectively seek to occasion (or indeed occlude) urban sustainability through smart growth are rather like differently sized oars on a creaky and overcrowded boat with no accepted captain struggling at the eleventh hour to move forward in rainy weather.

1.3 Rain Without Thunder? Greater Seattle as Smarter City-Region

The metaphor of rain is apt here. In much of the academic and practitioner literatures, the *city* of Seattle—a rainy municipality of 675,000 people—is represented as a major leader in the search for more sustainable forms of urban development and sociopolitical change (Fitzgerald, 2011; Portney, 2003). Whether or not this reputation is justified is increasingly debated, a theme I consider throughout this book (Abel, White, & Clauson, 2015; Dierwechter, 2013a; Fowler, 2015; Gardheere & Grant, 2014; Gregory, 2015; Karvonen, 2011; Klingle, 2007; Robinson, Newell, & Marzluff, 2005; Ward, 2012). Is progress in Seattle just "rain without thunder," as Frederick Douglas once wrote?

Moreover, Seattle per se comprises less than one-fifth of the total population of the Seattle "global city-region" (Scott, 2001), which I alternatively refer to in this book as Greater Seattle. In itself this is not a problem. We should study urban sustainability at multiple scales, including for instance the more intimate architectural scale of specific buildings or indeed individual cities like Seattle. But there are three main reasons why widening our geographical vision of urban sustainability to the city-region, or metropolitan region in this case, makes particular sense here (cf. Benner & Pastor, 2012).

The first reason, as the late Ed Soja (2000) and many others have argued, is that people do not really live in municipalities. They live in multinodal city-regions (Calthorpe & Fulton, 2001). Labor and housing markets, inter-firm linkages, transport flows, environmental resources (air, water, waste, etc.), etc. all transgress politically meaningful (but functionally artificial) municipal-scale borders (Pastor, Benner, & Matsuoka, 2009). People and nature are bound together in metropolitan-wide space-economies shaped by various assemblages of firms, workers, infrastructures, markets, and socio-ecologies (Etherington & Jones, 2009). Soja (2000) described this new reality for many years in several key books and articles as "the regionality of cityspace," by which he meant the extraordinary remaking of contemporary urban life since the 1970s or so into "larger polycentric regional system[s] of interacting nodal settlements" (p. 16). This is how we should see the present case study. Figure 1.2 below, for instance, illustrates Soja's "regionality of cityspace" through select commute flows between different kinds of populated places across Greater Seattle. Such regionality also could be expressed equally through housing markets, policy compacts, ecological connections, and especially high-tech industrial production complexes.

The second reason is related to the first. Dynamic, fast-growing cities are increasingly being reshaped into policy regions from above by what Martin Jones (1997) termed the "spatial selectively of the state." Here the state can mean either the national level and/or, in the US context, the subnational state (Florida, California, Maryland, Oregon, etc.). From this supra-local perspective, economically successful places that are strongly associated with high-tech accumulation, global trade, and/or metropolitan competitiveness—i.e., "trendy" conurbations like

Fig. 1.2 Select city-regional commute flows across Greater Seattle, 2014

Seattle, Austin, San Francisco, Denver, and Boston—are increasingly favored by "state rescaling" in the political-economies of advanced globalization (Brenner, 1997, 2004). For example, McCauley and Murphy (2013) have recently shown how the state of Massachusetts has tried to rescale land governance away from the "micropolitics" of local municipalities in the Greater Boston region via the smart growth doctrine; in part, the motivation is to support high-tech industries and

various non-basic sectors like real estate. What the state most "fears," they conclude, "is the potential collapse of the region's knowledge economy" (p. 2864).

The third reason in that smart growth—the policy focus of this book—is a *regional* planning movement, not only in academic theory (Daniels, 2001; Song, 2012) but also in local policy practice (Prosperity Partnership, 2012; Puget Sound Regional Council, 2009; Robinson et al., 2005). The state of Washington has spent the past 25 years constructing a new planning regime informed by smart growth theory, even as the federal government has strengthened metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) like the Puget Sound Regional Council over the past several decades.

According to one Seattle-based think tank, the 1990/1991 Washington Growth Management Act (GMA), which reappears many times in this book, encourages smart growth principles dedicated to urban sustainability by, inter alia, mandating that new growth is shunted into well-serviced areas through tools like regionally coordinated urban growth boundaries that require policy coordination. In theory, the GMA, along with other policies, further promotes affordable housing goals, the preservation of critical areas, enhanced transportation choices, and more predictable and efficient permit decisions. These goals are associated with the strategic pursuit of sustainability, even as researchers debate their merits in various territorial settings and policy environments (Abels, 2014; Anguelovski & Carmin, 2011; Badshah, 1996; Bobker, 2006; Bulkeley, 2006; Cochrane, 2010; Cowell & Owens, 2006; De Carvalho, Carden, & Armitage, 2009; Echenique, Hargreaves, Mitchell, & Namdeo, 2012; Feoick, Portney, Bae, & Berry, 2013; Fitzgerald & Motta, 2012; Foster, 2008; Herrschel, 2013; Krueger & Agyeman, 2005; Krueger & Gibbs, 2008; Macdonald & Keil, 2012) .

When we map the spaces that smart growth makes, particularly with respect to urban sustainability, we benefit from a multilevel, regional-scale sensitivity. We place even the largest and most important cities in the analytical context of city-regional development patterns and policy geographies (Mossner & Miller, 2015). Understanding Seattle's "city" geographies, in other words, demands a relational engagement with its wider "regional" development patterns, and vice versa. Seattle cannot explain its internal "trait" geographies without this commitment (Roy, 2009). Nor for that matter can Tacoma, Bellevue, Everett, Redmond, Renton, tribes, King County, University Place, Pierce County, key ports, or any number of other places that together constitute the global city-region of Greater Seattle. Intercurrence, I repeatedly argue, helps us to describe, explain, and critique the spaces of regional planning as the multitiered and institutionalized state seeks to forge a new kind of sustainable urban order.

1.4 Structure of the Book

The forthcoming chapters explore these claims and themes in greater detail. In brief, Chap. 2 broadly presents a critical review of the now vast literatures on urban sustainability and smart growth, respectively. Here contending political economies of urban sustainability are outlined, while the normative planning theory of smart growth is also elaborated. Chapter 3 presents the book's central theoretical approach, highlighting core concepts and themes within the field of American Political Development (APD), notably intercurrence, and arguing for their relevance in understanding the emerging geographies of smart growth policies and projects in city-regions like Greater Seattle. After a discussion of the book's mixed-methods approach in Chap. 4, which includes a review of essential data sources and modes of analysis, Chap. 5 examines the historical geography of regional development in Greater Seattle, tracing central problems of consequence like segregation, accumulation, resiliency, technocracy, and social justice from the nineteenth century to present times. The core empirical charters that follow on growth problems and management plans (Chap. 6), housing and sprawl (Chap. 7), and mobility and labor (Chap. 8) seek to offer fresh geographical interpretations of how smart growth theories are practiced in key policy arenas and places around the region. The general conclusions in Chap. 9 recapitulate the book's key claims and contributions, identify limitations, and reflect on future problems for research.

References

Abel, T., White, J., & Clauson, S. (2015). Risky business: Sustainability and industrial land use across Seattle's gentrifying riskscape. *Sustainability*, *7*(11), 15718–15753.

Abels, M. (2014). Strategic alignment for the new normal: Collaboration, sustainability, and deliberation in local government across boundaries. *State and Local Government Review*, *46* (3), 211–218. doi:10.1177/0160323x14551179.

Altshuler, A. (1965). *The city planning process*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Amberg, S. A. (2008). Liberal market economy or composite regime? Institutional legacies and labor market policy in the United States. *Polity 40*(2), 164–196.

Anguelovski, I., & Carmin, J. (2011). Something borrowed, everything new: Innovation and institutionalization in urban climate governance. *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*, *3*(3), 169–175. doi:10.1016/j.cosust.2010.12.017.

Badshah, A. (Ed.). (1996). *Our urban future: New paradigms for equity and sustainability*. London: Zed.

Beauregard, R. (1990). Bringing the city back in. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *56*(2), 210–215.

Benner, C., & Pastor, M. (2012). *Just growth: Inclusion and prosperity in America's metropolitan regions*. London: Routledge.

Bobker, M. F. (2006). Infrastructure conundrums: Investment and urban sustainability. *Technology in Society*, *28*(1–2), 125–135. doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2005.10.003.

Brenner, N. (1997). State territorial restructuring and the production of spatial scale: Urban and regional planning in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1960–1990. *Political Geography*, *16* (4), 273–306.

Brenner, N. (2004). Urban governance and the production of New State Spaces in Western Europe, 1960-2000. *Review of International Political Economy*, *11*(3), 447–488. doi:10.2307/4177507.

Bulkeley, H. (2006). Urban sustainability: learning from best practice? *Environment & Planning A*, *38*(6), 1029–1044. doi:10.1068/a37300.

Burns, N., Evans, L., Gamm, G., & McConnaughy, C. (2009). Urban politics in the state arena. *Studies in American Political Development*, *23*(1), 1–22.

Calthorpe, P., & Fulton, W. (2001). *The regional city*. Washington, DC: Island Press.

Carlson, T., & Dierwechter, Y. (2007). Effects of urban growth boundaries on residential development in Pierce County, Washington. *The Professional Geographer*, *59*(2), 209–220.

Cochrane, A. (2010). Exploring the regional politics of 'sustainability': Making up sustainable communities in the South-East of England. *Environmental Policy and Governance*, *20*(6), 370–381. doi:10.1002/eet.556.

Cooke, P. (1983). *Theories of planning and spatial development*. London: Hutchinson.

Cowell, R., & Owens, S. (2006). Governing space: Planning reform and the politics of sustainability. *Environment and Planning. C, Government & Policy*, *24*(3), 403–421. doi:10.1068/c0416j.

Daniels, T. (2001). Smart growth: A new American approach to regional planning. *Planning Practice and Research*, *16*(3–4), 271–279.

De Carvalho, S. C. P., Carden, K. J., & Armitage, N. P. (2009). Application of a sustainability index for integrated urban water management in Southern African cities: Case study comparison—Maputo and Hermanus. *Water SA*, *35*, 144–151.

Dierwechter, Y. (2008). *Urban growth management and its discontents: Promises, practices and geopolitics in US city-regions*. New York: Palgrave.

Dierwechter, Y. (2010). Metropolitan geographies of US climate action: Cities, suburbs and the local divide in global responsibilities. *Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning*, *12*(1), 59–82.

Dierwechter, Y. (2013a). Smart city-regionalism across Seattle: Progressing transit nodes in labor space? *Geoforum*, *49*, 139–149.

Dierwechter, Y. (2013b). Smart growth and state territoriality. *Urban Studies*, *50*(11), 2275–2292.

Dierwechter, Y. (2014). The spaces that smart growth makes: Sustainability, segregation, and residential change across greater Seattle. *Urban Geography*, *35*(5), 691–714. doi:10.1080/02723638.2014.916905.

Dierwechter, Y., & Coffey, W. (2010). Assessing the effects of neighborhood councils on urban policy and development: The example of Tacoma, Washington. *The Social Science Journal*, *47*(3), 71–491.

Dierwechter, Y., & Wessells, A. (2013). The uneven localisation of climate action in metropolitan Seattle. *Urban Studies*, *50*(7), 1368–1385.

Dilworth, R. (Ed.). (2009). *The city in American political development*. New York: Routledge.

Echenique, M. H., Hargreaves, A. J., Mitchell, G., & Namdeo, A. (2012). Growing cities sustainably does urban form really matter? *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *78*(2), 121–137.

Egan, T. (2006). *The worst hard time*. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Etherington, D., & Jones, M. (2009). City-regions: New geographies of uneven development and inequality. *Regional Studies*, *43*(2), 247–265. doi:10.1080/00343400801968353.

Ethington, P. J. (1993). Urban constituencies, regimes, and policy innovation in the progressive era: An analysis of Boston, Chicago, New York City, and San Francisco. *Studies in American Political Development*, *7*(2), 275–315.

Fainstein, S. (2005). Planning theory and the city. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *25*(2), 121–130. doi:10.1177/0739456x05279275.

Feoick, R., Portney, K. E., Bae, J., & Berry, J. (2013). Governing local sustainability: Agency venues and business group access. *Urban Affairs Review, 50*(2), 157–179, 1–13. doi: 10.1177/1078087413501635.

Fitzgerald, J. (2011). *Emerald cities*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Fitzgerald, J., & Motta, M. (Eds.). (2012). *Cities and sustainability: Critical conceps in urban studies, Volume I*. London: Routledge.
Flyvbjerg, B. (1998). *Power and rationality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Foster, J. (2008). *The sustainability mirage*. London: Earthscan.
Fowler, C. (2015). Segregation as a multiscalar phenomenon and its impliciations for neighborhood-scale research: The case of South Seattle, 1990-2010. *Urban Geography*, *37* (1), 1–25. doi:10.1080/02723638.2015.1043775.
Frank, A. (2015). Is climate disaster inevitable? *New York Times*.
Gardheere, U., & Grant, J. (2014, September 29). Seattle Housing Authority rent proposal would hurt working poor. *Seattle Times*.
Green Leigh, N., & Hoelzel, B. (2012). Smart growth's blindside: Sustainable cities need productive urban industrial land. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *78*(1), 87–103.
Gregory, J. (2015). Seattle's left coast formula. *Dissent*, *62*(1), 64–70.
Harari, Y. N. (2015). *Sapiens: A brief history of humankind* (First U.S. ed.). New York: Harper.
Herrschel, T. (2013). Sustainability and competitiveness: Can smart growth square the circle? *Urban Studies*, *50*(11), 2332–2348.
Huxley, M. (2008). Planning, space, and government. In K. Cox, M. Low, & J. Robinson (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of political geography*. SAGE: Los Angeles.
Jones, M. (1997). Spatial selectivity of the state: The regulationist enigma and local struggles over economic governance. *Environment & Planning A*, *29*, 831–864.
Karvonen, A. (2011). *Politics of urban runoff: Nature, technology, and the sustainable city*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Klingle, M. (2007). *Emerald city: An environmental history of Seattle*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Krueger, R., & Agyeman, J. (2005). Sustainability schizophrenia or "actually existing sustainabilities?" Toward a broader understanding of the politics and promise of local sustainability in the US. *Geoforum*, *36*(4), 410–417. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2004.07.005.
Krueger, R., & Gibbs, D. (2008). 'Third Wave' sustainability? Smart growth and regional development in the USA. *Regional Studies*, *42*(9), 1263–1274.
Lees, A. (2015). *The city: A world history*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Levine, R. S., & Yanarella, E. J. (2011). *The city as fulcrum of global sustainability*. London: Anthem Press.
Macdonald, S., & Keil, R. (2012). The Ontario Greenbelt: Shifting the scales of the sustainability fix? *The Professional Geographer*, *64*(1), 125–145.
McCauley, S. M., & Murphy, J. T. (2013). Smart growth and the scalar politics of land management in the Greater Boston Region, USA. *Environment & Planning A*, *45*(12), 2852–2867. doi:10.1068/a45307.
McEvoy, D., Gibbs, D. C., & Longhurst, J. W. S. (2000). City-regions and the development of sustainable energy-supply systems. *International Journal of Energy Research*, *24*(3), 215–237.
Modarres, A., & Dierwechter, Y. (2015). Infrastructure and the shaping of American urban geography. *Cities*, *47*, 81–94.
Mossner, S., & Miller, B. (2015). Sustainability governance in one place? Dilemmas of sustainability governance in the Freiburg metropolitan region. *Regions*, *300*, 18–21.
Orren, K., & Skowronek, S. (1996). Institutions and intercurrence: Theory building in the fullness of time Nomos XXXVII. In I. Shapiro & R. Hardin (Eds.), *Political order*. Nomos 38. New York: New York University Press.
Orren, K., & Skowronek, S. (2004). *The search for American political development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pastor, M., Benner, C., & Matsuoka, M. (2009). *This could be the start of something big?* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Pendall, R., & Puentes, R. (2008). Land-use regulations as territorial governance in US metropolitan areas. *Boletín de la A.G.E*, *46*, 181–206.

Perry, D. C. (1995). Making space, planning as a mode of thought. In H. Liggett & D. C. Perry (Eds.), *Spatial practices: Critical explorations in social/spatial theory*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Portney, K. E. (2003). *Taking sustainability seriously: Economic development, the environment, and quality of life in American cities*. Boston: MIT Press.

Prosperity Partnership. (2012). *Regional economic strategy for the Central Puget Sound Region economy*. Seattle: Puget Sound Regional Council.

Puget Sound Regional Council. (2009). *VISION 2040*. Seattle: Puget Sound Regional Council.

Rifkin, J. (1989). *Entropy* (2nd ed.). New York: Bantom Books.

Robinson, L., Newell, J. P., & Marzluff, J. M. (2005). Twenty-five years of sprawl in the Seattle region: Growth management responses and implications for conservation. *Landscape and Urban Planning*, *71*(1), 51–72.

Roy, A. (2009). The 21st-century metropolis: New geographies of theory. *Regional Studies*, *43*(6), 819–830. doi:10.1080/00343400701809665.

Scott, A. (Ed.). (2001). *Global city-regions: Trends, theory, policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Soja, E. (2000). *Postmetropolis*. London: Sage.

Song, Y. (2012). Suburban sprawl and smart growth. In R. Weber & R. Crane (Eds.), *Handbook on urban planning*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Stone, C. (2015). Reflections on regime politics: From governing coalition to urban political order. *Urban Affairs Review*, *51*(1), 101–137. doi:10.1177/1078087414558948.

Stone, C., & Whelan, R. (2009). Through the glass darkly: the once and future study of urban politics In R. Dilworth (Ed.), *The city in American political development*. New York: Routledge

Tretter, E. (2013). Contesting sustainability: 'Smart growth' and the redevelopment of Austin's Eastside. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *37*(1), 297–310.

Ward, M. (2012). *The production of value: A study of urbanism in South Lake Union, Seattle* (Masters thesis). University of Washington, Seattle. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1035151582?accountid=14784

Chapter 2
Review: GeoPolitical Economies of Planning Space

There will be no sustainable world without sustainable cities.

—Herbert Girardet (1999, p. 8)

2.1 Introduction

Whether approached as urbanizing sustainability or sustaining urbanization, the abstract concept of "urban sustainability" is a multidimensional aspiration. So in the American context, as elsewhere, it relies on more familiar (and concrete) governance arenas for political and policy support as well as pragmatic implementation at the level of individual programs and projects. Some of the most important of these arenas are urban planning systems ostensibly focused on comprehensive socio-spatial management problems, including the multilevel coordination of territorial development strategies that seek to achieve, sometimes in isolation from one another, various economic, ecological, and social objectives over relatively long periods of time. For reasons that are not entirely clear, smart growth has emerged since the mid-1990s as "the most prominent planning framework theory for sustainable land use and urban development" (Green Leigh & Hoelzel, 2012, p. 88). Its practical importance demands scholarly attention.

In this chapter, I consider various ways in which urban sustainability might be differently understood and contested, focusing on three distinct traditions of political-economy that provide alternative theorizations. I then turn to a more specific analysis of smart growth as a state-directed if market-influenced regional planning strategy to limit sprawl and revitalize central cities and older suburbs, by far its most prominent territorial goals and spatial policy ambitions. Following Phil Cooke's (1983) lead, I argue that we need to integrate the planning theory of smart growth with the wider pursuit of urban sustainability as a contested geopolitical project. Such a theoretical commitment, I further suggest, might help us to describe and to explain what I call in Chap. 2 the (un)sustainable geographies of sustainability across Greater Seattle.

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Dierwechter, *Urban Sustainability through Smart Growth*, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54448-9_2

2.2 Urban Sustainability

We are an urban species, and we are in trouble. We may already be in the midst of propagating a "sixth extinction" in the earth's long history (Kolbert, 2014), with the unnatural self-termination of our own species and the subsequent survival of evolved rats as one scientifically plausible scenario (pp. 104–107). So advancing *urban* sustainability is far and away the most important challenge facing humankind both now and in the coming few decades. Herbert Girardet (2002, p. 9) puts the problem this way:

> Humanity is involved in an unprecedented experiment: we are turning ourselves into an urban species. Large cities, not villages or towns, are becoming our main habitat. The cities of the 21st century are where human destiny will be played out and where the future of the biosphere will be determined. There will be no sustainable world without sustainable cities. Can we make a world of cities viable in the long run—environmentally, socially as well as economically?

The enormity of this last question and what amounts to the almost unfathomable stakes involved, i.e., life on earth as presently understood, means that urban sustainability must be both imagined and implemented through an array of programs, policies and projects; it must incorporate all sorts of actors in various kinds of places who operate resourcefully at multiple territorial scales through a diverse range of strategic approaches and forms of disciplinary knowledge. This much we know.

Urban sustainability is, in consequence, much bigger than community planning issues or urban development problems like affordable housing, green jobs, and smart energy grids. Urban sustainability is, in its largest philosophical sense, a profound aspirational journey that, strictly speaking, nowhere actually exists at present—albeit, the same might also be said of the (still unrealized and "thin") doctrine of political democracy. When simply stated, after all, democracy refers to a system of government in which power is vested in the people, who rule either directly or through freely elected representatives. But questions about democracy are unresolved. What is power and how does it work? How is any given society organized socially, economically, and culturally? Is the USA today a democracy, so defined, if "freely elected" representatives spend most of their time chasing large donors, a process facilitated by the US Supreme Court; if, as Bernie Sanders quipped in his failed 2016 presidential campaign, "Congress does not regulate Wall Street. Wall Street regulates Congress"? Democracy's actually existing disappointments and radical imperfections, however concerning, do not ultimately expunge its theoretical desirability as a project worth pursuing. Something normatively similar holds for sustainability, notwithstanding its elusive conceptual nature, its "not-always well-understood mix" of goals that, for better or worse, offers what Yvonne Rydin calls "the prospect of a very different world" (Rydin, 2010, p. 1).

What, then, is urban sustainability? The idea is multidimensional. Narrowed to ecological criteria, as Slavin (2011) notes, sustainability refers to the biophysical capacity of the natural world to endure. This relates closely to older notions of

natural preservation or outright protection from industrialized society. Here the core question is: how can various ecosystems remain diverse, resilient, and productive over relatively long periods of time? From an economic point of view, however, sustainability asks more anthropologically how our economic systems can be managed so that we might live off the dividends of our resources (Repetto, 1986). This economic perspective "peoples" the ecological discourse, while an explicit sociocultural standpoint in turn insists normatively that sustainability should be concerned most directly with increasing the economic standard of living of the poor (Barbier, 1987, pp. 101–102).

Urban sustainability: The economic transformation of nature into ecologically resilient, democratically vibrant, and socially just societies whose daily spaces of production and reproduction reflect the material and immaterial requirements of a now predominantly urbanized and interconnected human population.

What, moreover, is *to be* sustained? (A different kind of) globalized urban society? If so, sustainability is about how to change within the context of constancy. And hence from an explicitly metropolitan perspective, where ecologies, economies and socio-cultures concentrate and co-mingle in complex socio-natural assembles, sustainability implicates multifaceted processes of economic, social, and political *transformation*, especially within and through the protean spaces of larger urban regions, where a plurality of the world's people increasingly now live (Talen, 2012). Sustainability as metropolitan space encompasses new forms and modalities of governance, economies, and built environments; new systems of transportation, energy, waste, and water use; and motivating if not always driving all these changes, new circuits of production, consumption and distribution. In short, conceived as an urban development(al) process of deliberate(d) transformation, the increasingly urbanized search for global sustainability is about building new kinds of human settlement spaces on the now largely urbanized and globalized surface of the earth (Vojnovic, 2012).

Since at least the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987, urban sustainability has been imagined as a creative, engaged, capable, multitiered polity that has concomitantly achieved, *or at least seeks to achieve over time*, economic vitality, ecological resiliency, and social equity (Fitzgerald, 2011). When scaled up globally with Girardet, sustainability is a future world of environmentally, socially, and economically viable cities, not a future world without such cities. Put another way, sustainability is not merely a system in which power is vested in the people, but a future condition-of-becoming wherein now mostly urbanized people(s) with vested powers over their collective shared life establish how to distribute new rounds of wealth justly without degrading the natural foundations of their multi-scaled economy.



Fig. 2.1 Alternative "political economies" of urban sustainability

Is such an ideal theoretically coherent? Can and do the various meta-components work together synergistically? Can they be balanced, as planners like to contend, or intertwined and co-constituted in specific project, programs and policies? If so, how? What *is* equitable—and who decides? Markets? Parliaments? Neighbors? Do we still need (capitalist) economic vitality or instead a different steady-state economy of de-growth? How can different polities, at different territorial scales, work together institutionally if they also contend for natural resources, political influence, and meaningful social control over daily decision-making?

Much of the voluminous, cacophonous, multidisciplinary literature on urban sustainability—a topic too big for a single book—is essentially an extended effort to answer these kinds of crucial if difficult questions (Cowell & Owens, 2010; Foster, 2008; Gunder, 2006; Meadowcroft, 2011; Moldan, Janoušková, & Hák, 2012; Moore, 2010; Seghezzo, 2009; Vojnovic, 2012). In brief, though, three major interpretations of urban sustainability, foregrounding three different traditions of political economy, tend to characterize these various debates, at least within the urban social science family. As depicted in Fig. 2.1 below, these three major traditions or interpretations are state-progressive, radical-societal, and market-liberal. I now consider each of these traditions in turn before engaging the smart growth literature.

2.2.1 The State-Progressive Tradition

Urban sustainability can be interpreted as a progressive process of piecemeal but still persistent social change. When urban sustainability occurs *as* space, however measured, it arrives *in* time—the spatialization of historical progress; the ameliorative unfolding of several interrelated dynamics that literally replace an imperfect past with an enriched present, steadily if unevenly activating what Evans (2002,

p. 13) has called "the possibility of trajectories leading in the direction of greener livability." Manifested through studies of concrete projects and legible policy shifts, interpreting sustainability as progressive urban development means telling action stories about work at multiple territorial scales to confront the series of commonly experienced urban problems, read as imperfections in the kinds of flawed societies we currently experience.

The problems are numerous and interrelated. But a common core includes: social exclusion from livelihoods, post-metropolitan sprawl, overly privatized movement, open-ended consumption, and fragmented politics (Fitzgerald & Motta, 2012). As such, the urban emergence of sustainability ostensibly involves, among other things, initiatives to restructure metropolitan economies, remix land-uses and urban housing, reconstruct transportation systems, recycle waste streams, and reform city-regional governance (Buckley, 2014).

This reading of urban sustainability communicates green projects and urban-environmental policies in the language of the Enlightenment. However unfinished, piecemeal, under-resourced, impressionistic, or tentative the empirical evidence (e.g., permeable pavement, better light-bulbs, roundabouts, rain gardens), we are asked to take solace in the possibility of societal perfectibility, the rationality of public purpose, the cadence of deliberation and social learning. This is the underlying assumption, in my view, that informs some of the seminal treatments of urban sustainability in recent years, including Kent Portney's *Taking Sustainability Seriously*, Joan Fitzgerald's (2011) *Emerald Cities*, Phil McManus' (2005) *Vortex Cities to Sustainable Cities* and Steven Moore's (2007) comparative treatment of Portland, Frankfurt and Curitiba, *Alternative routes to the sustainable city*. Philosophically, these are resolutely progressive books. They are sober, but sanguine. As Tai-Chee Wong, Shaw, and Goh (2006) put it, urban sustainability is about charting the bid to effect permanent reform.

The permanent reform at issue in the progressive literature is post-liberal but not anti-modern. The central theme is to reshape our economic life, to redirect raw capitalist imperatives like private property, freedom of enterprise, self-interest, unfettered competition, limited government, and, most importantly, the ideology of "self-regulating" markets (Chamberlain, 1976[1959]; Friedman, 1962; Hayek, 1944). In this broad sense, the literature—and the urban activity it imagines and calls for—is an attack on the neo-liberalized version of the global political-economy advanced through market economies. The banner message is to embed markets back into strong democracy.

Arguably these aspirations reflect a specific kind of world anticipated by figures like Karl Polanyi (Jamie Peck, 2013). In *The Great Transformation* Polanyi (1944) called market-liberal principles "utopian" and therefore "impossible" (Block, 2001, p. xxv). *Contra* Friedrich Hayek's (1944) argument in *The Road to Serfdom*, Polanyi concluded from his study of economic history that markets do not "self-regulate" for very long without producing profound social and ecological damage (Lacher, 1999). Among other projects, Polanyi was trying to understand the economic origins of WWI, European fascism, and WWII—a time when European liberal democracy had either "failed" (Mazower, 1998, p. 403), or come very close

to it. Polanyi's nemesis, Friedrich Hayek, referred to communism and fascism as "a union of anti-capitalist[,] … radical and conservative socialisms," respectively. Polanyi was anti-fascist and anti-capitalist; but he was not a Marxist, rejecting for example the labor theory of value (Dale, 2010).

Impressed with markets, he nonetheless dismissed "the 'economistic prejudice' found in both the market liberalism of Ludwig von Mises and the communism of Karl Marx" (Carlson, 2006, p. 32). To him, the regression to fascism emerged not because of state economic planning, as Hayek had claimed, but because of market self-regulation. Unleashed from democratic controls, the liberalized market led to chaos (Somers & Block 2014). Polanyi felt that the problem was not the existence of markets, but their social management within broader political-economic systems at various territorial scales. As Fred Block (2001, p. xxxv) notes:

> The key step [for Polanyi] was to overturn the belief that social life should be subordinated to the market mechanism. Once free of this 'obsolete market mentality,' the path would be open to subordinate both national economies and the global economy to democratic politics. Polanyi saw Roosevelt's New Deal as a model of these future possibilities. Roosevelt's reforms meant that the US economy continued to be organized around markets and market activity but a new set of regulatory mechanisms now made it possible to buffer both human beings and nature from the pressures of markets.[1]

Contemporary progressives in turn believe, when thinking about city-nature relationships, that social institutions like self-regulating markets "do not spontaneously generate a sustainable development trajectory" (Meadowcroft, 2011, p. 17). Conjuring Polanyi's central theoretical premises, they interpret urban sustainability as a recurrent series of institution-shaping, policy-design and project-level efforts to *embed* market-liberalism back into re-democratized society by 'greening up' its metropolitan engines through a revived social realm. As Polanyi ultimately put it: "the idea of a self-adjusting market implie[s] a stark utopia. Such an institution [cannot] exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness." Progressives place their faith in a stronger form of ecological modernization and a related greening of the re-democratized state, key points I return to shortly.

[1] My interpretation of Polanyi sees him, with Somers and Block (2014), as closer to Keynes than Marx, emphasizing his work on socially embedded markets and economic democratization—all points Jamie Peck (2016) has taken up. But as Peck (p. 3) elsewhere cautions: "The extent to which Polanyi veered towards an anti-Marxist position, from midway through *The Great Transformation* into his postwar career … remains a controversial and contested one, since one can clearly be skeptical of teleological stage models and singular modes (and motors) of economic transformation—as indeed Polanyi was—without burning all bridges to varieties of Marxian political economy." Suffice to say that, like Weber, Polanyi is a complex theorist, subject to multiple renderings and deployments.

2.2.2 The Green–Red Radical Dissent of Post-capitalism

Various radical visions of urban sustainability, in contrast, question the supposition that embedded markets and institutions, even if appropriately reformed, can *ever* generate a sustainable development trajectory. The problem is *not* self-regulating markets or enervated democracy; the problem is the rapacious nature of capitalism itself. Whether or not socially embedded and democratically governed, capitalism's fundamental laws of geo-historical motion structurally necessitate the ever-deepening commodification and over-exploitation of nature and society. Rejecting the progressive, ameliorative, lexicon of "green growth," "natural capitalism," "Green New Deals," and especially "ecological modernization," John Barry (2012 p. 141), for example, envisions a "post-growth, anti-capitalist" paradigm that transcends rather than embeds current political-economies and institutional matrices of power. "In short," he writes in his conclusions,

> the common green critique of orthodox economics must become a clearer critique of capitalism itself, and relatedly its long-standing and evidence-based critique of economic growth must become a critique of capital accumulation. [. . .] Carbon-based capitalism is destroying the planet's life-support systems and is systematically liquidating them and calling it 'economic growth (ibid.).

The state-progressive's search for urban sustainability "is the pursuit of a mirage, the politics of never getting there" (Foster, 2008, p. ch 1).

These basic fault-lines are familiar to students of other kinds of problems. For example, they characterize the historiography on the Great Depression and the politico-economic effects of FDR's New Deal, which paradoxically Polanyi had once considered important as a possible model of embedded political-economy. Like most sympathetic treatments of urban sustainability, the dominant interpretation of the New Deal is (still) fundamentally progressive (Maher, 2008). Alan Brinkley (1990, p. 134) summarizes the era this way: "Reform might move in fits and starts, but move it did, pushing the nation inexorably out of the inferior past and towards an improving future. The New Deal was, therefore, part of a long tradition of reform—of popular democratic movements battling successfully against selfish private interests—that stretched back to the early days of the republic." The correspondence here is direct. Certain (progressive) city-regions may not have accomplished *everything*, moving 'in fits and starts,' but at least they are now taking sustainability seriously, standing out from others like green emeralds in an otherwise desolate policy desert.

The radical critique of the progressive search for urban sustainability mirrors the radical (New Left) critique of Schlesinger et al.'s view of the New Deal:

> the real story of modern American life [is] the decline of genuine democracy: the steady increase in the power of private, corporate institutions, the growing influence of those institutions over the workings of government, and hence the declining ability of people to control the circumstances of their work and their lives. Reform crusades . . . [have] served not to limit the power of "interests" and increase the power of the people. . . . They [are], instead, the products of corporate liberalism, through which powerful capitalist institutions [have] expanded and solidified their influence at the expense of the people (p. 136).

Originally developed in the tumult of the 1960s, these dissents reverberate with more contemporary critiques of urban sustainability as deeply compromised (Krueger & Agyeman, 2005; Macdonald & Keil, 2012). Here the most common projects and polices associated with urban sustainability may well be "reform crusades"; but they do not challenge or displace neoliberal capitalism; if anything, they ensure it (While, Jonas, & Gibbs, 2010). Put another way, urban sustainability is capitalism's newest spatial fix: Give the creative class their under-utilized bike paths and built-green, in-fill condos with adjacent solar-paneled parking bays just big enough for their electric SUVs. Following this logic, the urban face of sustainability has simply delivered on the evolving spatial imperatives of the globalizing urban economy, which increasingly call for "habitats" that attract and keep the skilled, innovative, but ultimately mobile butterflies that flutter through the convention centers, boutique squares, experiential museums, and various other cultural assets (Dierwechter, 2008). "Green policies" sanction empirically the theoretical claim that "urban entrepreneurialism itself might [now] depend on the active remaking or urban environments and ecologies" (While, Jonas, & Gibbs, 2004, p. 550).

Moving from outright critique to positive alternatives via deep-ecology politics, radical theorizations of urban sustainability emphasize extreme localism and small-scale neo-anarchistic possibilities for future society, delinking and de-commodifying "organic communities" of mutual self-help from broader global patterns of over-consumption and ongoing ecological exploitation (Giorel, 2004). While various efforts at "eco-cities" fall roughly (if superficially) into a "how-to" manual of this tradition (Caprotti, 2014; Silvestro & Silvestro, 2007), such places are irradiated philosophically by the neo-anarchist, eco-feminist, and/or social-ecological writings of, for instance, Carolyn Merchant (2005), Alan Carter (2010), and Murray Bookchin (1991). Drawing on Kropotkin and Fourier, Bookchin critiques the "ambiguities of freedom" that are based on modernity's tryptic of rationality, science, and technology in favor of a "post-scarcity" society (Brincat & Gerber, 2015). Carter links the state's reliance on a nature-exhausting process of "throughput accumulation" to its core role in maintaining (internal and external) security through a cash-hungry monopoly on the legitimated use of violence over/against people and territory (Paterson, Doran, & Barry, 2006). More recently, he has tried to sketch out an environmentalist political theory based on a new *entente* between Marxian and anarchist postulates of social change.

Within planning theory and urban studies, moreover, radical engagements with urban sustainability and especially social justice have recently emphasized Henri Lefebvre's original concerns with "the right to the city" (Purcell & Tyman, 2014; Samara, He, & Chen, 2013). Seeing sustainability as the economic transformation of nature into "socially just" forms of/in/through urban space, the "right to the city," as David Harvey (2003) notes, is not simply about individual liberty to access services regardless of property, but, more fundamentally, about collectively reconquering the common ownership over the means of transforming nature itself. Or as Basta (2016, p. 5) summarizes the key nexus: "urban transformation is an act of self-transformation."

2.2.3 *The Liberal Case: Unleashing Markets on Ecology*

From a third perspective, in contrast, the main goals associated with urban sustainability, including enhanced environmental protection and improved economic opportunity, are not advanced but damaged by political efforts to embed and shape much less eliminate self-regulating markets. Clapp and Dauvergne (2008, pp. 6–7) outline succinctly this "market liberal" view of sustainability. "The main drivers of environmental degradation according to market liberals," they write, "are a lack of economic growth, poverty, distortions and failures of the market, and bad policies." The problem is not unfettered markets, as the progressives and especially radicals maintain; the problem is the *absence* of a rationally unfettered and therefore more dynamic global capitalist order:

> Market liberals believe open and globally integrated markets promote growth, which in turn helps societies find ways to improve or repair environmental conditions. To achieve these goals, market liberals call for policy reforms to liberalize trade and investment, foster specialization, and reduce government subsidies that distort markets and waste resources. . .. Governments are encouraged to use market-based tools—for example, environmental taxes or tradable pollution permits—to correct situations of market failure (ibid.).

At the scale of the global community, a "liberal internationalism" is premised on the "emancipatory utopia of free trade," where, in David Ricardo's original phrase, "the pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of the whole" (Mazower, 2012, p. 43). Scholarly treatments of such ideas include interventions that challenge dichotomous treatments of "markets vs. ecosystems" (Adler, 2000). Free-market environmentalists invoke Frederick Hayek, Ronald Coase, James Buchanan, Garrett Hardin, and Milton Freedman to reject the claim that (democratized) government action improves environmental quality. Fred Smith, for example, theorizes externalities like pollution not as market failures, but as "a failure to permit markets and create markets where they do not yet—or no longer–exist" (cited in Competitive Enterprise Institute, 1996, p. 3). Government power, democratic or otherwise, is bureaucratic and clumsy rather than discursively mediated and socially legitimated whereas "individual self-interest" harnesses, for him, an atomized world of individual-consumer and firm-producer "sovereignty." In Anderson and Leal's (2001, p. 12) phrase, public management of the environment is "economics without prices."

Channeling a long-line of market-liberal theorists, from Cobden to Von Mises to Hayek, Mark Pennington (2002, p. 187) expresses faith in this philosophical orientation in the urban planning arena, arguing that "far from extending the range of state activities, there should be a reduction in the role of social democratic planning and the extension of private markets." Accordingly, free-market environmentalists, in particular, and market-liberals more generally, stipulate that decisions about the (non-)uses and distribution of resources, ecological or otherwise, are better made in the economic arena rather than any political forum. In fact, the only

"politics" conjured is "an electorally determined succession that checks public interference in markets" (Evans, 2002, p. 4).

2.2.4 *Progressive Rejoinder(s): From "Weak" to "Strong" Eco-modernization*

Progressive theorists have pushed back against both critiques, but especially against market-liberal dogma. The market arena, they point out, fundamentally fails to capture any common good outside of individual wants and preferences. As Peter Self notes, "[e]conomic markets follow an instrumental logic whereby, under the right conditions, rational egoistic behavior is socially legitimated and acceptable.... In politics, by contrast, it is or was a general social belief that individuals should have some regard to the 'good of society' and not just their own private wants" (Self, cited in Beder, 1997, p. 101). Peter Evans (2002, p. 6) has made an even stronger case, linking the ongoing search for sustainability and livelihoods with more concrete "urban livability" doctrines that recognize the important role of markets, particularly in land, but that also rigorously reject "the triumphalist 'imaginary' in which minimalist markets are sufficient to maximize welfare and sustainability." As Evans sees it,

> In a neoliberal world, local and regional institutions become more interesting places to look for sources of alternative agency. Local governments have never had the same kind of market-constructing prerogatives that national governments enjoyed and have always been vulnerable to threats by investors to move to other cities or regions. Globalization may also have reduced the bargaining power of subnational political institutions in relation to capital, but [...] []local governments' admittedly more modest ability to shape market is more intact (pp. 7–8).

Though sympathetic with local-regionalist experimentation, state-progressives additionally critique (albeit more gently) the anarcho-radical cases of Bookchin, Carter and others as both unrealistic and overstated (Paterson et al., 2006). State-progressives see instead recent institutional changes in state form and legal-policy focus as a legitimately significant if still inchoate response to wider environmental movements and political concerns since the 1960s, if not earlier (Eckersley, 2004). This does not paper over many internal disagreements, particularly between proponents of the so-called "weak" vs. "strong" forms of ecological modernization—and thus varying "distances" between progressive and more radical traditions of ecological (geo)politics.

Certainly the umbrella concept of ecological modernization refers in general terms to how environmental problems "come to be framed as issues that are politically, economically and technologically solvable within the context of existing institutions and power structures and continued economic growth" (Bailey, Gouldson, & Newell, 2011, p. 683). As two of its early and most influential adherents freely admit, ecological modernization does not aim for a fundamentally different organization of capitalist society, but for modernization "with an

ecological twist" (Mol & Janicke, 2009)—or what Huber called "superindustrialisation," wherein "...the dirty and ugly industrial caterpillar will transform into a[n] ecological butterfly" through the adoption of improved technology (Murphy & Gouldson, 2000, p. 34). However, this line of analytical reasoning depends on how we interpret different generations of this still growing family of theories.

Most work on ecological modernization, circulating between detached analysis and normative prescription, stipulates that "change can and does occur from within the prevailing forms of industrial states and markets" (Warner, 2010a, 2010b, p. 540). Most also emphasizes gradual consensus rather than shock conflict, tradeoffs and uneven ruptures, perhaps reflecting the term's origins in German social theory in the early 1980s. "Weak" forms of ecological modernization, though, privilege discourses and practices of "enlightened self-interest," and are associated typically with new industrial practices by sectors in crisis or with improved eco-design and material efficiencies (Warner, 2010a, 2010b). Here ecological modernization means that efficiency adjustments *within industrialism*—called "dematerialization"—will eventually diffuse to wider, more fundamental forms of socio-political and economic change.

Put (a bit too) simply, money flows to those who reduce greenhouse gases or toxic pollutants, a message of "greenwashing" to radical critics that nonetheless prevails in mainstream (political and corporate) circles because it reverberates with win-win Brundtland-inspired versions of sustainability (Harvey, 1996, p. 378). "Don't drive less," one might exhort, "but drive a green car" (Bomberg & Super, 2009, p. 429). Economistic versions of this approach emphasize the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), wherein greater pollution from industrialized economies indicates dynamic new forms of accumulation that, in time, will invariably help to pay for a cleaner environment now demanded by (enriched) citizens increasingly wary of ecological risks.

Critics like Robyn Eckersley (2004) dismiss such "weak" versions of ecological modernization as "functionalist" and "deterministic." While dematerialization is a start, she holds, strong ecological modernization demands, at least in theory, the broader emergence of "green states" predicated firmly upon the constant institutional impacts of a "reflexivity" associated with socio-political processes of "learning, dialogue and agency" rather than with any simple diffusion of firm-level self-interest in dematerialization (Warner, 2010a, 2010b). Eckersley's model is normative and suggestive—though hopefully imminent—more than positive and explanatory. The "green state" at issue is predicated upon ecological democracy and a new form of sovereignty that might effectively displace both liberal democracy and neoliberal capitalism (Eckersley, 2006). Eckersley's effort to "reinstate the state" in green political theory assumes, however, that the transformation of the state's core concerns with territoriality, sovereignty, and especially accumulation, as discussed earlier, can be redirected to prioritize the achievement of urban sustainability (Backstrand & Kronsell, 2015).

2.3 Shifting Political Economies of Change

As "ideal models," each of these major traditions of political economy can be treated analytically but not as empirical equivalents in space or time. In reality, as numerous studies have substantiated for many decades (e.g., George, 1999; Keil, 2002), the growing power of global market-liberal actors and institutions since the late 1970s has reshaped the state-progressive tradition of political economy that is represented by Polanyi's desire for democratically embedded markets. Within geography, this work is subsumed under the broad rubric of urban neoliberalism (Didier, Morange, & Peyroux, 2013; Gunder, 2010; Hackworth, 2007; Parnell & Robinson, 2012; Peters, 2012). Figure 2.2 below visualizes this dynamic in the terms introduced first in Fig. 2.1.

Processes of the so-called neoliberalization (depicted by arrow 1) do not necessarily shrink the state in the manner held by classical liberal theorists, much less eliminate the state in toto as propounded by "anarcho-capitalists" like Murray Rothbard (1971). Rather the modern state's progressive qualities are reshaped by capital, particularly finance capital, around market rationalities and modes of governing. In theory, the resulting "neoliberal state" focuses on enclosure and the assignment of private property rights, privatization, deregulation, and constant efforts to ensure "competitive" environments. In practice, as David Harvey (2005) notes, constant state power is central to the reproduction of such conditions, which leads to many contradictions and tensions. (These include contradictions and tensions with previous state forms and institutional arrangements, a key point I come back to in Chap. 3 when discussing problems of "intercurrence.")

However, efforts to build various societies around neoliberal market logics, according to Polanyi, (eventually) create social and ecological conditions that



Fig. 2.2 Contending forces: geopolitical economies and the double movement

produce a sociopolitical backlash—or what he called the "double movement." This is depicted above by arrow 2. Fred Block (2008) summarizes the idea as follows:

> Particularly since 1980, the movement of laissez-faire has been in the ascendant in the form of 'neo-liberalism', 'market fundamentalism;' or the 'Washington consensus.' Yet at the same time, *at multiple levels of politics*–local, national, regional, and global—*we also see counter movements* that have sought to check, control, or modify the impact of market forces. And, in fact, there is considerable evidence that *business and finance 'need' some of these limits, especially regulatory initiatives*, to avoid destructive social, environmental, and economic consequences (p. 2, emphasis added).

Urban scholars have recently explored these claims, often with empirical reference to local planning and urban sustainability policies (Hefetz & Warner, 2004; Kantor, 2013; Warner, 2008). Nate McClintock (2014), for example, deploys Polanyi's theory of the double movement to reinterpret the complex politics of urban agriculture and sustainable food systems vis-à-vis hegemonic neoliberalism within Oakland, California. In her essay on the future of local government within the USA as a whole, Margaret Warner (2010a, 2010b, p. 145) argues even more directly that lack of cost savings and the loss of public values in market provision, "are prompting reversals in privatization, increases in regulation, and new approaches to government enterprise."

More generally, the global economic catastrophe in 2008 and the publication of Thomas Picketty's (2014) *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* arguably provide compelling broad-spectrum evidence for Polanyi's insights about the chaos of unregulated markets and the disruptive nature of capitalism. In the wake of the crisis, Picketty showed that income inequality, for example, does not eventually decline as capitalism matures, a view Kuznets had originally propounded in the 1950s with his famous "Kuznets Curve." While politics are treated as exogenous shocks to core economic dynamics, rather than constitutive of these dynamics, Picketty's book nonetheless suggests, in the spirit if hardly letter of Polanyi, the importance of re-democratized states in counteracting capitalism's tendencies towards inequality (Hopkins, 2014). In this sense, the role of the multi-scaled state in reconstructing politically the good society at various levels has returned to prominence.

2.4 Smart Growth

Narrowing this book's discussion to smart growth—indeed, "mapping" urban sustainability through planning for smart growth—does not necessarily narrow our core concerns with the key questions these broader debates occasion. Is smart growth part and parcel of state-progressive space, a new counter movement that checks, controls, or modifies the impact of market forces, or is it shaped decisively by neoliberalization and the demands for a "sustainability fix"? Are the new

metropolitan "spaces that smart growth makes" (Dierwechter, 2014), in Seattle and elsewhere, about carbon-based capitalism's need for "throughput accumulation," or is smart growth better understood as urbanism "with an ecological twist"? Let us turn now to a more specific discussion of smart growth with these questions in mind, focusing in particular on various planning debates as well as recent research that explore the emerging spatialities of smart growth as an important new strategy of green city-regionalism.

2.4.1 Normative Planning Theory

In this book, smart growth is seen generally as a *normative* theory for city-regional planning practices that seeks to promote the broader project of urban sustainability through a specific spatial (re)ordering of metropolitan regions over time. The use of theory to guide future action arguably most distinguishes the field of planning from urban studies, human geography, sociology and other academic disciplines. Professional planners and other actors involved in deliberated urban development processes at various scales and sites—from the activist neighborhood to federal bureaucracies—typically look forward, proposing specific interventions in the environment over other potential interventions. This means that planners, broadly defined, typically move beyond explanation and prediction, i.e., the classic understandings of "theory" (ibid.). In consequence, planning theory is more explicitly prescriptive than other kinds of theory, sometimes bordering on ideology and ethics. Normative theory invariably asks the following kinds of questions. What should we do? How should we engage? What ought to be done? What sort of city ought to exist? How should space be organized? What norms should we employ to do so?

These questions reflect concerns with either the process of planning (planning as a "verb") or the urban form of planning (planning as a "noun"), but rarely both at the same time. Until WWII or so, the professional field of planning was dominated by architects, engineers, and other kinds of designers concerned strongly with the physical geometry of built-environments at various scales, levels of resolution and empirical detail. Planning theory was much more about rendering and projecting idea(l)s of the "good city" and appropriately ordered space, i.e., normative diagrams of how regions, cities, neighborhoods and groups of buildings should be spatially organized as products, than about core questions of improved process (rational decision-making, comprehensive planning, citizen participation, radical advocacy, etc.).[2]

[2]Important early exceptions include the seminal work of Patrick Geddes, with his integrated concepts of civics, selective surgery, and the regional survey.

Smart growth: A planning theory of practice that calls for shifting new development away from low-density residential and commercial sprawl into well-serviced cities and suburbs using tools like containment, mixed-use, transit and stronger regional coordination.

This changed in the late 1950s and especially the 1960s, when social scientists increasingly populated the still relatively new planning profession, in the USA as elsewhere (Alexander, 1981). Perhaps the dominant theoretical concern in both scholarly debates and the empirical world of practice over the past several decades, at least since the mid-1960s, accordingly has been how to make "rational" planning procedures more collaborative, participatory, democratic, administratively effective, etc. Here the approach is to consider how planning is an ongoing process of decision-making between state and society about alternative urban futures, i.e., between public officials and society-based groups (neighborhood leaders, community development corporations, developers, unions, chambers of commerce, etc.) all concerned with the future form and function of shared physical environments and eco-social spaces. While planning is thus often seen as "technical," can it also be made more collaborative and meaningfully inclusive of economic and social diversity? If yes, how might/does this occur and what are the implications for how we theorize the possibility of rationality, where collective ends are achieved through selected means?

Such questions also encounter the issue of power. For some scholars, such as John Forester (1987), planning must and sometimes does effectively "face" the widely recognized reality of uneven relations of power occasioned structurally by obdurate socio-spatial and economic stratifications within patriarchal, unequal, and racialized forms of urban capitalism and bureaucratized statism (Lauria & Stoll, 1996). Within this context, Forester focuses our attention on improving the practical capacity of various actors to communicate more skillfully with one another about possible urban worlds, arguing (through Habermas) in the normative and procedural tradition of planning studies that "decent social theory must address possibilities, not just constraints; it must inform hope, not simply resignation" (Forester, 1998, p. 214). Such hope, moreover, is predicated upon identifying a series of "right and "good" actions, which are defined more elaborately by Patsy Healey (1992, p. 144) as "those we can come to agree on, in particular times and places, across our diverse differences in material conditions and wants, moral perspectives, and expressive cultures and inclinations."

For others, such as Bent Flyvbjerg (1998), the world of collaborative planning practice is a shared fiction. Local actors tell one another misleading stories about the interrelationships between planning, space, and power (Yiftachel, 2001). Through a detailed case study of transit planning in Alborg, Denmark, collaborative planning for sustainability-related goals is little more than an elaborate process of self-deception that effectively masks how power really works as key actors seek to transform or stabilize configurations of space in particular ways. Efforts to shift

planning procedures from an elusive and elitist "instrumental" rationality, i.e., a comprehensive assessment of means when ends are known. to a more "communicative" or inclusive form of rationality, i.e., establishing rules for reaching mutual understandings and conducting argumentation, float too far above a more disturbing reality: power always "defeats" rationality, however defined. What is rational to do, in Flyjbjerg's estimation, is dependent strongly on context and context in turn is defined decisively by power, which ultimately tends to turn rationality into rationalization. In fact, he concludes, the capacity to present rationalization as rationality is how power works.

All planning theories, at bottom, necessarily presume that our cities "should be purposefully shaped rather than the unmediated outcome of the market and of interactions within civil society" (Fainstein, 1999, p. 250). Differences are important to consider and can be dramatic. Early planning and design innovators, as diverse as Tony Garnier, Camillo Sitte, Ebenezer Howard, Soria y Matta, Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier, among many others, focused more attention on the preferred "shape" of the city (or city-region) rather than on the *processes* of "shaping," whereas by the mid-1960s, the question of "shaping" itself—of process, procedures, and decision-making—became more important in planning scholarship.

But the ghosts that haunt planning practice still drag around the heavy chains of power. Who really does the shaping or can do the shaping, even in theory? Relatedly, what sorts of "shapes" or urban forms do those enacting power in society seek to occasion, transform, stabilize or extend? What values, interests, and motivations "shape the shapes"? In various ways, these latter questions, which explicitly link together planning and space through power, require that we explore not only "how planning shapes urban form," or at least tries to do so, but also that we attend closely to "the political and economic forces constraining planning, and the distributional effects of planning decisions" (Fainstein, 2005, p. 122). It also requires that we ask whether the spatialities of planning are progressive, regressive, or something hybrid, and therefore whether they advance social reform or legitimize control (Yiftachel, 2001). This is no less true for the spaces of smart growth than for any other planning program.

2.4.2 Smart Aspirations, Territorialized Spaces

David Resnick (2010, p. 1853) sees smart growth as "a policy framework that promotes an urban development pattern characterized by high population density, walkable-bikeable neighborhoods, preserved green spaces, mixed-use development (i.e., development projects that include both residential and commercial uses), available mass transit, and limited road construction." Others offer similar views, albeit from slightly different perspectives (Burchell, Listokin, & Galley, 2000; Daniels, 2001; Downs, 2001; International City/County Management Association

& Smart Growth Network, 2006; Pollard, 2000; Ross, 2014; Schneider, 2008; Song, 2012; Szold & Carbonell, 2002).

Smart growth scholars further link smart growth to regional-scale policy action that is focused ultimately on deepening sustainability. For Scott (2007), as one example, smart growth constitutes nothing less than a comprehensive strategy of regional sustainability. Tom Daniels (2001, p. 277) in turn posits that smart growth represents a "new American approach to regional planning" focused squarely on leveraging Brundtland-inspired sustainability: i.e., "the best of both worlds: economic growth without the ugliness, congestion, environmental degradation, and wasteful public subsidies or sprawling development."

American-style smart growth, then, is one species in the global genus of planning movements for urban sustainability, many of which predate smart growth by many years (e.g., Dewar & Watson, 1990; Faludi, 2005). Indeed, Richard Cowell (2013) has argued that the field of planning has emerged as a "vital mechanism" for promoting sustainability goals and governance values. "Calls for planning to be used in the service of sustainability [have] emerged from all levels of government—international, national, and local—from countries around the world, and from public, private and non-governmental sectors," Cowell writes, "[i]n many countries, this rhetoric has been turned into formal, statutory requirements for plans to promote sustainability" (p. 2447).

Scholars of US planning have traced the growing parallels between the policy ambitions of urban sustainability and the rise of smart growth, respectively (Barbour & Deakin, 2012). They have explored how, in the US context where concepts like "Agenda 21," a global policy child of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, are still unfamiliar or ignored, the spaces of urban sustainability might emerge theoretically through the albeit contested localization of smart growth strategies and philosophies (Godschalk, 2004). From this perspective, the appearance of most any smart growth policy, program and project is associated with the piecemeal implementation of sustainability. "While the meaning of [smart growth] continues to evolve," one study by the Lincoln Land Institute puts it, "today's sustainable development initiatives share many of the goals promoted by the smart growth movement" (Ingram, Carbonell, Hong, & Flint, 2009, p. 3).

That said, as shown in Fig. 2.3 below, smart growth is concerned mostly with "outcome" questions of "how planning shapes urban form" (op cit.), i.e., with "bringing the city back in" (Beauregard, 1990). Attentive to procedural issues and challenges like development control and collaborative decision-making, smart growth seeks mainly to spatialize urban sustainability goals through deliberate(d), more predictable, and hopefully high-quality densification of (re)development activities in new and established communities, preferably near public transport that is distant from ecologically vulnerable areas like farms, critical habitats and forests. Although affiliated with "deliberative democracy" (Resnick, 2010), smart growth is less a discursive process than an urban form for sustainability, albeit with a nod to process around the recognition of contingencies. "It's like a Christmas tree," as one planner in Washington State reports, "people can decorate their community how they want, but they have to have a tree" (Vincent, pers. comm.).

A. Urban form vs. planning process	*B. Focus of action*	*C. Normative principles*
Urban form … • *Howard*: Urban-rural balance, clear growth boundaries/lines • *Burnham*: Using public facilities as key focal points • *Unwin*: Neighborhood-scale life; de-emphasis on automotive dependency • *Mumford*: Regional-scale planning and active regional culture • *Jacobs*: Mixed- and adaptive- reuse, preservation, complete street life • *Alexander*: Improved urban-scale connectivity and spatial legibility • *McHarg*: Environmental planning and natural integration into form and design • *Bauer*: social housing reforms, range of types	Location	• Preserve open space, farmland, natural beauty, and critical environmental areas • Strengthen and direct development towards existing communities
	Connectivity	• Create walkable neighborhoods • Provide a variety of transportation choices.
	Design	• Take advantage of compact building design • Mix land uses • Foster distinctive, attractive communities with a strong sense of place • Create a range of housing opportunities and choices
Planning process… • *Mannheim*: planned shaping of private markets • *Simon*: means-ends rationality • *Faludi*: comprehensive planning • *Geddes*: civics, surveying • *Healey*: collaboration	Procedures	• Make development decisions predictable, fair, and cost effective • Encourage community and stakeholder collaboration in development decisions

Fig. 2.3 Smart growth as normative planning theory (Sources: (**a**) author's rendering; (**b**) Knaap and Zhao, 2009; (**c**) smart growth Network.org)

Smart growth is procedurally prescriptive in so far as extant planning processes and regulatory powers should be fair, predictable, cost effective, and collaborative. But its favored spatialities are presumed universally accommodating: mixed, compact, 'rangy,' distinctive, walkable, preserved, and varied.

When taken together, smart growth, at least in the imagination of its strongest advocates, steadily replaces low-density, rigidly segregated, automobile-oriented and overly private forms of (sub)urban living with denser, mixed, clustered, walkable, disproportionately infill-oriented developments that, by their locational/functional nature alone, might help to conserve adjacent farmland and other assets and directly support multimodal transit alternatives (Litman, 2009). So functionally defined, smart growth concomitantly aims to "impose a consciously chosen pattern of development upon the urban terrain" (Fainstein, 2005) but in a democratically inclusive, socially participatory manner of collective mutual learning that somehow still results in economically efficient and technically rational decisions about specific urban changes with respect to the most vested parties in particular places.

Seen this way, smart growth is ambitious because, I argue, it is syncretic (Dierwechter, 2013b). The chosen pattern of development that smart growth promotes, after all, draws eclectically on decades of planning theory and experimentation—incorporating various elements from, *inter alia,* Ebenezer Howard's garden city ideals around urban-rural balance and sharp growth lines; Daniel Burnham's urbane celebration of iconic public spaces (who drew on Camillo Sitte's 'urban rooms' and use of monuments); Raymond Unwin's more intimate walkable neighborhoods; Christopher Alexander's sense of place, connectivity, and coherent pattern language; Ian McHarg's insistence on planning through natural forms; Catherine Bauer's agenda for more diverse and equitable housing; Jane Jacobs' influential defense of historic preservation and short, densely intersecting blocks to promote street life; and not least the eco-regionalist sensibilities of Lewis Mumford, among many others.

In addition, smart growth's *procedural* insistence on regulatory efficiency but technical rationality reflects the seminal impacts on planning theory of Karl Manheim, Herbert Simon, and Andres Faludi. Its desire to encourage community collaboration around preferred built-environmental change even evokes the spirit of Patrick Geddes' foundational notion of "civics" as well as more recent work on collaborative planning that seeks to develop "relational resources" of action by Patsy Healey. Here smart growth is imagined as a meta-tool to reconsider how we traditionally think of state and market relationships to forge new partnerships.

Efforts to understand how smart growth programs, policies, and especially projects (re)shape US urban form at various scales emphasize its long range aspirations. The same Lincoln Land Institute study that foregrounds the parallels with sustainability goals also evaluates smart growth theory, so rendered, within the geographically comparative context of state-level planning (non)reforms over the past several decades. Rather than planning processes, this study focuses mostly on spatial "outcomes" in terms of a handful of key program arenas: (1) growth patterns and trends (especially compaction goals); (2) the protection of natural resources and environmental quality; (3) enhanced transportation choices; (4) fiscal efficiency of

public outlays; and (5) social equity concerns around affordable housing. It compares states like Oregon, Florida, New Jersey and Maryland—where smart growth and earlier forms of urban growth management are explicitly instituted in state laws and planning regulations—with states like Indiana, Texas, Colorado and Virginia, where smart growth is less institutionalized and/or geopolitically fragmented, unevenly localized, and contingently deployed (e.g., Boulder, Denver, Austin). Designed to gauge the impacts of various kinds of state-level smart growth programs, the study pays less detailed attention to metropolitan-scale and intra-metropolitan patterns of urban (re)development.

From a national perspective, however, the study argues that smart growth states differed from other states as well as from each other. Overall, for example, "developed land generally increased less in smart growth states" (p. 136), "marginal land consumption was lower" (p. 137), "smart growth states kept more population growth in urbanized areas" (p. 137), and "annual increases in traffic delays declined . . . after smart growth programs were introduced" (p. 140). At the same time, New Jersey performed better with respect to affordable housing; Oregon with respect to countering sprawl. These uneven stories across the US reflect differently institutionalized political-economies of development and urban change. Smart growth has a *geography*.

The scholars of this study are appropriately careful to highlight notable limitations and weaknesses of various policy experiences, particularly with respect to social equity. But the practical benefits of smart growth theory are considered central to the slow, hard, progressive improvement of metropolitan America. This is seen in their optimistic summary of the otherwise (for them) desultory situation in Texas:

> Given its historical and political context, the state of Texas seems unlikely to support smart growth principles and practices any time soon. While the state has become increasingly urban, its mindset is distinctively country and western. One way that a shift might happen is if state law makers and business leaders become convinced that smart growth can provide a competitive advantage in the marketplace. A second possibility is that state leaders come to realize that Texas is urban (if not urbane). At the same time, though, visioning processes in Dallas, Houston, and Austin have generated hope that a majority of the estimated 12 million new residents arriving in Texas over the next three decades will be able to live, work, and play in a more livable, walkable, and socially just urban settings (p. 229).

Other work on how state-level programs of smart growth shape urban form and/or built environmental patterns of development similarly compare and contrast "state-led" planning strategies (Anthony, 2004; Deal, Kim, & Chackraborty, 2009). Howell-Moroney (2007) argues that the "intensity" of state-level programs matters the most in discernably impacting local land development outcomes. In particular, he concludes, only states with the strongest regulatory regimes, notably Oregon, Florida and Washington, showed success in meeting the truly synoptic goals of smart growth doctrine, notably to curb sprawl through intensification. States that make local communities plan without mandating auxiliary tools, for example, urban growth boundaries and infrastructure concurrent rules, are simply "managing growth," but not really reshaping growth over time into the so-called smarter

forms. Yet top-down mandates complicate interpretations of how smart growth differs from early, supposedly more state-interventionist phases of urban growth planning. Top-down forms of smart growth in Oregon and to a lesser extent Florida and Washington, in other words, now contend geopolitically with other state-territorial forms of smart growth in other US states whose models of regulation rely instead on incentives and fiscal steering rather than one-size fits-all legislative requirements.

Hamin, Steere, and Sweetser (2006), for example, explore the Community Preservation Act (CPA) in Massachusetts, finally passed in 2000 after 16 years of negotiation, and initial (though not final) opposition from the real estate lobby. Under this law, local communities vote "yes" or "no" to implement the provisions of the CPA system (in Oregon, *all* communities *must* implement urban growth boundaries, etc.). Designed to favor more local flexibility, Massachusetts communities are allowed to tax themselves at various rates and also receive commensurate matching grants in order to protect open space, preserve historic buildings, and/or build more local affordable housing. Here smart growth is a spatially selective, deliberately narrow, and thus far more geographically uneven form of self-investment in only parts of the overall theory.

State-scale systems also highlight crucial temporal dynamics. In perhaps the best single monograph on the new politics of planning across Oregon, Hurley and Walker (2011) explore electorally successful property-rights challenges to what most scholars regard as by far the strongest land-use regime in the USA. Oregon's elaborate planning system, particularly as manifested in the Portland area, "is characterized by a top-down and interventionist philosophy of land use regulation, which places greater authority in the hands of the state than with officials in local communities" (p. 23).

But once again, is this smart growth? Built mostly in the 1970s with a bi-partisan coalition that today would appear all but impossible, Walker and Lewis distinguish Oregon's system with the state of Maryland's approach to growth planning, which was built largely in the 1990s, when both wider political-economic and ideological conditions had shifted within the USA as elsewhere. Maryland's statewide system, which popularized the term smart growth, relies less of hard regulation, statewide systems of review, and enforcement than on fiscal incentives and targeted infrastructure investments to implement key smart growth principles (e.g., compact development patterns).

Yet people routinely visit Portland, the state's most important city, "to learn the wonders of smart-growth planning," as one libertarian critic of the city's planning approaches consistently laments (O'Toole, 2004, p. 203). Such wonders include the rare statewide mandate of regionally coordinated urban growth boundaries along with extensive commitment to public transit systems, etc. Real estate scholars sometimes worry that aggressive anti-sprawl strategies pay insufficient attention to the satisfactory production of affordable housing (similar complaints are made about green belts in the UK). But they also acknowledge the complexity of competing metropolitan goals that still require regional policy coordination, such as the need for incentivized infrastructure taxes (Mildner, 2015). This again

suggests that smart growth manifests itself differently in specific geographical *and historical* contexts as well as within socially and economically diverse metropolitan regions. It is difficult to do everything well, yet rather easy to entreat the impossible utopia of market liberalism.

At the other end of the territorial scale, practitioner-focused literature produced by advocacy organizations, such as the National Resources Defense Council (Terris, Vorsanger, & Benfield, 2001), exemplifies work that explores more micro-level impacts on urban form, focusing on exemplary policies and development projects. The focus is especially on *projects* rather than politics, suggesting an easier path to rapid replication. In the book, *Solving Sprawl*, projects like Adidas Village in Portland putatively highlight how suburban campuses can be transformed into urban villages through the reuse of abandoned property, the recycling of materials from old buildings, and "an inclusive, neighborhood-oriented planning process" (p. 13). The implication is that more of the same types of projects will invariably expand urban sustainability over time, recognizing however that cutting-edge places are rather too often like the Reston Town Center in Reston, Virginia, i.e., "an island of smart growth in a sea of suburbia." When defined as most *any* mixed-use, infill, and/or adaptive reuse project, smart growth is actually more a scattershot phenomenon, found nearly everywhere one might look yet also usually concentrated, restricted, unevenly distributed within the fabric of cities and suburbs. Here, too, its metropolitan-scale geographies demand closer inspection.

Evidently smart growth policies tend to revitalize and valorize *certain kinds* of urban uses and socioeconomic functions, especially those that directly reflect the so-called post-Fordist landscapes of consumption and reproduction commensurate with upper middle-class notions of an appropriate(d) twenty-first century urbanism. Industrial uses, for example, are usually overlooked or even discursively excised as smart growth seeks to curb sprawl and revitalize existing cities and suburbs, its two most important meta-goals. For Green Leigh and Hoeltzel (2012), in particular, manufacturing is smart growth's "blindside," even though paradoxically this sector "[most] contributes to diverse, innovative, and more resilient local economies" (p. 88), a crucial ingredient, it would seem, in the ongoing search for a stronger, more socially just form of urban sustainability.

Mindful that newly refashioned spaces of smartness might be read as "ecological gentrification" (Dooling, 2009) or "sustainability for hipsters" (SustainabilityHub, 2013), of which more below, examples such as the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative in inner-city Boston are cited to bolster broader claims that smart growth does not necessarily generate displacement (Terris et al., 2001). Other examples include neighborhood-based plans that seek to institute countervailing policies (e.g., http://eastportlandactionplan.org/). However, this micro-work of celebration, experimentation, and hope seldom links planning practices to wider theories of political-economy and socio-spatial development and especially to the core problem of how power works through institutions and coalitions over time. Yet the spatial organization of any given urban society, as the radical geographer Doreen Massey (1984) has argued, is integral to the production of the social, not merely its result. Planning is, from this perspective, an effort to institute horizons that stabilize

space-time envelopes, which helps to create in turn a grid of particular "power-geometries" (Massey, 1993).

Geographers have offered distinctive and generally more critical readings of smart growth. Rob Krueger and David Gibbs (2008), for example, have situated smart growth in broader theoretical terms, seeing it more expansively as America's "third wave" of urban sustainability. In their judgement, the US smart growth movement reflects a decidedly "neoliberal turn" in the wider political-economy of city-regions since the steady demise of Fordism: "Smart growth is, in the last instance, a paradigm shift from more state-based regulatory mechanisms to market-based mechanisms, primarily incentives" (p. 1272). Paul Knox (2008, pp. 124–128) also analyses smart growth—which he sees as little more than "a stealthy euphemism for old-fashioned regional planning"—as part and parcel of the now heavily neoliberalized "geopolitics of suburbia." More recently, Tahvilzadeh, Montin, and Cullberg (2015, p. 4) argue that smart growth "is [still] intimately integrated with sustainability concerns, but may stand in sharp contrast to the change of course that [sustainable development] demands by mainly relying on 'fetishized' urban lifestyles which avoids the critical issue of consumption patterns."

Eliot Tretter (2013) has offered analogous ideas in his critical discussion of smart growth policies in Austin, Texas (cf. Karvonen, 2011). The spatialization of smart growth, in his view, means that "environmental issues are only about internalizing the effects of urbanization on non-human species" (p. 4). Austin's creative classes get environmental sustainability in a remade metropolitan space from a state dominated by business groups whose quid pro quo is targeted urban regeneration at the cost of "a firm commitment to social justice." His scholarship explicates the strategic role of smart growth in helping to create, not "emerald cities," to appropriate Joan Fitzgerald's (2011) felicitous and influential term, but something more like elite emeralds—places colonized increasingly by "upscale condos, rehabbed housing, candle-lit restaurants, vintage furniture emporia and valuable real estate," i.e., greener urban worlds "cleansed of its working class residents" (Wetzel, 2015). For Tretter (2016), environmentalists representing "anti-growth" politics have not stopped growth in Austin; they have helped to create appropriate conditions for new rounds of segregated accumulation.

Tretter's emphasis on class, race, and accumulation and hence on Fainstein's theoretical concern with "the distributional effects of planning decisions" (op cit.) is also reflected in scholarship on urban sustainability in Portland. Using David Harvey's influential theory of capital switching,[3] Goodling, Green, and McClintock. (2015, p. 511) explore Portland's urban development history "to illustrate how cycles of investment and disinvestment have left a legacy of racially and spatially

[3]For Harvey (1985), the capitalist system involves investment in basic commodity production, which he calls accumulation in "the primary circuit" of the economy. In Harvey's view, over-accumulation in the primary circuit is structurally inevitable and eventually forces more and more investors to look for alternative outlets to secure sufficient profits. Capital "switches" at this point to "the secondary circuit," which includes the urban built-environment (e.g., real estate as well as loans to finance public infrastructure).

explicit disparities, arguably exacerbated rather than mitigated by the city's sustainability efforts." Goodling et al.'s work raises serious questions about the role of strong political institutions like Portland Metro in forging tertiary bonds of place around the city-region's collective future. Governed by a home rule charter and six directly elected councilors, Portland Metro has the "astounding power," as Ethan Seltzer (2003, p. 38) puts it, "to require changes in local comprehensive plans to make them consistent with regional functional plans." Carl Abbott (1997) shows that Metro's management of the Portland area UGB is coupled tightly with regional housing goals, which essentially mandates

> a 'fair share' housing policy by requiring that every jurisdiction within the UGB provide 'appropriate types and amounts of land. . .necessary and suitable for housing that meets the housing needs of households of all income levels.' In other words, suburbs are not allowed to use the techniques of exclusionary zoning to block apartment construction or to isolate themselves as islands of large-lot zoning. By limiting the speculative development of large, distant residential tracts, the [Metro system] has tended to level the playing field for suburban development and discourage the emergence of suburban 'super developers' with overwhelming political clout. . ..

This is inspiring research, but is planning for smart growth in strongly institutionalized settings a progressive, malleable space for collaborative regional empowerment? Or is it, alternatively, a convenient space for overpowering forces that seek to rationalize regional accumulation as urban sustainability and green corporate citizenship?

Elevating questions of class, race, and ethnicity forces broad, often deeply unsettling, questions about linkages between synoptic planning experiences, on the one hand, and the social composition of otherwise shared communities, on the other (Abel, White, & Clauson, 2015). Lipsett has drawn sustained attention to how the complex, urbanizing mosaic of immigrant and racial enclaves in the USA has militated historically against progressive politics (Lipsett & Marks, 2000). Even well-known exceptions, such as the municipal socialism of Progressive Era Milwaukee, Wisconsin, paradoxically underscore the cementing role of German-immigrant identities in building an outward but thin façade of place- and/or class-based based solidarity.

Similarly, Europe's post-war social democratic states look decidedly more contingent when we consider darkly that "between 1914 and 1945 [multicultural] Europe was smashed into dust," as Tony Judt argues, "[t]he 'tidier' Europe that emerged, blinking, into the second half of the twentieth century had fewer loose ends [. . .] But since the 1980s. . .Europe is facing a multi-cultural future" (Judt, 2010, p. 9). The rightward lurches in European politics at multiple scales in recent years has exposed the difficulties in maintaining post-war variants of progressive political-economies in shared (now fully urbanized) territories, including spatial planning policies. Diverse Dutch municipalities like Almere and The Hague, for instance, are building some of most interesting new kinds of green urban space in Europe, arguably much more advanced than smart growth theory and practice in the USA. But they also places where, as recently as 2010, openly nativist and

reactionary parties like the PVV (Party for Freedom) experienced a disturbing growth in influence.

Nativist elements within the American Tea Party movement and more recently Trumpism have explicitly pushed back against smart growth and attendant concerns with global climate change and sustainable regionalism (Hester, 2011; Trapenberg Frick, 2013). Martin and Holloway (2005) explicitly link the limitations of progressive planning and neighborhood governance in St. Paul, Minnesota, for example, to growing ethnic diversity. They worry that,

> the city is fragmented along multiple dimensions at multiple geographic scales. Its significant racial and ethnic cleavages do not correspond to political units for urban governance—units that form a basis for citizen involvement and community development within the city. The governance structure in fact reinscribes or reinforces economic inequalities across the urban landscape, even as it enables some areas to foster a district-wide political and social identity that partially transcends significant racial and ethnic fragmentation (p. 1110).

That cultural concerns with accommodating diversity and attendant narratives of global governance are driving Tea Party push back against smart growth and urban sustainability is a significant development. Carruthers and Úlfarsson (2008, p. 1816) suggest, for instance, that sprawl "nearly always raises per capita spending," a finding that might otherwise lead conservatives to support cost-saving smart growth policies. So hostility to smart growth reflects cultural narratives as much as economic interests.

My own work has considered many of these themes as well. Nearly a decade ago, I suggested that smart growth had emerged as a syncretic solution to the contradictory problems of pro-growth and anti-growth histories, offering a specific kind of metropolitan-scale synthesis nonetheless wracked by recurrent geopolitical conflicts around the "contending spatial rationalities" of diversity, justice, nostalgia, and freedom (Dierwechter, 2008). While incorporating classic political economy concerns and commitments, particularly as expressed through regulation theory, I was also concerned with parallel questions of culture, ideas, and values, including people's hopes and fears, aspirations and anxieties. Nostalgia, for example, seemed important if hardly sufficient in mapping the complex new landscapes of smart growth in fast-growing city-regions like Portland, Seattle, Baltimore, and Madison.

In different ways, other urban scholars have developed theoretical approaches that also seek to account for the complex spaces of planning consensus, conflict, and growth (geo)politics by emphasizing both hard interests and soft idea(l)s, political-economies, and socio-cultures. Hurley and Walker (2011), for instance, analyze the land-use planning changes in Oregon just discussed using the foundational work of Raymond Williams, highlighting the political and economic roots of cultural visions and highly romantic processes of "cherishing" rural landscapes.

More recently, I have advanced a series of arguments that together formed the main warrants and embedded motivations for this longer book treatment. "Thinking critically and geographically about smart growth," I suggested in my examination of smart transit nodes across Greater Seattle,

> implies that we are sensitive to the structuring effects of capital as it conditions the state's territorial projects, particularly at the city-regional scale where much recent urban scholarship is now directed; but such thinking should likewise alert us to the perils of sweeping generalizations in the search for tidy explanations of metropolitan space. Following [Sue] Parnell and [Jennifer] Robinson, we need to look *at* space both through but also beyond neoliberal frameworks. Such a move, drawing creatively on the 'pluralist conversations' of various urban disciplines, may allow us to *occasion new descriptions and explanations* of smart growth as a key component of urban space, not only in North American cities but in comparative dialogue with a fast-changing world of experimenting polities (Dierwechter, 2013a, pp. 148, emphasis added).

My related study of residential changes over the past 20 years in the wider metropolitan region offers a second set of cognate conclusions:

> Smart growth across Greater Seattle, then, struggles to reverse very strong, long-subsidized sprawl forces that produce regionally scattered, haphazard development—seizing new opportunities to reinvent urban areas through containment strategies that also, at least in broad outline, generate improved compactness, mix use, density, and diversity …. And indeed, in general, new growth is being contained. Land recycling is up, and generally at higher densities than before [. . ..] Yet smart growth cannot and does not 'land' unalloyed; it is adulterated socially, if often surprisingly, by what Lefebvre memorably and elusively called the 'meshwork' of cities. *Additional reflection is needed* on how this meshwork feeds back into smart growth theorizations of urban change, and, at still higher levels of generalization, alternative philosophies and programs of/for urban sustainability—particularly where concerns of racial and economic segregation are foregrounded (Dierwechter, 2014, pp. 709, emphasis added).

2.5 Conclusions

The search for urban sustainability encompasses new forms and modalities of governance, new kinds of economies, and new types of built-environments. Conceived through alternative political economies, however, sustainability is an uneven project in state-progressive, market-liberal, or radical-societal transformation. In practice, the fin de siècle expansion in market-liberal rationalities at multiple territorial scales, the so-called "neoliberalization" of state-society-economy relationships, has paradoxically eroded state-progressive traditions even as it may have produced in recent years what Polanyi called a "double movement." Broader questions of political economy infuse how we think about the emerging geographies of US smart growth, a syncretic and normative planning doctrine for (re) organizing metropolitan space associated with sustainable land use and urban development. Smart growth does not explain itself.

In this chapter, I have suggested that geographers, planners, and urbanists interested in questions of urban sustainability differ in their interpretations of "the spaces that smart growth makes." They mobilize different traditions of political economy and attendant theories of urbanization. Key scholars have attempted, in my view, to address Phil Cooke's (1983, p. 9) still-relevant argument more than a generation ago that theories of planning (such as smart growth) should not be

separated from wider theories of the socio-spatial development process. As a generalization, geographers have tended to be more critical of smart growth space; planners discernably more positive if still circumspect. Nonetheless, many scholars have explored in various ways, "how planning shapes urban form, the political and economic forces constraining planning, and the distributional effects of planning decisions" (Fainstein, 2005, p. 122).

Although I am generally sympathetic with many of the critical-geographical arguments about smart growth as inchoate urban space, I am also concerned, once again, to "look at space both through but also beyond neoliberal frameworks" (op cit.). In particular, I wonder if it might be time to occasion "new descriptions and explanations of smart growth" (op cit.), wherein we draw on/in pluralist conversations. In what now follows, I attempt to move both with and beyond the neoliberal framework per se, focusing on the central neo-Weberian concept of "intercurrence" that is borrowed and also adapted from the field of American Political Development (APD).

References

Abbott, C. (1997). The Portland region: Where city and suburbs talk to each other—And often agree. *Housing Policy Debate*, *8*(1), 11–51.

Abel, T., White, J., & Clauson, S. (2015). Risky business: Sustainability and industrial land use across Seattle's gentrifying riskscape. *Sustainability*, *7*(11), 15718–15753.

Adler, J. (Ed.). (2000). *Ecology, liberty, and property: A free market environmental reader*. Competitive Enterprise Institute: Washington, DC.

Alexander, E. (1981). If planning isn't everything, maybe it's something. *Town Planning Review*, *52*(2), 131–142.

Anderson, T., & Leal, D. (2001). *Free market environmentalism*. New York: Palgrave.

Anthony, J. (2004). Do state growth management regulations reduce sprawl? *Urban Affairs Review*, *39*(3), 376–397.

Backstrand, K., & Kronsell, A. (2015). *Rethinking the green state: Environmental governance towards climate and sustainability transitions*. London: Routledge.

Bailey, I., Gouldson, A., & Newell, P. (2011). Ecological modernisation and the governance of carbon: A critical analysis. *Antipode*, *43*(3), 682–703.

Barbier, E. B. (1987). The concept of sustainable economic development. *Environmental Conservation*, *14*(2), 101–110. doi:10.1017/S0376892900011449.

Barbour, E., & Deakin, E. A. (2012). Smart growth planning for climate protection evaluating California's Senate Bill 375. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *78*(1), 70–86. doi:10.1080/01944363.2011.645272.

Barry, J. (2012). Climate change, the cancer stage of capitalism, and the return of limits to growth. In M. Mark Pelling, D. Manuel-Navarrete, & M. Redclift (Eds.), *Climate change and the crisis of capitalism: A chance to reclaim self*. London: Routledge.

Basta, C. (2016). On Marx's human significance, Harvey's right to the city, and Nussbaum's capability approach. *Planning Theory*, online before print. doi:10.1177/1473095216641153).

Beauregard, R. (1990). Bringing the city back in. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *56*(2), 210–215.

Beder, S. (1997). The environment goes to market. *Democracy and Nature*, *3*(3), 90–106.

Block, F. (2001). *Introduction Karl Polanyi. The great transformation*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Block, F. (2008). Polanyi's double movement and the reconstruction of critical theory. *Revue Interventions économiques*, *38*, 1–14.

Bomberg, E., & Super, B. (2009). The 2008 US presidential election: Obama and the environment. *Environmental Politics*, *18*(3), 424–430.
Bookchin, M. (1991). *The ecology of freedom: The emergence and dissolution of hierarchy*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
Brincat, S., & Gerber, D. (2015). The necessity of dialectical naturalism: Marcuse, Bookchin, and Dialectics in the midst of ecological crises. *Antipode*, *47*(4), 871–893.
Brinkley, A. (1990). Prosperity, depression, and war, 1920-1945. In E. Foner (Ed.), *The New American History*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Buckley, G. (2014). Urban sustainability. In L. Benton-Short (Ed.), *Cities of North America*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Burchell, R., Listokin, D., & Galley, C. (2000). Smart growth: More than a ghost of urban policy past, less than a bold new horizon. *Housing Policy Debate 11*(4), 821–879.
Caprotti, F. (2014). Eco-urbanism and the eco-city, or, denying the right to the city? *Antipode*, *46* (5), 1285–1303.
Carlson, A. (2006). The problem of Karl Polanyi. *Intercollegiate Review*, *41*, 32–39.
Carruthers, J., & Úlfarsson, G. (2008). Does 'smart growth' matter to public finance? *Urban Studies*, *45*(9), 1791.
Carter, A. (2010). Beyond primacy: Marxism, anarchism and radical green political theory. *Environmental Politics*, *19*(6), 951–972.
Chamberlain, J. (1976 [1959]). *The roots of capitalism*. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
Clapp, J., & Dauvergne, P. (2008). *Paths to a Green World: The political economy of the global environment*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Competitive Enterprise Institute. (1996). *Free market environmental bibliography*. Washington, DC: Competitive Enterprise Institute.
Cooke, P. (1983). *Theories of planning and spatial development*. London: Huchinson.
Cowell, R. (2013). Sustainability and planning. In S. Jorgensen (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of environmental management*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
Cowell, R., & Owens, S. (2010). Revisiting ... governing space: Planning reform and the politics of sustainability. *Environment and Planning. C, Government & Policy*, *28*(6), 952–957.
Dale, G. (2010). *Karl Polanyi: The limits of the market*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Daniels, T. (2001). Smart growth: A new American approach to regional planning. *Planning Practice and Research*, *16*(3–4), 271–279.
Deal, B., Kim, J. H., & Chackraborty, A. (2009). Growth management and sustainable transport: Do growth management policies promote transit use? *Journal of Public Transportation*, *12*(4), 21–40.
Dewar, D., & Watson, V. (1990). *The structure and form of metropolitan Cape Town: Its origins, influences and performance* (Working Paper no. 42). Retrieved from Cape Town.
Didier, S., Morange, M., & Peyroux, E. (2013). The adaptative nature of neoliberalism at the local scale: Fifteen years of city improvement districts in Cape Town and Johannesburg. *Antipode*, *45*(1), 121–139. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.00987.x.
Dierwechter, Y. (2008). *Urban growth management and its discontents: Promises, practices and geopolitics in US city-regions*. New York: Palgrave.
Dierwechter, Y. (2013a). Smart city-regionalism across Seattle: Progressing transit nodes in labor space? *Geoforum*, *49*, 139–149.
Dierwechter, Y. (2013b). Smart growth and state territoriality. *Urban Studies*, *50*(11), 2275–2292.
Dierwechter, Y. (2014). The spaces that smart growth makes: Sustainability, segregation, and residential change across greater Seattle. *Urban Geography*, *35*(5), 691–714. doi:10.1080/02723638.2014.916905.
Dooling, S. (2009). Ecological gentrification: A research agenda exploring justice in the city. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *33*(3), 621–639. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2009.00860.x.
Downs, A. (2001). What does smart growth really mean? *Planning (APA) 67*(4), 20–21.
Eckersley, R. (Ed.). (2004). *The Green State*. Boston: MIT Press.

Eckersley, R. (2006). From the liberal to the green democratic state: Upholding autonomy and sustainability. *International Journal of Innovation and Sustainable Development, 1*(4).
Evans, P. (2002). Introduction. In P. Evans (Ed.), *Livable cities? Urban struggles for livelihood and sustainability*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Fainstein, S. (1999). Can we make the cities that we want? In S. Body-Gendrot & R. Beuaregard (Eds.), *The urban moment*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Fainstein, S. (2005). Planning theory and the city. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *25*, 121–130.
Faludi, A. (2005). The Netherlands: A culture with a soft spot for planning. In B. Sanyal (Ed.), *Comparative planning cultures*. New York: Routledge.
Fitzgerald, J. (2011). *Emerald cities*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fitzgerald, J., & Motta, M. (Eds.). (2012). *Cities and sustainability: Critical concepts in urban studies, volume II*. London: Routledge.
Flyvbjerg, B. (1998). *Power and rationality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Forester, J. (1987). *Planning in the face of power*. Thousand Oaks, CA: University of California Press.
Forester, J. (1998). *Rationality, dialogue and learning: What community and environmental mediators can teach us about the practice of civil society*. Chichester, England: Wiley.
Foster, J. (2008). *The sustainability mirage*. London: Earthscan.
Friedman, M. (1962). *Capitalism and freedom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
George, S. (1999). *A short history of neoliberalism: Twenty years of elite economics and emerging opportunities for structural change*. Paper presented at the Conference on Economic Sovereignty in a Globalizing World, Bangkok.
Giorel, C. (2004). Anarchism, environmentalism, and anti-globalisation. *Interdisciplinary Environmental Review*, *6*(2), 22–32. doi:10.1504/IER.2004.053924.
Giradet, H. (1999). *Creating sustainable cities*. Totnes, UK: Green Books.
Godschalk, D. R. (2004). Land use planning challenges: Coping with conflicts in visions of sustainable development and livable communities. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *70*(1), 5–13. doi:10.1080/01944360408976334.
Goodling, E., Green, J., & McClintock, N. (2015). Uneven development of the sustainable city: Shifting capital in Portland, Oregon. *Urban Geography*, *36*(4), 504–527. doi:10.1080/02723638.2015.1010791.
Green Leigh, N., & Hoelzel, B. (2012). Smart growth's blindside: Sustainable cities need productive urban industrial land. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *78*(1), 87–103.
Gunder, M. (2006). Sustainability. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *26*(2), 208–221.
Gunder, M. (2010). Planning as the ideology of (neoliberal) space. *Planning Theory*, *9*(4), 298–314.
Hackworth, J. (2007). *The neoliberal city: Governance, ideology, and development in American urbanism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Hamin, E. M., Steere, M. O., & Sweetser, W. (2006). Implementing growth management. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *26*(1), 53–65.
Harvey, D. (1985). *The urbanization of capital: Studies in the history and theory of capitalist urbanization*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Harvey, D. (1996). *Justice, nature and the geography of difference*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Harvey, D. (2003). The right to the city. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *27*(4), 939–941. doi:10.1111/j.0309-1317.2003.00492.x.
Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hayek, F. (1944). *The road to Serfdom*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Healey, P. (1992). Planning through debate: The communicative turn in planning theory. *The Town Planning Review*, *63*(2), 143–162.
Hefetz, A., & Warner, M. (2004). Privatization and its reverse: Explaining the dynamics of the government contracting process. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *14*(2), 171–190.

Hester, W. (2011). Tea party objects to growth plan; Chesterfield residents say it could result in major problems, 604 words. *Richmond Times Dispatch*, p. A1.
Hopkins, J. (2014). The politics of Piketty: What political science can learn from, and contribute to, the debate on capital in the Twenty-First Century. *British Journal of Sociology*, *65*(4), 678–695.
Howell-Moroney, M. (2007). Studying the effects of the intensity of US state growth management approaches on land development outcomes (United States). *Urban Studies, 44*(11), 2163. doi:10.1080/00420980701518958.
Hurley, P. T., & Walker, P. A. (2011). *Planning paradise: Politics and visioning of land use in Oregon*. Tuscon: University of Arizona Press.
International City/County Management Association, & Smart Growth Network. (2006). *This is smart growth*. Washington, DC: Environmental Protection Agency.
Ingram, G., Carbonell, A., Hong, Y., & Flint, A. (2009). *Smart growth policies: An evaluation of program outcomes*. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Judt, T. (2010). *Postwar: A history of Europe since 1945*. New York: Random house.
Kantor, P. (2013). The two faces of American urban policy. *Urban Affairs Review*, *49*(6), 821–850. doi:10.1177/1078087413490396.
Karvonen, A. (2011). *Politics of urban runoff: Nature, technology, and the sustainable city*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Keil, R. (2002). 'Common-sense' neoliberalism: Progressive-conservative urbanism on Toronto, Canada. *Antipode*, *34*(3), 578–601.
Knaap, G., & Zhao, X. (2009). Smart growth and urbanization in China: Can an American tonic treat the growing pains of Asia. In Y. Song & C. Ding (Eds.), *Smart urban growth for China*. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute.
Knox, P. (2008). *Metroburbia, USA*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Kolbert, E. (2014). *The sixth extinction*. New York: Picador.
Krueger, R., & Agyeman, J. (2005). Sustainability schizophrenia or "actually existing sustainabilities?" Toward a broader understanding of the politics and promise of local sustainability in the US. *Geoforum*, *36*(4), 410–417. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2004.07.005.
Krueger, R., & Gibbs, D. (2008). 'Third wave' sustainability? Smart growth and regional development in the USA. *Regional Studies*, *42*(9), 1263–1274.
Lacher, H. (1999). The politics of the market: Re-reading Karl Polanyi. *Global Society*, *13*(3), 313–326.
Lauria, M., & Stoll, M. (1996). Communicative action, power and misinformation in a site selection process. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *15*, 199–211.
Lipsett, S., & Marks, G. (2000). *It didn't happen here: Why socialism failed in the United States*. New York: WW Norton.
Litman, T. (2009). *Evaluating criticisms of smart growth*. Retrieved from Victoria, BC.
Macdonald, S., & Keil, R. (2012). The Ontario Greenbelt: Shifting the scales of the sustainability fix? *The Professional Geographer*, *64*(1), 125–145.
Maher, N. (2008). *Nature's new deal*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Martin, D. G., & Holloway, S. R. (2005). Organizing diversity: Scales of demographic change and neighborhood organizing in St Paul, MN. *Environment & Planning A*, *37*(6), 1091–1112. doi:10.1068/a36142.
Massey, D. (1984). Introduction: Geography matters. In D. Massey & J. Allen (Eds.), *Geography matters! An introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Massey, D. (1993). Power-geometry and a progressive sense of place. In J. Bird, B. Curtis, T. Putnam, G. Robertson, & L. Tickner (Eds.), *Mapping the futures: Local cultures, global change* (pp. 59–69.). London: Routledge.
Mazower, M. (1998). *Dark continent: Europe's 20th century*. New York: Knopf.
Mazower, M. (2012). *Governing the world: The history of an idea, 1815 to the present*. New York: The Penguin Press.
McClintock, N. (2014). Radical, reformist, and garden-variety neoliberal: Coming to terms with urban agriculture's contradictions. *Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability*, *19*(2), 147–171.

McManus, P. (2005). *Vortex cities to sustainable cities*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
Meadowcroft, J. (2011). Engaging with the politics of sustainability transitions. *Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions*, *1*, 70–75.
Merchant, C. (2005). *Radical ecology: The search for a livable world* (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.
Mildner, G. (2015). The gentrifcation plan for metro Portland. *Center for Real Estate Quarterly Report*, *9*(4), 5–18.
Mol, A., & Janicke, M. (2009). The origins and theoretical foundations of ecological modernisation theory. In A. Mol, D. Sonnefeld, & G. Spargaren (Eds.), *The ecological modernisation reader*. London: Routledge.
Moldan, B., Janoušková, S., & Hák, T. (2012). How to understand and measure environmental sustainability: Indicators and targets. *Ecological Indicators*, *17*, 4–13.
Moore, S. (2007). *Alternative routes to the sustainable city: Austin, Curitiba, and Frankfurt*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Moore, S. A. (2010). *Pragmatic sustainability: Theoretical and practical tools*. New York, NY: Routledge.
Murphy, J., & Gouldson, A. (2000). Environmental policy and industrial innovation: Integrating environment and economy through ecological modernisation. *Geoforum*, *31*(1), 33–44. doi:10.1016/S0016-7185(99)00042-1.
O'Toole, R. (2004). A Portlander's view of smart growth. *The Review of Austrian Economics*, *17*(2), 203–212. doi:10.1023/B:RAEC.0000026831.99365.3c.
Parnell, S., & Robinson, J. (2012). (Re)theorizing cities from the global south: Looking beyond neoliberalism. *Urban Geography*, *33*(4), 593–617.
Paterson, M., Doran, P., & Barry, J. (2006). Green theory. In C. Hay, M. Lister, & D. Marsh (Eds.), *The state: Theories and issues*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Peck, J. (2013). Disembedding Polanyi: Exploring Polanyian economic geographies. *Environment & Planning A*, *45*(7), 1536–1544.
Peck, J. (2016). Polanyian pathways: A review of The Power of Market Fundamentalism: Karl Polanyi's Critique by Fred Block and Margaret R. Somers and For a New West: Essays, 1919–1958 by Karl Polanyi; edited by Giorgio Resta and Mariavittoria Catanzariti. *Economic Geography*, *92*(2), 226–233. doi:10.1080/00130095.2015.1096195.
Pennington, M. (2002). A liberal-Hayekian critique of collaborative planning. In P. Allmendinger (Ed.), *Planning futures: New directions in planning theory*. London: Routledge.
Peters, J. (2012). Neoliberal convergence in North America and Western Europe: Fiscal austerity, privatization, and public sector reform. *Review of International Political Economy*, *19*(2), 208–235. doi:10.2307/41697915.
Piketty, T. (2014). *Capital in the twenty-first century*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Polanyi, K. (1944). *The great transformation*. Boston: Beacon Press.
Pollard, O. (2000). Smart growth: The promise, politics, and potential pitfalls of emerging growth management strategies. *Virginia Environmental Law Journal 19*, 247–285.
Purcell, M., & Tyman, S. K. (2014). Cultivating food as a right to the city. *Local Environment*, *20*(10), 1–16. doi:10.1080/13549839.2014.903236.
Repetto, R. (1986). *World enough and time*. New Haven: Yale.
Resnick, D. (2010). Urban sprawl, smart growth, and deliberative democracy. *Journal of Public Health*, *100*(10), 1852–1856.
Rothbard, M. N. (1971). *Man, economy, and state: A treatise on economic principles*. Los Angeles: Nash.
Ross, B. (2014). *Dead end: Suburban sprawl and the rebirth of American urbanism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rydin, Y. (2010). *Governing for sustainable urban development*. London: Earthscan.
Samara, T. R., He, S., & Chen, G. (2013). *Locating right to the city in the Global South*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Schneider, K. (2008). *Smart growth in the states*. East Lansing, MI: Land Policy Institute, Michigan State University.
Scott, J. W. (2007). Smart growth as urban reform: A pragmatic 'recoding' of the new regionalism. *Urban Studies*, *44*(1), 15–35.
Seghezzo, L. (2009). The five dimensions of sustainability. *Environmental Politics*, *18*(4), 539–556.
Seltzer, E. (2003). It's not an experiment: Regional planning at Metro since 1990. In C. Ozawa (Ed.), *The Portland Edge*. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Silvestro, M., & Silvestro, M. (2007). Eco-villages: Community withdrawal or political engagement? *Economie et Solidarites*, *38*(1), 58–75.
Slavin, M. (2011). The rise of the urban sustainability movement in America. In M. I. Slavin (Ed.), *Sustainability in America's cities: Creating the green metropolis* (pp. 1–19). Washington, DC: Island Press/Center for Resource Economics.
Somers, M., & Block, F. (2014a). *The power of market fundamentalism: Karl Polanyi's critique*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Song, Y. (2012). Suburban sprawl and smart growth. In R. Weber & R. Crane (Eds.), *Handbook on urban planning*. New York: Oxford University Press.
SustainabilityHub. (2013). *Sustainability: Not just for hipsters anymore*. Retrieved from http://sustainabilityhub.com/2013/03/17/sustainability-not-just-for-hipsters-anymore/
Szold, T., & Carbonell, A. (Eds.). (2002). *Smart growth: Form and consequences*. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Tahvilzadeh, N., Montin, S., & Cullberg, M. (2015). *The urban politics of sustaining growth: Sustainability governance in the Gothenburg metropolitan area*. Retrieved from Gothenberg.
Talen, E. (2012). Sustainability. In R. Weber & R. Crane (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of urban planning*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Terris, J., Vorsanger, N., & Benfield, F. K. (2001). *Solving sprawl: Models of smart growth in communities across America*. New York, NY: Natural Resources Defense Council.
Trapenberg Frick, K. (2013). The actions of discontent: Tea party and property rights activists pushing back against regional planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *79*(3), 190–200. doi:10.1080/01944363.2013.885312.
Tretter, E. (2013). Contesting sustainability: 'Smart growth' and the redevelopment of Austin's Eastside. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *37*(1), 297–310.
Tretter, E. (2016). *Shadows of a sunbelt city*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Vojnovic, I. (2012). Advancing toward urban sustainability: The pursuit of equity. In I. Vojnovic (Ed.), *Urban sustainability: A global perspective*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.
Warner, M. (2008). Reversing privatization, rebalancing government reform: Markets, deliberation and planning. *Policy and Society, 27*(2), 163–174. doi:10.1016/j.polsoc.2008.09.001.
Warner, M. (2010a). The future of local government: Twenty-first-century challenges. *Public Administration Review*, *70*, S145–S147.
Warner, R. (2010b). Ecological modernisation theory: Towards a critical ecopolitics of change? *Environmental Politics*, *19*(4), 538–556.
Wetzel, T. (2015). *Market failure in housing and the limits of smart growth/new urbanism*. Retrieved from http://www.uncanny.net/~wetzel/marketfailuresmartgrowth.htm
While, A., Jonas, A., & Gibbs, D. (2004). The environment and the entrepreneurial city: Searching for the urban 'sustainability;fix' in Manchester and Leeds. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *28*(3), 549–569.
While, A., Jonas, A., & Gibbs, D. (2010). From sustainable development to carbon control: Eco-state restructuring and the politics of urban and regional development. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, *35*(1), 76–93.
Wong, T.-C., Shaw, B. J., & Goh, K. C. (2006). *Challenging sustainability: Urban development and change in Southeast Asia*. New York: Marshall Cavendish.
Yiftachel, O. (2001). Introduction: Outlining the power of planning. In O. Yiftachel, J. Little, D. Hedgecock, & I. Alexander (Eds.), *The power of planning: Spaces of control and transformation*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Chapter 3
Theory: A City-Regional Geography of Multiple Orders

How do we explain and evaluate the typical outcomes of planning so far?

—Susan Fainstein (2005, p. 121)

3.1 Introduction

The pursuit of urban sustainability through smart growth programs, policies, and projects—the subject of this book—raises wider theoretical questions about how we should map the uneven ways in which regional planning strategies ultimately (re)shape urban form, in Greater Seattle or indeed other places. American Political Development (APD) is a subfield of political science that focuses on "neo-Weberian" themes of political order(ing), state-building, and the substantive role of historically uneven changes in authoritative institutions, governing routines, and political and social values. The state is generally treated, following Michael Mann's work, as "a territorially demarcated, differentiated set of institutions and personnel with a center that exercises authoritative rulemaking backed by ... coercive powers" which, in turn, reflect "the subjective preferences of policy makers who possess at least some significant degree of autonomy," albeit constrained by structural forces like capital, class, gender, and race relations (Lynn, 2008, p. 4). While there are several productive if hardly mimetic links with radical state theory (Antonio, 2005), neo-Weberian approaches assign more causal weight to variations in state structures (Skocpol, 1985). The upshot here is that such variations are also geographical variations *that matter*, not simply contingent forms of accumulation (Lewis & Neiman, 2009).

Neo-Weberian approaches assume, in particular, that states shape territory in order to form and execute goals that *are not automatic reflections* of the manifest interests of social groups, classes, or society (Krasner, 1984). Within APD work, however, such goals are always projected through often chaotic congeries of authoritative institutions—some rather ancient, some more recent (Almond, 1988). This gives APD a specific theoretical quality that I find helpful in capturing the uneven and entangled spatialities of planning theory and practice in US

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Dierwechter, *Urban Sustainability through Smart Growth*, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54448-9_3

metropolitan regions (Dierwechter, 2013), and perhaps elsewhere, too (Lucas, 2015). In what follows, I highlight especially the central theoretical concept of intercurrence in APD. I also elucidate how to apply intercurrence to the metropolitan scale of smart growth, drawing on recent debates in the urban politics of growth policies to do so. Here intercurrence manifests itself, I argue, as a city-regional geography of "multiple orders."

3.2 American Political Development and Urban Growth

APD sits between fields, listening in two directions. Critical of political science that theorizes ahistorically, APD is paradoxically criticized in turn by historians as too preoccupied with generalizable propositions and overarching concepts: i.e., APD is too historical for political science, but too theoretical for history (Skowronek, 2003). While American organizational historians, notably Ellis Hawley (1966), had earlier highlighted the development (or "modernization") of Federal institutions, bureaucracies, and organizational routines, particularly during the 1920s and thirties, scholars like Fred Block, Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly, Richard Bensel, Steve Skowronek and the critical urbanists Ira Katznelson and Amy Bridges looked for new ways to merge a radical sensitivity with class power alongside parallel concerns with "autonomous" state-building and political modernization. Methodologically, then, their work has tended to emphasize the story of whole institutions, policy development, and organizations rather than the aggregated behaviors of atomized individuals, strongly rejecting behavioral and positivist approaches to research (Gerring, 2003).

Two main approaches broadly define APD scholarship, although these sometimes overlap (Glenn, 2004). The "ideational" approach focuses on the political impacts of cultural ideas, norms, narratives, and outlooks. In contrast, or better yet as a complement, the more dominant historical-intuitionalist school focuses on how actors (re)build and then negotiate their way through formal "institutional settings," which are defined as "rules, organizations, laws, or practices that inform or delimit the actions that persons can take" (p. 163). Both schools have tracked public policy developments and key social reforms, including studies related to the politics, planning, and development of cities (Allard, Burns, & Gamm, 1998; Burns, Evans, Gamm, & McConnaughy, 2009; Erie, 1990; Ethington 1993; Orren, 1986; Revell, 1999). Indeed, Katznelson's 1981 book, *City Trenches*, not only exemplifies these themes but the importance of urban topics in the creative flowering of APD scholarship.

For Orren and Skowronek (2004), scholars that emphasize the development of political and policy institutions over time see discord and tensions across state-society relationships often associated, in their view, with the persistence of ancient rules, organizations, laws, or practices surprisingly impervious to contemporary social pressures (ibid.). Such work argues, in other words, that time does not simply "pass" in discrete, separated stages or successive regimes. There are multiple

"times" working themselves out, multiple developmental or policy stories that crisscross and interpenetrate. Through unevenly developed path-dependencies and temporarily variegated lines of institutional continuity, "time" exerts a quasi-independent but also striated influence on political developments. This apparent paradox, accounting for change given patterns of constancy and resiliency, means that most accounts in APD typically replace chronological interpretations of history with "fugue-like" narratives that highlight the addition, subtraction, and repetition of familiar themes (p. 12–13). Unlike traditional history, APD tries to move beyond the goal of "getting the narrative of characters and events—the story—down on paper as accurately and meaningfully as possible" (p. 6). The key analytical effort instead is on finding patterns and deploying synoptic concepts like intercurrence to make sense of history.

Skeptical of "bounded eras"—e.g., the "Age of Jackson"; the "Rooseveltian Epoch"—APD specifically rejects treatments that pit continuity vs. change. Instead, order and change are held together *in* time rather than sorted out *across* time. "Situated in time between the 'normal' politics of order," for too many scholars of the past "change is seen as episodic and contained. In contrast, in APD change is something inherent in politics as such" (p. 14). Rather than long "orders" punctuated by brief periods of unsettling change, it is more accurate to see political history itself—including public policy histories—as uneven processes of constant and complex (re)orderings.

Change, then, does not only mean "addition" and thus replacement, wherein we are now smart if neoliberal when once we were dumb yet Keynesian, for instance. It also means "subtraction" and "repetition," wherein "imprinting events" constantly (re)shape current possibilities (e.g., US democratization preceded state bureaucratization), or where categories of law-like developments recur in cycles that demand theoretical rather than simply narrative recognition (e.g., wars build states). Orren and Skowronek summarize this way of thinking as follows: "Cycles and other patterns found in American political history are of special interest in assessing relations of continuity and change because they suggest that breakpoints themselves sometimes take the form of patterned events . . . [where] the mode of change itself suggests a certain kind of continuity" (p. 10). In consequence, any given "site," whether historical (e.g., the 1990s), institutional (e.g., a policy network), or geographical (e.g., a city-region), is composed of "multiple orders" that "overlap and counteract and layer upon one another simultaneously" (p. 20). In other words, any given site of multiple orders is constantly "in the process of becoming" (p. 19); as such, it will display "all the tensions and contradictions of prior construction" (p. 21) as it collides daily with both contemporary and imminent political dynamics.

Concrete cases help to illustrate these claims. The Progressive Era (c. 1890–1920) in US history, for instance, did not push change in only one direction or only through the "addition" of a brand new kind of reform politics unseen or uninformed by past developments. The Progressive Era was molded by how "two [contradictory] impulses engaged—one to promote corporate welfare and social reform, and the other to promote racial segregation and white supremacy" (p. 16). Such "repetition" of impulses continues to cause friction even today.

Princeton University struggles to both honor and reject the multiple legacies of the Progressive Era figure, Woodrow Wilson, in the new political time of Black Lives Matter (itself shaped by the imprinting event of institutionalized slavery, and the country's "amazing tolerance for black pain" (Bouie, 2015). Ideational scholars within APD have further contributed insights into such profound contradictions, highlighting why, as a second example, "America, a country that seems to hate government, has so much of it, especially in the form of regulatory penetration into seemingly private spheres of personal life" (Glenn, 2004, p. 158).

Part of the explanation for such contradictions has to do with a politics of cultural diversity. Americans have been willing to engage state powers to suppress newcomers who challenge the status quo of elites. Additionally, in *Building the New American State*, Skowronek (1982) conceptualizes "state-building" as a distinctive process of US political development, but shows that organizational and procedural changes in central administration, the army, and economic regulation tended to deflect rapid alterations in the ideas of a new cadre of professional elites, at least for a while.

The synoptic concept of "intercurrence," arguably the most important in the APD literature, accordingly attempts to capture what is, in fact, a rather *ordinary* state of affairs: namely, "the coexistence of multiple orders, typically originating at different times and in tension with one another. . ." at/in any given 'site' (Stone & Whelan, 2009, p. 99). Intercurrence thus anticipates the constant "abrading" produced by what Orren and Skowronek elsewhere call "non-simultaneity" and "other-directness" of institutions informed deeply by cultural values, social norms, and ideological ideals—some reasonably noble, others anything but:

> The very tendency of institutions to persist means that at any moment in time several different sets of rules and norms are likely to be operating simultaneously. To the extent that the idea of order presumes institutions synchronized with one another, entailing their creation all at once, something unlikely to be accomplished by even the most radical revolution. These insights take on special significance in the case of political institutions, because political institutions are inherently other-directed; that is, they seek to control individuals or other institutions outside their own sphere. As a consequence, different institutional rules and norms will abut and grate as a normal state of affairs (Orren & Skowronek, 1996, p. 112).

Major political challenges in society, so theorized, fundamentally reflect "engagements throughout the polity of the different norms embedded in institutions" (p. 112). In so far as different norms typically originate as idea(l)s, both institutionalist and ideational approaches to APD can productively merge (Gottschalk, 2000). Such ideas might actually be "clusters of ideas"—such as Keynesianism—or more concrete notions, such as employer-mandated health care or, I would suggest, planning for urban sustainability through smart growth. Either way, ideas—especially when seen as normative innovations—"take a life of their own when they 'fit' perceptions of a problem" (Gottschalk, 2000, p. 235). But such "fit" depends on the contours of the socio-institutional landscape, on the relatively fertile or barren soil of the political and economic places where they seek to flourish (ibid).

Put another way, it is not only that ideas stretch themselves out unevenly across space; it is that specific structures of place also influence the local uptake of ideas.

> *Intercurrence*: Multiple orders in simultaneous action, i.e., a world of "ordered disorder," where relatively independent institutions originating at different times and in constant tension with one another at/in any given "site" move in and out of alignment in patterns of both continuity and change, whether understood as institutional, geographical, or temporal in nature (Rodgers, 2005; Stone & Whelan, 2009).

Themes resonant in APD have influenced urban studies for many years (Burns et al., 2009; Ethington 1993), but have not been taken up explicitly by urban political geographers (though see Dierwechter, 2013). Arguably APD themes have been revived with the publication of Richardson Dilworth's (2009) edited volume, *The City in American Political Development*. Dilworth believes that the city has been "woefully neglected" in American politics. He is thus eager to push APD deeper into urban space. APD improves work in urban affairs, but urban research refines APD. Jeremy Hodos (2009), for example, describes patchy efforts by the central governments of the US and the UK to incorporate preexisting cities into a national political order as exemplary cases of intercurrence. Hodos shows how the anti-urban policy shift under Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s—the "shift" to neoliberalism discussed earlier—was resisted, and may have also paradoxically reawakened dormant instincts by cities to engage in "foreign policies." This has produced new political spaces like nuclear free zones and sanctuary cities, and has further opened up experiments in global climate policy and green city networking (Toly, 2008), creating momentum what others see as the search for a new post-Westphalian international order (Barber, 2013; Bouteligier, 2012; Toly, 2008).

APD develops extant theories of US urban politics (Judd, Stoker, & Wolman, 1995; Logan & Molotch, 1987). Early work on US urban politics focused on the influence of "society-based" actors in shaping local policy priorities, key regulation choices, and major public investment decisions. Fred Hunter (1953), for example, argued in the 1950s that, based on patterns in Atlanta, a small business elite typically rules most central US cities. In the early 1960s Robert Dahl (1961) suggested that while business elites are indeed habitually important, local governments actually respond to multiple and diverse local constituencies and policy pressures. Advocates of "growth coalition" theory in turn have critiqued the assumed shortcomings of both of these "community power" schools—"elitist" and "pluralist," respectively—initiated by Harvey Molotch's work in the mid-1970s (Rogers, 2009). According to Molotch, the fortunes of land-based interests and their "pro-growth" allies (e.g., bankers, retailers) are tied specially to place-based accumulation. So they push for urban intensification. This frequently leads to immediate resistance from counter-coalitions of neighborhood actors,

residential groups, and/or urban environmentalists. Molotch and Logan (2007) called this a struggle between the "exchange values" and "use values" of specific places: downtowns, ports, local retail districts, new neighborhoods, etc. Domhoff and Gendron (2008) have argued that conflicts around these two contradictory values constitute "the main axis around which power struggles unfold at the local level" (p. 9). Growth coalition theory thus reflects a neo-Marxian emphasis on the ongoing "commodification" of place, but it explicitly accepts the decisive role of *local agency*—of people and institutions—that are highlighted in the older "community power" debates.

Regime theory emerged in the 1980s as an attempt to merge 'Dalhian' pluralism with Marxian insights into place commodification, whilst still emphasizing the politics of agency through careful regime building. Regimes build capacity to govern. So the literature includes investigations of the developmental achievements of "informal" coalitions of state and non-state actors—from sports complexes, waterfront redevelopments, and mass transit investments; to inclusionary zoning, housing linkage policies, and local-hiring agreements—depending on the political nature of the regime (Clavel, 1986). In most cases, a single city is mapped as, for instance, "developmental" or "progressive," but less seldom with compelling reference to the inter-scalar, often messier context of metropolitan-wide development and city-regional restructuring (Clavel & Kleniewski, 1988; Erie & Mackenzie, 2009). Yet, as Joel Rast (2015) notes, business leaders are increasingly focusing their networking interests and policy attention on the entire city-region rather than the central city (cf. Jonas, 2013); so the scalar limits of regime theory are increasingly apparent.

Regime theory's most influential voice, Clarence Stone, now also argues (with Robert Whelan) that intercurrence offers a fresh theoretical alternative to regime theory and most other types of urban political economy, too. Following APD, Stone and Whelan seek to discard "monocausal" explanations of urban politics and policy choices, such as the "forces of the economic system" (p. 99). Just as various kinds of urban political economy approaches replaced pluralism, they suggest, so too might intercurrence and APD allow scholars to move beyond urban political economy traditions in order to consider the "interpenetrations of government, civil society and economy" (Stone & Whelan, 2009). These two arguments are linked. As "urban" politics and policies shift scales, monocausal theories give way to approaches that map urban development instead as "a multiscalar political strategy" (Brenner, 2009, p. 134).

Finally, John Lucas (2015) applies APD concepts, notably intercurrence, to the Canadian urban context, arguing that APD is more analytically portable across national cultural and administrative spaces than many have assumed, including Orren and Skowronek themselves (p. 9). For Lucas, intercurrence anywhere is constituted by three key dynamics: new political institutions that are always created within the context of already existing institutions; political cultures that do not reflect single ideologies ("e.g., liberalism"), but multiple often competing ideals about the role of state authority; and, relatedly, the institutionally entangled nature of the state itself, wherein each part has its own internal purposes, culture, and rules

(p. 4). In consequence, he argues that intercurrence manifests itself in both spatial and temporal dimensions. "Across political space," he theorizes, "we [should] expect to find multiple political orders coexisting at once, each with different purposes, internal organization, and ideological commitments. Across political time, we [should] also expect that changes to political orders will not be as clean as any simple periodization might suggest" (ibid.).

3.3 Smart Growth and the Geography of "Multiple Orders"

APD provides a novel way to theorize smart growth, especially when deployed as a strategy of urban sustainability. It is not simply that the politics, policies, and projects of "growth" constitute a major thematic concern in the expansive literature on US urban politics just recounted above. It is also that smart growth's syncretic aspirations, as discussed at length in Chap. 2, embody both ideational and institutional claims and modes of authority. Its normative-theoretical desire to accept growth by making regional space "smart" embodies seemingly contradictory ambitions that, as I shall show later in the book, often "abut and grate" as different institutional dynamics collide with one another through historic time, across metropolitan space, and over administrative scales of authority. Smart growth's "neoliberal" qualities, such as using incentives to shape markets, sometimes sit uneasily with its more socially progressive architectonics: viz., wherein growth creates but, *if* reshaped through state-based legal and investment powers, *can* solve social and ecological problems; wherein private cars should be deemphasized in favor of mass transit; wherein transit-oriented developments seek to leverage social integration through housing mix; and so on.

Figure 3.1 below integrates APD themes and concepts, especially intercurrence, as well as key insights from the expansive literature on urban politics. This creates an analytical framework going forward for broadly theorizing smart growth as a city-regional geography of "multiple orders" within the specific context of Greater Seattle.

Questioning "monocausality" with Stone and Whelan (2009), six major empirical themes are important here: private accumulation; social segregation; public solvency; technical efficiency; ecological resiliency; and social justice (more said of these themes below). Following wider work in APD (e.g., Gottschalk, 2000), Fig. 3.1 incorporates "ideational" narratives as well as "institutional" choices associated with these six themes. Adapting the urban work of Lucas (2015), moreover, the framework investigates intercurrence across political *time* and political *space*, while treating urban sustainability through smart growth as a multi*scalar* political strategy of local, regional, state-legislative, and indeed federal-level authorities (Brenner, 2009, p. 134). Crossing scales of authority, of course, generates tensions, frictions, and contradictions, as variously located actors in space



Fig. 3.1 Framing intercurrence across Greater Seattle: "multiple orders"?

negotiate institutional settings via different cultural norms, routines, and philosophical worldviews that have accrued piecemeal over time.

For practical reasons, dates are attached in Fig. 3.1 to major developments in local urban history. But the core of the framework tries to resist rigid periodization, emphasizing the coexistence of multiple orders through interwoven path-dependencies. Change is seen, then, as modes of continuity. Indeed, various "political times" are still working themselves out, from the colonial into the city-regional, even as they form unevenly distributed ideational and institutional layers or zones across local political space. While the local origins of industrial urbanization, for example, are found in the late 1840s, a point I take up in Chap. 5, this was built upon European colonization (and land expropriation) from Native Americans in the late eighteenth century that, in some ways, continues to structure the political geography of regional economic development today (Winchell & Ramsey, 2013). The proliferation of cars after WWI initiated the quickened development of different metropolitan spaces, notably auto- (rather than rail-) dependent suburbs; yet the original urban dynamic, especially in core cities like Tacoma and Seattle, still reverberates. Seattle's dramatic re-urbanization in neighborhoods like South Lake Union, Capital Hill, and Fremont is sending shock waves across the city-region as a whole, even as older metropolitan forms—highways, strip zoning, pavilion malls, stagnate districts—also shape the region's overall trajectory.

Rather than a story of "bounded eras," localized intercurrence across Greater Seattle as elsewhere draws constant attention to the "abrading" associated with building institutional spaces (for smart growth, in the present case) in a world of prior construction: e.g., strong property rights protections; Federal programs and rules; extant morphological patterns—what Thrift and Amin (2002, p. 3) have called "the slower times of the built environment"; long-term sunk investments by banks, businesses, governments, and households; market ideologies; discourses of state responsibility; mounting social anxiety over the fragility of local and global ecosystems. Institutions designed to facilitate private accumulation and even social segregation, for example, are more resistant to comprehensive reforms and policy shifts than might be hoped; institutional (and spatial) *obduracy*, as we shall also see, conflicts in small, subtle, insidious ways with efforts to champion ecological resiliency or redress social injustices. Once embedded in often rather banal authority relations, APD scholars note, institutional practices are impervious to social pressures, resilient in their constancy.

When we study a cross-section of the contemporary world (the shaded area in Fig. 3.1), we "peer" back into entangled layers of time, space, and scale. Institutions and ideas co-mingle and interweave, often uneasily to produce strange cultural-ideological-territorial landscapes that geographers have called "hybrid urbanisms" (Thrift & Amin, 2002). Planning commissions charged with shaping urban space through the police powers of the American Constitution, for instance, invoke instead the logic of market self-regulation to manage freshly legalized marijuana shops in Tacoma. Business groups in Seattle lobby for stronger regional planning strategies to facilitate global competitiveness. None of this is theoretically unexpected in APD work.

Intercurrence is made to capture, as Lucas (2015, p. 14) further notes, "the coexistence of multiple forms of governance, each of them premised on different assumptions about political authority, *within and across* . . . cities and urban policy domains." And so, incurrence "sees" neoliberalism, market values, privatization, outsourcing; but it also skillfully accommodates the sometimes radical spaces of progressive politics (Clavel & Kleniewski, 1988) as well as the broad range of public authority relations in actually existing metropolitan regions (Lewis & Neiman, 2009): private governance, yes, but "low-" and "high-" level authority institutions at the local and regional scales too (Lucas, 2015), with varying degrees of democratic oversight, technical-bureaucratic management, and policy aspirations around urban growth and regional development. As Fortner (2015, p. 2) argues in his own neo-Weberian defense of the "urban state," US city politics and urban policies are determined by economic context and democratic practices that are contingent upon: the design of government and its capacities to govern; relevant connections to larger political structures; and specific locations within broader economies.

As "urban APD" work remains small and nascent, however, claims within the more expansive literature on urban politics are crucial to consider. APD does not replace this previous work, jettisoning decades of valuable scholarship in various traditions of urban political economy. To be sure, differences with other approaches

are important. As earlier stated, Weberian work tends to assign more "causal weight" to variations in state structures, policy commitments, and local political cultures and indeed to the role of ideas (rather than simply material conflicts) in shaping unequal market arrangements; the state is also typically treated as more autonomous (if hardly unconnected) than it is epiphenomenal or crudely instrumental, although within APD it is, once again, subject to the tensions and abrading of intercurrence both vertically and horizontally.

But APD's application to cities must benefit, as urban regime theory did earlier, from longstanding and more recent research on the politics of growth. Weberian work of various kinds, including the work of Weber, is attentive, for example, to the economic power of market resources, and thus to the importance of private accumulation (wealth creation through profits and wages) in directly influencing the politics and policies of the local urban state. This is most obvious in the state's preemptive need for what I am calling here public solvency, i.e., for sufficient finances over time to provide public services, fund desired investment priorities, and meet fixed-expenses. It is also important to recognize how patterns in private accumulation impact and or impacted by patterns in social segregation, whether understand in racial or economic terms. While abject prejudice explains a lot in America, class and race segregation in space also relates to the fiscal fears that homeowners attach to "mixing" residential zones with lower-income neighbors and therefore to the constant if always thickly veiled defense of restrictive zoning and other land-use regulations. No geography of growth, smart or otherwise, could plausibly proceed without trying to grasp the spatially variegated politics of accumulation, segregation, and solvency.

That said, I argue that no critical geography of smart growth, particularly where deployed in principle as a major regional planning strategy for leveraging urban sustainability, should really stop there. At bottom, then, Fig. 3.1 considers the animating role of three additional socio-spatial goals, which are also simultaneously manifested as narrative cultural stories and institutional routines across space, time, and scale. These are technical efficiency, ecological resiliency, and social justice. Let us take each in turn before offering preliminary conclusions.

Making urban growth *smart* in the pursuit of global sustainability is not simply a political-economic project, wherein broad-gauged policies emanate out of state and economy to reshape city-regions *tout court*. Urban space "at the coalface" is engineered, designed, and molded into specific architectonic forms that stretch across space, time and scale to provide both the slowly changing "containers" of, and faster-moving "conduits" for, economic, political, and cultural life (Thrift & Amin, 2002).

Urban space embodies the political-economies of accumulation, segregation, and (in)solvency, but also: institutionalized technologies of waste, water, and asynchronous movements of all kinds (cars, bikes, trams, ships, animals, carbon, energy, digits); popular and radical architectures of setbacks, heights, colors, materials; and indeed, professionally administered plans that instantiate old, repackaged, and sometimes new ideas as well as multiple tools and techniques. (The 2015 comprehensive plan of Tacoma, for example, is 730 pages long.) As

discussed in Chap. 2, smart growth's syncretic genealogy, its pragmatic attempts to merge an eclectic range of ideals around urban form and planning process, its explicit valorization of mixed-uses, public movement, functional integration, urban intensification, and eco-rural protection—all these find variously located advocates, translators, and skeptics who are each managing bits of pieces of real places: roads, bus stops, homes, apartments, waste dumps, park programs, permits, federal funds. Following intercurrence, of course, these various attempts by various people in various institutional settings all confront an obdurate world of prior construction; of contrasting cultures within different parts of the multi-scaled state; of wider social tensions around "value." But the city-region is nonetheless a socio-technical artifact no less than a politico-economic machine.

The real rub between state-progressive and societal-radical treatments of urban sustainability, also discussed in Chap. 2, is therefore where to focus; how much to expect; which "dimension" of the restructured city-region—the socio-technical or the politico-economic, respectively—can most effect our two remaining sustainability goals: ecological resiliency and social justice? To restate key questions broached first in Chap. 2: Can smart growth be part and parcel of state-progressive space, *a new counter movement* that checks, controls, or modifies the impact of market forces, or is it shaped too decisively by neoliberalization and the demands for a sustainability fix? Are the new metropolitan spaces that smart growth makes (Dierwechter, 2014), in Seattle and elsewhere, about carbon-based capitalism's need for throughput accumulation, or is smart growth better understood as urbanism "with an ecological twist"?

When severed from wider politico-economic realities, as critical geographers like Eliot Tretter, Rob Krueger, David Gibbs, Gordon McLeod, and a few others (including myself in some pieces) have intimated, discourses of smart growth come off well enough as technical accounts of physical reengineering and more flexible land regulations, of reducing wasteful fiscal outlays and ongoing developmental irrationalities in the extant geographies of capitalist growth management and its shockingly unfair distribution of benefits and burdens across metropolitan space.

But the problem space often shrinks to Grand Design. Put growth here, not there—and forge what will be insufficient or unused links to affordable housing incentives. Iron-out regulatory inconsistencies and inefficiencies. Complete arterial streets. Institute improved parking standards. Protect regional ecosystems and hobby farms from the low-density bulldozer, etc. All this may indeed contribute to lower per capita carbon footprints, an ecological benefit Todd Litman (2011) has effectively established in principle. That said, the critique runs, smart growth more often than not reinforces the (presumably untouched) structures of economic and political power if *merely* technical. Urban sustainability through smart growth typically means, in the end, improved efficiencies for the already privileged, for well-located homeowners, hipsters, and educated progressives (in parts of) cities like Seattle or Portland or Austin or Boston, but not everywhere. Complete streets only complete some lives.

Like Le Corbusier's modernist plans for colonial Chandigarh, the smart city only "orbits" the real lives of the poor, the marginal, the dispossessed—the growing

legions of the wounded homeless who survive beneath the green and gilded glitter in San Francisco. We get certain kinds of ecological resiliency (e.g., energy conservation, carbon reductions), but not social justice.

Critical geographies of smart growth do not, however cold-eyed, flatten out the *theoretical* possibilities of planning for social justice. As Elliot Tretter (2016, p. 149) notes in his recent work on Austin, "Smart Growth is not a set of values that is reducible to the beliefs and practices of a dominate group of planners or a single interest group. Indeed, it is a pliable set of ideals . . . that of composed of a vast assortment of competing, often contradictory, values systems." While he charts smart growth in Austin as a largely "technocratic" exercise aligned so far with the agenda of a "growth coalition," he nonetheless signals its empirical possibilities if politicized sufficiently from below (and perhaps above); if its theoretical "pliability" is shaped more by the progressive values of desegregation and inclusive opportunity, even those associated with the emerging Polanyian-like "countermovements" that other urban scholars have located in a complex, mutating American polity (Warner & Clifton, 2013). In Tretter's (2016) view, this means deepening democratic control over local and regional planning (p. 150). It means embedding smart growth is a reformed politico-economic world.

The urgency of that task is upon us, in Greater Seattle as much as anywhere in the USA. Arthur Nelson (2013, p. 1) calculates that, as the heavy dust from the Great Recession finally settles, more than $20 trillion will be spent on reshaping America's metropolitan areas by 2030. How will all that money "land" in space, exactly? When we theorize metropolitan space through APD as a geography of multiple orders, I argue here, we expect to see a variegated story of smart growth steadily developing, especially where the institutional tensions and constant abrading associated with intercurrence over political times and across territorial scales are analytically foregrounded. Much, and maybe even most, of that story will comport broadly with critical geographical readings of smart growth, with the standing hypothesis that technical efficiencies and ecological resiliencies will marginally improve, but private accumulation and social segregation will work mainly to service a local state apparatus strait-jacketed by the heavy pressures of public solvency in a time of fiscal austerity, mounting inequality, and large-scale corporate income tax evasion.[1]

But there is a parallel hypothesis. We may also see other, more progressive, if only partial kinds of sociopolitical stories, and for three thematically related reasons.

The first reason is the diversity of the US local state. As Lewis and Neiman (2009) have shown in their large-N, explicitly neo-Weberian treatment of the new growth politics in Californian cities, both residential and economic development strategies, the very stuff of smart growth and urban sustainability, are actually

[1]The Center for Tax Justice reports that between 2008–2012 the Boeing Corporation, for example, made total profits of $20.5 billion, but actually had a Federal income tax rate of −1.0 %. See http://www.ctj.org/corporatetaxdodgers/sorrystateofcorptaxes.pdf (p. 51).

subject to "a wide degree of variation" (p. 162). Arguing for a certain measure of urban political autonomy in policy design, they propose that, in fact, local growth choices are shaped by "custodians of place" who reflect rather differently upon their own community conditions; who forge remarkably diverse municipal visions; and, finally, who do not necessarily genuflect to "monocausal" fiscal influences or uniform corporate pressures. "Officials from high-status cities," for example, "may well recognize the need to house the workers who staff local jobs, many of which are low paying, at least relative to the prevailing incomes of residents in affluent communities" (p. 169). Other wealthy places, of course, may work hard to *deflect* the residential poor away through aggressive growth control measures. But the larger point is, following intercurrence, policy diversity across political space.

The second reason is the evolving diversity of US metropolitan geography. Urban core gentrification, the demolition and political remaking of public housing (Goetz, 2011), and heightened foreign immigration to suburbs rather than cities (Modarres, 2009), have slowly forged a "new metropolis" reworking extant social patterns (and policy spaces) in which poverty and segregation were once "contained" within original urban cores (Weir, 2011). By 2005, for example, most poor people in large metropolitan areas of the USA lived in suburbs. As upper-income whites have returned to core cities, geographies of economic opportunity have also changed. Stark city/suburban antinomies are shifting. Older solutions to concentrated poverty, including calls for political regionalism, fiscal tax-base sharing, and policy commitments to inclusionary zoning (IZ) reforms and fair-share housing strategies are, at best, uneven and inchoate Such changes in social, policy, and economic geographies of metropolitan space arguably help to elucidate rather directly the local political variegation that Lewis and Neiman have charted. Margaret Weir (2011) argues that locational advantage (i.e., proximity to jobs) and local organizational endowment (i.e., political and institutional capacity) interlock contingently to create assorted kinds of metropolitan communities. Some communities, including increasingly diverse suburbs, are poorly located in economic space and also poorly endowed in political, institutional, and fiscal capacity. Such communities struggle to combat "extrusion," where low-income residents are both far away from jobs (that have "sprawled out" in recent decades) and also lack local social and public services (e.g., transit lines). In contrast, other communities—such as the high-status cities discussed above—are well located in regional economic space and politically capable while liberal as well, leading to locally progressive policies of "inclusion."[2] The larger point I want to make is once again the same: policy diversity across local political space strongly suggests a "geography of multiple orders," where core questions of growth, sustainability, justice, and urban developmental choices are spatially situated, politically contingent, and historically path-dependent.

[2]A Seattle-based example is Redmond, WA, the home of Microsoft, which has IZ policies. See: https://redmond.gov/PlansProjects/ComprehensivePlanning/RedmondCommunityIndicators/Choices/HousingAffordability/.

The third and final reason is diversity within US local planning. Recalling Lucas (2015, p. 14), intercurrence not only captures "multiple forms of governance" *across* cities (e.g., Lewis and Nieman or Weir) but *within* them, and especially *within* critical urban policy domains like comprehensive planning. Following APD, this has ideational-cultural and institutional dimensions. As popularly conceived by most laypersons, comprehensive plans offer unitary, often visualized "blueprints" that provide a "how-to" manual for future development choices—a still powerful meta-narrative of urban planning practices forged originally in the late nineteenth century. In reality, though, comprehensive plans seek only to corral (or "rationalize") many other documents and intentions, most of which originate in bodies that do not necessarily share the values of comprehensive planning as a technical-professional endeavor (Altshuler, 1965). For Kristina Ford, reflecting on her experiences in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina,

> [In the eyes of] a modern city planner the word "plan" implies a compendium of mostly unillustrated documents that [might] act together to predict and oversee the process of urban development. Such documents include economic studies and projections, demographic descriptions of local citizenry, and many technical reports and individual plans for various aspects of city life (Ford, 2010, p. 45).

Efforts to amalgamate this "compendium" into a coherent program for space over the multiple political times of history in a given community located somewhere in regional (and global) economic space that in turn is endowed unevenly with political and institutional capacity are, in short, efforts to overcome constant intercurrence.

There will be many failures, tensions, and missed opportunities, both real and perceived. But there just might also be the odd success, however small or unnoticed in the wider palimpsest of territorial governance and urban (re)development. On this final point, it is not only a question of what Pierre Clavel (2010) and others have documented in the US progressive cities literature for several decades as "the aggressive use of public planning to shape the nature of the local economy and a commitment to democratic participation in local decision making by previously disenfranchised groups," however still important (Clavel & Kleniewski, 1988, p. 202). It is also a question of how many *non-municipal* actors, such as Metropolitan Planning Organizations (e.g., Kirwan Institute, 2010) or far less-studied "progressive counties," shape these dynamics, including joint-work with environmental- and community-based social justice organizations (e.g., King County, 2015). A range of outcomes is possible.

3.4 Conclusions

The pursuit of urban sustainability through smart growth programs, policies, and projects in any US metropolitan area raises theoretical questions about how to describe and explain the empirically variegated ways in which constrained local

and regional planning strategies in a federal polity now moored economically in global space ultimately (re)shape urban form. The APD concept of intercurrence offered here highlights the inevitable abrading of multiple political orders at any given site, forcing us to reconsider the geopolitical-economies of smart growth as a heavily contested form of American territorial governance.

Rather than theorize the landscapes of smart growth as self-evident spaces of piecemeal sustainability or as delusional distractions from capitalist unsustainability, as progressive or neoliberal, as policy savior or political Satan, intercurrence allows us to capture the variegated, multi-scaled (re)order(ings) of smart growth *that are in tension as they chafe with one another in political times, across metropolitan spaces, and over territorial scales of regulation and investment*. Intercurrence specifically helps us to account for the syncretic nature of smart growth as a multi-scalar political strategy of territorial planning and (sub)urban (re) development as well as for the uneven nature of smart growth as an urban and geographical formation. Ultimately, intercurrence gives us a potentially fresh way, I am suggesting in this book, "to explain and evaluate the typical outcomes of planning so far," to recall Susan Feinstein's head quote (op cit.).

Let us turn, then, to the methodological question of how these theoretical concerns and core claims can be studied empirically in the specific case of Greater Seattle, arguably one of the country's exemplary city-regions for urban sustainability experimentations and activist smart growth planning policies.

References

Allard, S., Burns, N., & Gamm, G. (1998). Representing urban interests: The local politics of state legislatures. *Studies in American Political Development*, *12*(2), 267–302.

Almond, G. (1988). The return to the state. *American Political Science Review*, *82*(3), 853–874.

Altshuler, A. (1965). The goals of comprehensive planning. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, *31*(2), 186–195.

Antonio, R. (2005). Max Weber in the Post-World War two US and after. *Etica & Politica*. Department of Philosophy, University of Trieste.

Barber, B. (2013). *If mayors ruled the world: Dysfunctional nations, rising cities*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bouie, J. (2015). *Where Black Lives Matter began*. Retrieved September 3, 2016, from http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/08/hurricane_katrina_10th_anniversary_how_the_black_lives_matter_movement_was.html.

Bouteligier, S. (2012). *Global cities and networks for global environmental governance*. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis.

Brenner, N. (2009). Is there a politics of 'urban' development? Reflections on the US case. In R. Dilworth (Ed.), *The city in American Political Development*. New York: Routledge.

Burns, N., Evans, L., Gamm, G., & McConnaughy, C. (2009). Urban politics in the state arena. *Studies in American Political Development*, *23*(1), 1–22.

Clavel, P. (1986). *The progressive city*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Clavel, P. (2010). *Activists in City Hall: The progressive response to the Reagan Era in Boston and Chicago*. Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press.

Clavel, P., & Kleniewski, N. (1988). Space for progressive local policy: Examples from the United States and the United Kingdom. In J. Logan & T. Swanstrom (Eds.), *Beyond the city limits: Urban policy and economic restructuring in comparative perspective*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Dahl, R. (1961). *Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dierwechter, Y. (2013). Smart growth and state territoriality. *Urban Studies*, *50*(11), 2275–2292.

Dierwechter, Y. (2014). The spaces that smart growth makes: Sustainability, segregation, and residential change across greater Seattle. *Urban Geography*, *35*(5), 691–714. doi:10.1080/02723638.2014.916905.

Dilworth, R. (Ed.). (2009). *The city in American Political Development*. New York: Routledge.

Domhoff, G. W., & Gendron, R. (2008). *The leftmost city power and progressive politics in Santa Cruz*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Erie, S. (1990). Bringing the bosses back in: The Irish political machines and urban policy making. *Studies in American Political Development*, *4*, 269–281. doi:10.1017/S0898588X0000095X.

Erie, S., & Mackenzie, S. (2009). The L.A. school and politics noir: Bringing the local state back in. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, *31*(5), 537–557.

Ethington, P. (1993). Urban constituencies, regimes, and policy innovation in the Progressive Era: An analysis of Boston, Chicago, New York City, and San Francisco. *Studies in American Political Development*, *7*(2), 275–315. doi:10.1017/S0898588X00001115.

Fainstein, S. (2005). Planning theory and the city. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *25*(2), 121–130. doi:10.1177/0739456x05279275.

Ford, K. (2010). *The trouble with city planning: What New Orleans can teach us*. New Haven: Yale.

Fortner, M. J. (2015). Straight, no chaser: Theory, history, and the muting of the urban state. *Urban Affairs Review,* online before print. doi:10.1177/1078087415608007

Gerring, J. (2003). APD from a methodological point of view. *Studies in American Political Development*, *17*(1), 82–102. doi:10.1017/S0898588X03000026.

Glenn, B. (2004). The two schools of American Political Development. *Political Studies Review*, *2*(2), 153–165. doi:10.1111/j.1478-9299.2004.00005.x.

Goetz, E. (2011). *New deal ruins*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell.

Gottschalk, M. (2000). "It's the health-care costs, stupid!": Ideas, institutions, and the politics of organized labor and health policy in the United States. *Studies in American Political Development*, *14*(2), 234–252.

Hawley, E. (1966). *The new deal and the problem of monopoly*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hodos, J. (2009). Against expectionalism: Intercurrence and intrgovernmental relations in Britain and the United States. In R. Dileorth (Ed.), *The city in American Political Development*. New York: Routledge.

Hunter, F. (1953). *Community power structure: A study of decision makers*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Jonas, A. (2013). City-regionalism as a Contingent 'Geopolitics of Capitalism'. *Geopolitics*, *18*(2), 284–298. doi:10.1080/14650045.2012.723290.

Judd, D., Stoker, G., & Wolman, H. (1995). *Theories of urban politics*. London: Sage.

King County. (2015). *King County equity and social justice strategic plan: Communty engagement report*. Seattle: King County.

Kirwan Institute. (2010). *The geography of opportunity: Mapping to promote equitable community development and fair housing in King County, WA*. Columbus, OH: Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity.

Krasner, S. (1984). Approaches to the state: Alternative conceptions and historical dynamics. *Comparative Politics*, *16*(2), 223–246.

Lewis, P., & Neiman, M. (2009). *Custodians of place: Governing the growth and development of cities*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Litman, T. (2011). Can smart growth policies conserve energy and redcue emissions? *Center for Real Estate Quarterly Journal*, *5*(2), 21–30.
Logan, J., & Molotch, H. (1987). *Urban fortunes: The political economy of place*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Lucas, J. (2015). Urban governance and the American political development approach. *Urban Affairs Review*. doi: 10.1177/1078087415620054 (First published date: 23 December 2015).
Lynn, L. (2008). *What is a Neo-Weberian state? Reflections on a concept and its implications*. Chicago. Retrieved from http://iss.fsv.cuni.cz/ISS-50-version1-080227_TED1_Lynn_Whats_neoweberian_state.pdf
Modarres, A. (2009). Immigrants are greening our cities, how about giving them a a break? *New Geography*. Retrieved from http://www.newgeography.com/content/00958-immigrants-are-%E2%80%98greening%E2%80%99-our-cities-how-about-giving-them-a-break
Molotch, H. L., & Logan, J. R. (2007). *Urban fortunes: The political economy of place* (20th anniversary ed., with a new pref. ed.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Nelson, A. C. (2013). *Reshaping Metropolitan America*. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Orren, K. (1986). Union politics and postwar liberalism in the United States, 1946–1979. *Studies in American Political Development*, *1*, 215–252. doi:10.1017/S0898588X00000365.
Orren, K., & Skowronek, S. (1996). Institutions and intercurrence: Theory building in the fullness of time Nomos XXXVII. In I. Shapiro & R. Hardin (Eds.), *Political order*. Nomos 38. New York: New York University Press.
Orren, K., & Skowronek, S. (2004). *The search for American Political Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rast, J. (2015). Urban regime theory and the problem of change. *Urban Affairs Review*, *51*(1), 138–149. doi:10.1177/1078087414559056.
Revell, K. (1999). The road to Euclid v. Ambler: City planning, state-building, and the changing scope of the police power. *Studies in American Political Development*, *13*(1), 50–145.
Rodgers, D. (2005). The search for American Political Development (review). *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, *36*(2), 275–276.
Rogers, S. (Ed.). (2009). *Urban geography: Urban growth machine* (vol. 12). Oxford: Elsevier.
Skocpol, T. (1985). Introduction. In P. Evans, R. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol (Eds.), *Bringing the state back in*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skowronek, S. (1982). *Building a new American state: The expansion of national administrative capacities, 1877-1920*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Skowronek, S. (2003). What's wrong with APD. *Studies in American Political Development*, *17*, 107–110.
Stone, C., & Whelan, R. (2009). Through the glass darkly: The once and future study of urban politics In R. Dilworth (Ed.), *The city in American political development*. New York: Routledge
Thrift, N., & Amin, A. (2002). *Cities: Reimagining the urban*. Cambridge: Polity.
Toly, N. (2008). Transnational municipal networks in climate politics: From global governance to global politics. *Globalizations*, *5*(3), 341–356.
Tretter, E. (2016). *Shadows of a sunbelt city*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Warner, M., & Clifton, J. (2013). Marketization, public services and the city: The potential for Polanyian counter movements. *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, *7*(1), 45–61. doi:10.1093/cjres/rst028.
Weir, M. (2011). Creating justice for the poor in the new metropolis. In C. Hayward & T. Swanstrom (Eds.), *Justice and the American metropolis*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Winchell, D., & Ramsey, G. (2013). Indigenous rural renewal in the Inland Pacific Northwest: The emergence of American Indian tribes in regional economic development. *Journal of Rural and Community Development*, *8*(3), 174–196.

Chapter 4
Methodology: Mixed-Methods Research Design

> *Mixed methods research, when undertaken from a transformative stance, is the use of qualitative and quantitative methods that allow for the collection of data about historical and contextual factors, with special emphasis on issues of power. . ..*
>
> —Donna Mertens (cited in Johnson et al., 2007, p. 120)

4.1 Introduction

Efforts to understand the trans-disciplinary search for enhanced urban sustainability through the state-mediated strategy of smart growth within Greater Seattle—the purpose of this book—suggest, I shall argue here, a mixed-methods research design or overall methodological approach. Work in the social sciences remains largely bifurcated between quantitative and qualitative approaches. But in recent decades mixed-methods work, sometimes also called multimethod or mixed research design (Nzeadibe, Anyadike, & Njoku-Tony, 2012; Thibert, 2015), has emerged in geography, planning, education, and many other urban fields as a "third major research approach or research paradigm" (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007, p. 112). This chapter briefly elucidates the book's research epistemology (or philosophy). It then details the overall analytical framework, which includes details of research questions, data sources, and modes of analysis in the empirical chapters that follow.

4.2 "Abductive" Research Epistemology

Any given research paradigm is subject to internal differences and debates. This includes even the mundane definition of research method or research design (terms often used interchangeably). In a narrow sense, research design refers to the methodology of a particular study, which involves elaborating key research questions, justifying data sources and collection procedures, explaining modes of analysis, and suggesting strategies for discursive and numerical representations

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Dierwechter, *Urban Sustainability through Smart Growth*, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54448-9_4

(Harwell, 2011, p. 148). More expansive definitions of research design include detailed elaborations of literature reviews, theoretical framings, and so on.

This chapter adopts the narrower definition. The focus is predominantly on refining and operationalizing the overall research questions; discussing data sources and collection; and elaborating the key modes of analysis and analytical representations. That said, I agree with mixed-method researchers in various fields who argue expansively for the growing benefits of deploying (1) different kinds of data sources (qualitative and quantitative); (2) different data collection techniques (archival, interviews, observation, etc.); and (3) diverse strategies of representation (e.g., historical narratives, case studies, GIS, statistics). In this book, such benefits include the methodological presumptions of complementarity, wherein qualitative and quantitative data provide overlapping but distinctive facets of a particular phenomenon under study, as well as expansion, which refers to improved clarification and data richness (Harwell, 2011). I further maintain, though do not seek to defend in this or other chapters, that such a design commitment reflects a certain degree of philosophical pragmatism that directly influences how the social world around us is intellectually engaged, and why. As Wheeldon explains:

> Instead of relying on deductive [quantitative] reasoning and general premises to reach specific conclusions or inductive [qualitative] approaches that seek general conclusions based on specific premises, [pragmatic mixed-method research] allows for a more flexible abductive approach. . .. As such, [researchers so engaged] *have no problem with asserting both that there is a single "real world" and that all individuals have their own unique interpretations of that world* (cited in Harwell, 2011, p. 152, emphasis added).

Such a philosophy resists dichotomies. The epistemological commitment to an "abductive approach" means, on my reading, a post-positivist or post-objectivist concern with partial, often institutionally embedded understandings of a politically and economically constructed world. Yet it also adopts a realist ontology that social relations *per se* are not reducible to atomized visions or relative forms of post-modernized knowledge wholly "situated" by specific social categories. I disagree that there are "no facts," as Friedrich Nietzsche held, "only interpretations" but do agree that *facts* (e.g., a collapsing African-American population in Seattle; ozone destruction; industrial specialisms) generate competing, contingent interpretations and restricted impressions from actor to actor. Trees fell in forests long before humans appeared to chop them down. Put another way, things do exist "independently of being perceived, or independently of our theories about them," but as Frazer and Lacey suggest: "Even if one is a realist at the ontological level, one could be an epistemological interpretivist. . .our knowledge of the real world is inevitably interpretive and provisional rather than straightforwardly representational" (cited in Maxwell, 2012, p. 5).

Abductive reasoning (or logic) suggests that we aim to offer successive approximations of our world through numbers, words, maps and/or figures; that we try to capture an urban domain of multiple orders, for instance, without assuming positivist reproduction from the real to the represented caveated only by statistical probability. Albert O. Hirschman decades ago encouraged social scientists of economic, cultural, and political development to "devise analytical foundations

that express rather than conceal the complexities of human motivations and institutions" (McPherson, 1989, pp. 157–159). For example, capitalism is the "destroyer of social fabric" but also "too feeble" to overcome many sociocultural formations; "these contradicting tendencies," Hirschman paradoxically concluded, "are present at once" (ibid.). Finally, I accept Donna Mertens' view in the head quote above that mixed-methods "allow for the collection of data about historical and contextual factors, with special emphasis on issues of power." Such views seem generally consistent with this book's use of the synoptic concept of "intercurrence" as the key theoretical concept. Both historical and contemporary contexts require illumination through various ways of knowing and epistemological strategies.

4.3 Analytical Framework: Questions, Claims, Data

In the first three chapters of this book, I posed a number of thematically related but still synoptic research questions that are broadly interpretative in nature and, therefore, in need of refinement. These include the following.

As arguably "the most prominent planning approach for sustainable land use and urban development" (Green Leigh & Hoelzel, 2012, p. 90), how might we judge "the spaces that smart growth makes" (Dierwechter, 2014)? Put another way, how does smart growth "shape urban form" and what are its "distributional effects" even as it is embedded within, and institutionally reflective of, major political, economic, and cultural forces pushing unevenly across times, spaces and scales (Fainstein, 2005, p. 122)? Roughly understood, is smart growth state-progressive space, a counter movement that checks, controls, or modifies the impact of market forces, or is it shaped too decisively by neoliberalization and the demands for a sustainability fix? Are the new metropolitan spaces that smart growth makes—in Greater Seattle or anywhere else—only about carbon-based capitalism's structural need for "throughput accumulation," or is smart growth better understood with ecological modernizers as urbanism with an ecological twist? Is planning for smart growth in strongly institutionalized settings a progressive, malleable space for collaborative regional empowerment? Or is it, alternatively, a convenient space for overpowering forces that seek to rationalize regional accumulation as urban sustainability and green corporate citizenship?

At the end of Chap. 3, I suggest two seemingly contending hypotheses for how these various questions of interpretation might be answered.

- I conjecture first (with other critical geographers of smart growth) that while technical efficiencies and ecological resiliencies will marginally improve, private accumulation and social segregation will work mainly to service a local state apparatus strait-jacketed by the heavy pressures of public solvency in a time of fiscal austerity, mounting social inequality, and large-scale corporate income tax evasion. In consequence, the spatialities of smart growth across Greater Seattle are largely *technical* contributions to urban sustainability.

- Nonetheless, I also conjecture (with city planning and urban affairs scholars of progressive cities and policy counter-movements) that we might also observe other, more progressive, if still only partial kinds of sociopolitical stories. Here, in contrast, the new city-regional spatialities of smart growth across Greater Seattle offer more *transformative* contributions to the global search for urban sustainability.

When intercurrence is applied concretely to the metropolitan context, I specifically argue with (if differently from) scholars like Jack Lucas (2015, p. 4), we find across political space "multiple political orders coexisting at once, each with different purposes, internal organization, and ideological commitments," in large part because changes to political orders over political time "will not be as clean as any simple periodization might suggest." *Intercurrence, in my view, opens up ample theoretical room to account for both hypotheses*. Rather than theorize landscapes of smart growth as self-evident spaces of piecemeal sustainability or as delusional distractions from capitalist unsustainability, as progressive or neoliberal, as policy saviour or political Satan, intercurrence allows us to capture the variegated, multi-scaled (re)order(ings) of smart growth that are in tension as they chafe with one another in political times, across metropolitan spaces, and over territorial scales of regulation and investment. Intercurrence accounts for the syncretic nature of smart growth as a multi-scalar political strategy.

Main argument: As a strategy of urban sustainability, smart growth is spatially variegated across metropolitan space—i.e., unevenly taken up and differentially embedded—precisely because of what the American Political Development (APD) scholars like Orren and Skowronek (1996) call intercurrence, or "multiple orders in action" (Rodgers, 2005).

Figure 4.1 below provides an analytical framework or what I think of as my overall research approach for the empirical investigation of these questions and claims that constitutes the second half of this book. The core problem is simplified in the figure as the (un)sustainable spatialities of smart growth in Greater Seattle. To consider this problem, as just suggested, both quantitative and qualitative data are collected in a mixed-methods format.

Most of the quantitative data are derived from the US Census Bureau and relate to employment, housing, and transport. This narrows the study's overall epistemological focus to a manageable number of urban policy domains. I make use of quantitative data, for example, from the Local Employment Dynamics (LED) Partnership, which provides block- and census-track level information about jobs, workers, and local economies. The LED partnership includes two datasets : (1) Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI), which estimates trends in employment, hiring, job creation and destruction, and earnings, with details on geography, age, gender, and industry from 1990 to 2015 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016); and (2) Longitudinal Employment-Household Dynamics-Origin-Destination Employment

Ch 6. Plans and policies	Ch 7. Housing and sprawl	Ch 8. Transport and labor
Problem: (Un)sustainable spatialities of smart growth in Greater Seattle		
Metropolitan Context 1. *Geography*: Metropolitan position-and-composition of municipalities 2. *State*: Nature of local regime 3. *Planning*: Comprehensive planning goals and policies	Smart Growth 1. *Location*: compact growth, preservation 2. *Connectivity*: transit choice, walkability 3. *Design*: housing mix 4. *Procedures*: efficiency, participation	Development Outcomes 1. *Accumulation*: jobs and firms 2. *(De)Segregation*: race, class, housing 3. *Solvency*: fiscal capacity 4. *Resiliency*: climate plans 5. *Justice*: redistributive spaces and policy efforts
Quantitative data 1. Census-Local Employment Dynamics (LED) Partnership (ch 6) http://lehd.ces.census.gov/data/ 2. Other Census data: (ch 6,7,8) • http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml • http://www.census.gov/econ/geo-city.html 3. PSRC-Residential building permits (Census derived) (ch 7) • http://www.psrc.org/data/pophousing/permits 4. Transport Analysis Data (ch 8) • http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning/census_issues/ctpp/ • http://lehd.ces.census.gov/data/		Qualitative data 1. Secondary histories of the region (ch 5) 2. Interviews and personal communication (ch 5,6,7,8) • Municipalities • Counties • PSRC, Sound Transit, Tribes, Housing Authorities 3. Public documents/plans/webpages (ch 5,6,7,8) • Municipalities, Housing authorities • Counties, Tribes • PSRC, Sound Transit • State-level agencies (e.g. Commerce) • Federal agencies (e.g. EPA, HUD) 4. Newspaper articles (e.g. Seattle Times, Tacoma News Tribune, Washington post) (ch 5,6,7,8)

Fig. 4.1 Research framework and data sources

statistics (LODES). The LODES data provide annual employment statistics linking home and work locations at the Census-block level. I further access a range of Census and policy-related data on the social, economic and fiscal profiles of specific communities within Greater Seattle. Finally, I explore census and other data prepared by the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC), especially on local employment trends, population and housing changes, local permit activity, and transportation policies.

To complement and expand the study, the analysis also draws on a range of qualitative data. Though not primarily a work in history, much less an original historical account drawing on primary sources, Chap. 5 draws especially on the published historiography of the region as well as accounts of the recent past by academic social scientists, journalists, and popular writers. This includes work that addresses the historical development of the overall political economy of Greater Seattle, or parts of Seattle, as well as literature that addresses environmental and social themes. This work is reinterpreted selectively here within the theoretical framework, exploring both ideas and institutions across time and space.

A second major source of qualitative data used here is interviews and/or personal correspondence (emails, informal conversations, group discussions) over many years with public officials, particularly planners, working in municipalities, counties, tribes, and regional governance bodies. These data are important in judging various local regimes' dispositions towards growth choices, planning histories, as well as perceived policy successes and ongoing development problems. That said, I have refrained in this book from extensive quotations of interviewees in text, but rather have drawn on informants for background information, policy clarity, and/or situational context.

Impressions of local planning and policy problems have included the following individuals: Chuck Kleeberg (Pierce County), Chip Vincent (Pierce County, City of Renton), Brianna Burroughs (City of Mercer Island, City of Fife, City of SeaTac), Chris Pasinetti (City of Fife), Steve Atkinson (City of Tacoma), Lindsey Sehmel (City of Bremerton, City of Gig Harbour), Dan Cardwell (Pierce County), Chelsea Levy (Sound Transit), Charlie Howard (PSRC), Patrick Reed (City of Seattle), Robin Mayhew (PSRC), Jeff Storrar (PSRC), Kristy Lynnett (City of Tacoma), Ryan Dicks (Pierce County), Tom Utterback (City of Puyallup), Tiffany Spiers (Master Builders Association), Jo Edgall (Puyallup Tribe, Nisqually Tribe), David Iyall (Nisqually Tribe), Dan Buehl (City of Bonney Lake, Pierce County), Amy Pow (Metro Parks, Pierce County), Ben Bakkente (PSRC), Bill Smith (City of Tacoma), Patrick Reed (City of Seattle), Ran Mello (City of Tacoma), Sarah Vanangs (City of Redmond), Brian Boudet (City of Tacoma), Brian Flint (Sierra Club), Elizabeth Leaf (ABHL consultants), Elton Gatewood (City of Tacoma), Glenn Hull (City of Fife), Jason Sullivan (City of Bonney Lake), Josh Jorgensen (Tacoma Housing Authority), Dave Swindale (City of University Place), Jo Tovar (Shoreline, planning consultant), Rocky Piro (PSRC), and Kenneth George (City of Gig Harbour),

I also acknowledge the influence here of a 2015 public panel discussion on "jobs and housing" I moderated with Ron Sims (King County, Housing and Urban

Development); David Boe (City of Tacoma, Boe Associates), Ethan Seltzer (Portland State University), and Carey Bozeman (City of Bellevue, City of Bremerton, independent consultant) as well as a 2013 forum I co-organised with the Puget Sound Regional Council on regional transportation investments that included insights from Fred Jarrett (King County, Washington State legislature), Pat McCarthy (Pierce County), Josh Brown (Kitsap County), Dave Gossett (Snohomish County), and Robert Puentes (Brookings Institute). Where appropriate, I identify informants with specific ideas, whether as direct quotes or simply by more general influence.

The third source of qualitative data of particular importance to this study, notably in Chap. 6 on plans and policy geographies, is public planning and policy documents, some of which are available on public webpages while others were collected from planners that help to situate and crosscheck materials. In addition, on occasion, I draw on local and national newspaper accounts, photo archives from the Tacoma Public Library, publically available videos of local government meetings, as well as activist and policy blogs.

4.4 Modes of Analysis and Discursive Representation

These mixed data sources directly inform the analysis of main thematic areas previously discussed in this book, including the local metropolitan context, smart growth (histories and current policies), and wider developmental outcomes associated with urban sustainability. By way of conclusion here, specific modes of analysis of forms of data representation are summarised for each chapter below.

Chapter 5 presents a synoptic history of city-regional history across Greater Seattle. Methodologically, I rely extensively on secondary material, particularly books and articles that address specific aspects of the political economy and institutional evolution of the region. Chapter 5 is therefore largely a work of synthesis, if not quite a historiography of what we know about local regional development. As this is a book of social science rather than history, the representation of past events is freighted heavily with theoretical assumptions, in particular, those associated with themes extant in American Political Development. In consequence, I focus on trends and developments that illustrate what I argue are three main "orders" of interest here: segregated accumulation; state-progressivism; and radical-societal dissent. The "regional frame" adopted hopefully compensates for the absence of primary documents. Future work should, however, consider this methodological deficiency.

Chapter 6 focuses next on what I call "policy geographies," and relies extensively on critical readings of existing public plans, which, I argue, illustrate the intercurrence of publicly mediated *intensions* toward urban space. The analysis here focuses on close readings of select plans, drawing on recent work in planning theory, rather than all plans, and in different policy arenas in different kinds of communities. Plans are interpreted as institutional "artifacts" that are crucial not

only to planning, of course, but also to the approach taken in this book, which focuses heavily on the role of institutions and institutionalized *forces* (rules, routines, laws, policies, votes, etc.) rather than say, entrepreneurial innovations (e.g., an invention) or single historical moments (e.g., September 11, 2001). The idea here is that plans "carry" the histories of both institutions and ideas, and this can be read as tools that seek to shape society and space in certain ways at certain times. Key visuals from these plans are highlighted as a key mode of analysis, although efforts are also made to relate these plans to existing social and economic geographies.

Chapters 7 and 8, although drawing as well on a mix of data sources, tend to focus more heavily on quantitative and cartographic data, and thus tend to represent spatial developments across Greater Seattle more through numbers (charts, tables, histograms, etc.) and especially through maps of various functional relationships and patterns of development that have emerged across the regional space-economy since the 1990s. Unless otherwise noted, all the maps that appear in this book were generated using online geographical information science (GIS) tools, notably those associated with the LODES data recently developed by the US Census Bureau discussed above; I imported these data into a desktop ArcView GIS software for subsequent manipulation and preparation. In addition to the maps, Chap. 7 makes extensive use of residential permit data at the census tract level that is prepared annually by the PSRC since the early 1990s. Finally, I explore commute linkages between communities in Chap. 8, also drawn mainly form the LODES datasets, while analyzing census data on industrial specialisation by place though location quotients (LQs).

4.5 Conclusions

In this chapter I have suggested that the theoretical approach this book takes towards the critical geographical analysis of smart growth as a major strategy of urban sustainability should be based on what Wheeldon (op cit.) and others have called an "abductive" research design. Such a design blends a "realist" ontology of society with an "interpretive" epistemology, a commitment which in turns calls for the collection and analysis of different kinds of data, both qualitative and quantitative in nature, within an overall theoretical framework broadly accepting of such a methodological admixture and overall discursive approach. Accordingly, this book adopts a mixed-method case study design in order to explore intercurrence in different ways, wherein the urban social world is represented historically, institutionally, quantitatively, qualitatively, and cartographically. With Hirschman (op cit.), moreover, such an approach to representation seeks pragmatically to "express rather than conceal complexity."

References

Dierwechter, Y. (2014). The spaces that smart growth makes: Sustainability, segregation, and residential change across Greater Seattle. *Urban Geography*, *35*(5), 691–714. doi:10.1080/02723638.2014.916905.

Fainstein, S. (2005). Planning Theory and the City. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *25*(2), 121–130. doi:10.1177/0739456x05279275.

Green Leigh, N., & Hoelzel, B. (2012). Smart growth's blindside: Sustainable cities need productive urban industrial land. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *78*(1), 87–103.

Harwell, M. (2011). Research design in qualitative/quantitative/mixed methods. In C. Conrad & R. Serlin (Eds.), *The Sage handbook for research in education*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Johnson, R. B., Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Turner, L. A. (2007). Toward a definition of mixed methods research. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, *1*(2), 112–133. doi:10.1177/1558689806298224.

Lucas, J. (2015). Urban governance and the American political development approach. *Urban Affairs Review*. doi:10.1177/1078087415620054.

Maxwell, J. A. (2012). *A realist approach for qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

McPherson, M., Hirschman, A. O. (1989). In Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., & Newman, P. *The New Palgrave: Economic development*. London: Macmillan.

Nzeadibe, T. C., Anyadike, R. N. C., & Njoku-Tony, R. F. (2012). A mixed methods approach to vulnerability and quality of life assessment of waste picking in urban Nigeria. *Applied Research in Quality of Life*, *7*(4), 351–370.

Orren, K., & Skowronek, S. (1996). Institutions and intercurrence: Theory building in the fullness of time Nomos (28): 111–171.

Rodgers, D. (2005). The search for American political development (review). *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, *36*(2), 275–276.

Thibert, J. (2015). *Governing regions through collaboration: A view from North America Farnham*. Surrey, UK: Ashgate.

U.S. Census Bureau. (2016). *LED: New data from the states and the U.S. Census Bureau*.

Chapter 5
History: An (Un)sustainable Geo-History of Intercurrence

The past is never dead, it's not even past.

—William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun

5.1 Introduction

History builds epistemic foundations. Reading contemporary spatial politics and policy reforms, thinking about the nominally pragmatic, often mundane, yet (occasionally) critical search for urban sustainability through the implementation of smart growth plans and inter-scalar modes of territorial governance, thus first requires us to trace the "intercurrence" of multiple political orders around growth that have built up over time.

That is my purpose here. Specifically, this chapter, the longest in the book, offers a geo-history of the uneven growth of Greater Seattle that emphasizes fundamental politico-economic changes of particular relevance to the empirical themes detailed in Chaps. 6–8. The discussion selectively traces three major "orders" that, I argue, constitute key lineaments linking together the late eighteenth century with the early twenty-first century. These are: (1) a liberal politics of "segregated accumulation," which appears with the advent of industrialized urbanism after the 1850s yet survives today in new socio-spatial forms; (2) a state-reformist politics of "technical progress," which highlights various efforts to restructure market-liberal institutions associated with the metropolitan spread of segregated accumulation; and, accelerating from the late 1960s, (3) a more ecologically conscious and (at times) radical politics of "just resiliency"—first in Seattle and of late in Tacoma—that has increasingly challenged the technical and rational assumptions of a state-managed, market-oriented growth paradigm.

Following the theoretical claims I first made in Chap. 3, these lineaments—or variegated lines of contending orders—"abut and grate" with one another today, and so should not be interpreted as "phases" or "stages" in the ongoing transformation of the Greater Seattle city-region. In consequence, I insist here (and for the rest of the book) that "multiple orders" structure contemporary efforts to forge urban sustainability through the otherwise outwardly novel policies of smart growth

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Dierwechter, *Urban Sustainability through Smart Growth*, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54448-9_5

and regional spatial policy. The region's efforts to effect change, in other words, are shaped by the sheer *obduracy* of previously established orders, which resonate in fugue-like motifs across the geo-history of the wider region (Orren & Skowronek, 2004).

5.2 Colonialism and the Origins of Dispossession

History is partly what people make of their geographies. An aesthetically attractive inland body of water formed from slowly receding glaciers between 15,000 and 11,000 years ago, Puget Sound within the majestic Salish Sea of the Pacific Northwest provides connections today to the Pacific Ocean, the North American West Coast, Alaska, and the world beyond. Its nooks, crannies, natural harbors, fiords, and inlets, moreover, set in motion a distinctive historical geography of colonialism, urban settlement, and eco-regional redevelopment (Plate 5.1).

Like anywhere in the Americas, the Greater Seattle area of Puget Sound is built originally upon a process of unrelenting, sometimes violent, cultural dispossession and land alienation from various indigenous populations who have occupied the region for some 11,000 years (Thrush, 2007). Within what is today just the city of Seattle, to say nothing of the broader ecological region, various groups of Duwamish/Squamish had lived in small villages composed of cedar longhouses since at least the sixth century (Watson, 1999). Repeating a timeworn leitmotif in world history, nonnative, mostly white-European colonizers arrived (for good) only in 1851 in Seattle and 1852 in Tacoma, but in fact the region's economy and society had already started to reveal the co-transformative interpenetrations of Native American and European-American histories by the eighteenth century (Morgan, 1979; Thrush, 2007).

Reflecting its favorable maritime location, colonial dispossession and land alienation first came from the sea. Various European powers—Spain, Britain, and Russia—made formal if at first mostly feigning claims in and around the Pacific Northwest region in the 1770s and eighties, even as the newly proclaimed USA located on the other side of the North American continent would also enter the fracas from the sea and, in time and more importantly, by land. Spanish claims largely ended with the Nootka Conventions, and the British thereafter contended only with the USA for economic and political control. "Inward" colonization from Americans and other migrants followed the Lewis and Clark Expedition. Spain ceded rights north of the 42nd Parallel in 1819, although much of the Pacific Northwest was jointly occupied by both Britain and the USA until 1846. At that point the current boundary between Canada and the USA was negotiated. The state of Washington eventually joined the union in 1889, having been the Washington Territory from 1853 and, before that, a key part of the Oregon Territory from 1848, which included Idaho and sections of Wyoming and Montana (LeWarne & Ficken, 1988).

Plate 5.1 Nooks and crannies: Mount Rainier from Pierce County, 1939 (Courtesy of Tacoma Public Library, Image Archives http://search.tacomapubliclibrary.org/images/)

A colonial dynamic unfolded. The steady dispossession from, and marginalization of, Native Americans led, in time, to additional processes of industrialized urban-based accumulation, while ongoing modes of class and race segregation, concerted efforts in public organization (e.g., engineering, planning, services, war-making, institutional reforms), and constant private innovations in product development (e.g., Boeing, Microsoft, Amazon) critically reshaped nature and society into a different metropolitan space by the late-twentieth century. Now well into the twenty-first century, Greater Seattle is, following Alan Scott (2012), an increasingly "digitized" global city-regional space-economy of four million people spread unevenly over four major counties, albeit anchored around the large core city of Seattle in King County and, to a lesser extent, the port city of Tacoma in Pierce County. I explore these themes below, but nonetheless emphasize at the outset the importance of colonial dispossession—which remains significant today in its own right—as the basis for the maturation of what would become an industrialized urbanism of segregated accumulation after the 1850s.

5.3 Political Order I: Segregated Accumulation

Cities came late to Puget Sound, but came with industry. By the mid-nineteenth century, the urban industrialization process that had started in England in the late eighteenth century was moving westerly across North America in what Tellier (2011) calls the "American Corridor" of urban-industrial development. Key cities formed at the optimal interface of different types of transport systems, e.g., rails and ports.

Regardless of origins, though, sustained urban growth *at specific points* was not assured. According to Jane Jacobs (1969), cities only grow if they produce and import goods for their own needs, a process she calls "breakaway." Entrepreneurs launch new firms that forge more complex divisions of labor as they "create new work from old work" (p. 59). For example, after importing bicycles from the West in the nineteenth century, key Japanese cities soon developed a system of small bicycle repair shops. A "breakaway" process of making replacement parts eventually spawned new bicycle manufacturing firms. Some of these small firms soon advanced into exports. The key idea is that, as Jacobs puts it, "the Japanese could have invited a big American or European bicycle manufacture to establish a factory in Japan," but instead they built up their own manufacturing industries (p. 64). (Meanwhile, the Wright brothers of Dayton, Ohio had "broken away" from bicycle manufacturing to airplane construction.)

By the mid-nineteenth century, a proto-urban system of small transshipment points for the competitive export of raw materials like timber and coal—initially to San Francisco—emerged all along the shores of Puget Sound and, in truth, seemingly overnight, preceding rather than following the kinds of frontier agricultural developments seen elsewhere in the country. Cities came first. Indeed, the external stimulus of two gold rushes, first in a booming San Francisco and then later in the Klondike/Yukon, "gilded" the region's early prospects as a natural resource supplier and, especially for Seattle, logistical center (MacDonald, 1987). Trade-dependency for sustained economic growth is thus an early and recurrent local theme. As the main "nodes" for this export activity, Seattle and Tacoma would struggle fiercely for early dominance within this emerging urban-trading spatial system. But other potential nodes also formed part of the original economic story, most notably Olympia (which seemed to have many early advantages) along with now largely forgotten competitors such as Port Gamble, Port Townsend, and even Mukilteo, among several others (Ames, 1925).

Seattle's eventual rise and triumph once seemed unlikely, at least on the surface and when isolated from wider forces. The role of railroad capital is especially crucial to note (Coleman, 1932). When Tacoma rather than Seattle or Olympia was formally selected in 1873 as the terminus on Puget Sound for the Northern Pacific Railroad, it seemed the region's future was set out in the shiny new rails leading up from Portland, Oregon. Tacoma would surely be the dominant player. That same foreboding year, a raffish Doc Maynard, who actually renamed the city Seattle (from the original "Duwamps"), established the first store, and formally platted out

the embryonic community, died. It seemed a telltale omen. But paradoxically it was the absence rather than presence of large railroad capital in Seattle's initial real estate markets and local business life that arguably allowed for a more diverse and eventually resilient port, trade, and service-economy to develop in subsequent decades.

Seattle's early disadvantages turned out to be long-term strengths. Tacoma's better proximity to Portland had, of course, initial benefits. As MacIntosh and Wilma (1999) argue, "[Railroad officials Rice and Ainsworth], charged with locating the terminus, decided on Tacoma, which was scarcely a village, because it was closer to the Columbia River and required the least amount of track to be laid." Yet the mundane costs of track, which should have most benefited southernmost Olympia, hid the deeper motive of real estate: "[The railroad] delayed making the announcement until they secretly purchased as much of the land at Commencement Bay as they could, some distance from McCarver's [original] Tacoma City. The Northern Pacific called its settlement, New Tacoma" (ibid.). And as Norbert MacDonald (1987) further elaborates:

> Tacoma's very insignificance in 1873 made its choice a shrewd one, at least for Northern Pacific officials. They apparently reasoned that Seattle was not intrinsically superior to Tacoma as a terminal point. And as a real estate boom was inevitable for the community that got the terminus, they much preferred to reap such profits themselves, rather than let them go to local speculators in Seattle.

The political economy of land ownership in early Seattle was hardly egalitarian (Klingle, 2007). It was, once again, the local articulation of a national process of profound cultural dispossession and large-scale land alienation—in this case from the Duwamish, Puyallup, Tulalip, Nisqually, etc. (Lazarus, 1987; Watson, 1999). But as MacDonald specifically suggests, land ownership was already dispersed enough across local capital, starting with pioneers like Arthur Denny, Doc Maynard, Thomas Burke, and Henry Yestler. Combined with other strategic advantages, including the presence of accessible coal deposits in Renton and Newcastle, the establishment of a new territorial (later state) university, and proximity to the Snoqualmie Pass across the Cascade Mountains, Seattle soon overcome its early setbacks, especially in regard to Tacoma (Fig. 5.1). Even the calamity of the Great Seattle Fire in 1889 wiped away the city's inferior (largely wooden/sawdust) infrastructure, clearing the ground almost *in toto* for "new and improved" public interventions that rebounded later (Williams, 2015).

Various observers have explained this triumphalist story as the result of the "Seattle spirit," a hard to pin-down quality often mystically mobilized in the twentieth century by self-interested boosters (Jones, 1972). Charitably, Seattle had probably accumulated sufficient civic capital—"spirit"—to make collective political action relatively more effective than elsewhere in the region (Tate, 2000). Early on, that spirit was directed at what the local journalist George Turnbull in 1907 called the "slaughter" of Seattle's natural topography—"a one-side contest. . .for progress," he lamented, that I shall pick up again later in this chapter (cited in Williams, 2015, p. viii). Seattle's economy was clearly benefitting from a



Fig. 5.1 Populations of Seattle and Tacoma, 1890–2015 (Source: US Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/index.html)

far wider shift in regional development and local reproduction. In particular, the Klondike Gold Rush in Alaska/Yukon Territory during the late 1890s accelerated its dominance. But this rush only exposed existing strengths vis-à-vis other cities to provision, finance, insure, and otherwise manage new economic opportunities that invariably come along in history (Bagley, 1916). Important early on, for instance, Olympia became the state's government center, but no more.[1]

As a new political order, segregated accumulation in and around Seattle, "spirited" or not, emerged through both institutional-spatial and ideational-cultural dynamics. For Matthew Klingle (2007), for instance,

> Surveyors relied on the technology of the town plat—the grid system created by Thomas Jefferson and made into law by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787—that layered the land into discrete blocks to ease surveying, settlement, taxation, and eventually social order.

[1]Seattle's dominance is also reflected in the uneven historiography on the region. A review of *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, for example, shows that major articles dealing with Seattle outnumber those for Tacoma by roughly four to one. Moreover, hardly any serious historical scholarship addresses development issues in Everett, Bremerton, and especially Bellevue (the region's one obvious edge city). Various "local" histories abound, as in most regions (e.g., McDonald, 1984). But they tend to "run the gamut, from idiosyncratic exercises in nostalgia, to histories motivated by centennials or by efforts at town promotion, to collections of oral accounts, to picture books with varying amounts of context or reliable interpretation" (Withuhn, 2008).

> Jefferson's idealized arrangement. . .settled like an imaginary net over the rugged country to turn rough-hewn nature into workable property (p. 32).

That "net" settled unevenly and unjustly. Powerful cultural narratives—ideas—constructed the new urban spaces of industrialized accumulation around parallel, far older, discourses of racial and moral superiority:

> Steeped in a Jeffersonian tradition of improving the natural world to secure economic progress and political independence, white Americans [in Seattle and the wider region] were repelled by what they took as lack of initiative, ignoring the centuries of Indians' shaping their land through fire and cultivation to promote more abundant game and food plants (p. 31).

Just as the architects of apartheid in coastal cities like Cape Town found out in the twentieth century, the internal contractions and tensions of racialized forms of capitalism produced new spatial "solutions" that sullied synoptic ideologies of free-market opportunity and political democracy, even as "nature" succumbed to new forces of appropriation as well. Outnumbered 12:1 in the early years, whites needed Indian labor, and later Chinese labor, to secure profitable production. Klingle further notes that the new reservations in the Puget Sound area, forged fairly quickly in the 1850s out of Federal agreements such as the Treaty of Medicine Creek, "were designed less to contain Indians than to keep them accessible for labor" (p. 37).

Meanwhile Tacoma and its fine deep-water port also exhibited growth, at first equally robust but then more slowly and, structured early on by that dominant and more speculative railroad capital, less diversely. New forms of work did not appear fast enough, with insufficient spinoff activities from existing industries and firms. For Roger Sale (1976), in particular, Tacoma had stagnated too early into a company town, unable to extend its early logistical and transport advantages over Seattle:

> Seattle's [early population] figures resemble Portland's, Los Angeles', or Chicago's in their first decades of great growth. Tacoma's are like those for Hollyoke, Massachusetts, Bridgeport, Connecticut, or Scranton, Pennsylvania. [. . .] Seattle's businesses [were] less tied to speculation [. . .] While the industries [in Tacoma] directly connected with the railroad and the harbor held their own, [by 1910] all the others had fallen off. . . (p. 51).

Other scholars have largely agreed with Sales' analysis over the years (Castile, 1990, p. 124). From the vantage point of the 1940s, for example, Tacoma was (still) "a lumber metropolis," according to Gertrude McKean, a city that had largely failed to diversity sufficiently its port-lumber-industrial economy in the antecedent decades:

> By 1903 the basic pattern of Tacoma industry had been established, with the exception of wood pulp and chemical plants, which were added in 1928. Since 1903, although their relative positions have shifted and all groups have expanded, *types of industries have remained essentially unaltered*. [. . .] Tacoma is an industrial city dominated by wood processing, with five other significant types of manufacturing—food processing, electro-metallurgy, electrochemical and related industries, metal working, and shipbuilding (McKean, 1941, pp. 312, 320, emphasis added).

Such interpretations help to describe the early and persistent divergence between Tacoma and Seattle and their respective hinterlands (Pierce and King Counties, respectively).

This divergence shapes problems today (Talton, 2015). At first little more than a "de facto colony" of San Francisco (Klingle, 2007, p. 47), Seattle soon exhibited a greater capacity for firm diversification. Despite its seemingly optimal location, Tacoma did not, leading to a regionally relative but still persistent sluggishness over time. As early as 1900, Seattle was fast pulling away from the rest of the still new urban nodes in the area. Tacoma's population grew. Seattle's grew far more. By 1920, when the mass-produced automobile was starting to put in place the technical pre-conditions for large-scale suburbanization, Seattle was already three times larger than Tacoma. Even as early as 1894, one Seattle Club member saw the two pioneering cities playing rather different if tensely complementary roles across the wider ecological region. "Well, gentlemen," he said, "if I were a man of wealth seeking a home and investments on Puget Sound, I would live in Tacoma and invest in Seattle" (Morgan, 1979, p. 332).

As late as 2015, these basic roles seemed eerily familiar—particularly when expanded spatially to include their respectively (sub)urbanized home counties, Pierce and King. Jon Talton (2015) puts the matter this way:

> The tantalizing question is whether affordable Tacoma could become Oakland to Seattle's San Francisco. Only 34 miles separate them. The biggest impediment is a 1970s transportation system dependent on a clogged Interstate 5. [. . .] Fix that, and Tacoma could see a beneficial spillover [. . . .] Until then, Tacoma will be an outlier: a major West Coast city that isn't booming (p. np).

Like Oakland, Jon Talton argues, Tacoma/Pierce County continues to offer local "affordability"—a place to seek a home. If transportation links to/from Seattle improve over time, it could just "boom" under the beneficial effects of "spillover." But Talton still assumes that Tacoma's destiny (its growth rates, economy, etc.) will be determined exogenously by what happens in and around Seattle-King County and the wider space-economy. Tacoma and the South Sound (i.e., Pierce County) need not only evolve as an affordable "home" for Seattle-King County, a space of reproduction. In principle, Tacoma could also develop a more dynamic urban economy. But even under this alternative scenario, following Talton's reading, everything depends upon planning *regionally* to capture "spillover" effects from Seattle-King County rather than organically growing new (post)industrial competencies *in loco*. On its own, Tacoma is conceptualized as a West Coast "outlier": a slow-moving cart insufficiently hitched to a globally strong horse.

This interpretation has theoretical value. As Charles Abrams (1969, p. BR3) noted early on, Jane Jacobs put forth her urban theory in a kind of vacuum in which cities grow or wane according to a few simple rules. Cities do not exist in vacuums. They are shaped by, inter alia, "location, basic resources, climate, transportation, the availability of skills, differential wage rates," but also "*the impact of government policies, [. . .] and public development strategies that advance or retard urban growth*" (ibid., emphasis added). It is better, therefore, to see unevenly distributed

neo-Jacobsian forces at work. But we must also make considerable space for *extra-local* factors intertwined with Greater Seattle's developmental story and current challenges. In particular, no factor had more impact than the political emergence of the USA as a military power. If war makes states, it also makes cities. Ongoing divergence still reinforced the early patterns of regional growth just recounted. Yet the maturation of what Kirkendall (1994) has called the "military-metropolitan-industrial complex" also fundamentally shifted core dynamics firmly to the city-regional scale.

This latter theme is a crucial one. The impacts of war on growth in the Puget Sound region, as elsewhere across the country, were profound yet can be captured efficiently with reference to just two institutions: the Boeing Corporation and the US military.

"Breaking away" from (but also with) timber, William Boeing engaged local engineers from the University of Washington and then founded a wooden airplane company on Seattle's Duwamish River in 1916 (Kershner, 2015). The next year, US entry into WWI provided a politically created market for seaplanes, initiating a long-term relationship with what would eventually become the national-security economy or, as Dwight Eisenhower would later christen it, the military-industrial complex. By the late 1920s Boeing was offering the world's first passenger service while gestating what would become United Airlines. Despite the Great Depression, key technical innovations continued to appear with regularity: the all-metal "monomail" for postal services; the Boeing 247 with retractable gear; and late in the 1930s the Stratoliner, which pioneered the use of pressurized cabins and high-altitude/above weather travel. As with the earlier impact of the Klondike Gold Rush, Seattle's competencies placed the city to build the B-19 and B-27 bombers of World War II, which it did at a rate of 350 per day by 1944.

Tacoma's "war stories" were predictably different. While WWI in 1917 first stimulated Seattle-based Boeing, Pierce County voters bonded land for the purpose of a new Federal military base, Camp (later Fort) Lewis, located south of Tacoma, in order to train soldiers. Later during FDR's New Deal, Works Progress Administration (WPA) funds were used to reconstruct an existing airstrip. This would become McCord Air Force base. In other words, Pierce County "invited in" Federal money for war-training but did not germinate import replacements. All through the Cold War, and especially during the two hot wars of Korea and Vietnam, both bases expanded as US global military power swelled—substantially stimulating the economy, culture, and society of the Tacoma-Pierce County part of the ever-widening city-region. But the Cold War ended in the early 1990s. The population of bases shrank, leading to consolidation in 2010. Today the two bases operate together as JBLM (Joint-Base Lewis-McCord), and continue to impact development patterns, problems, regional policy, and investment choices.

Militarization also effected other places. The third major port/node that today constitutes the global city-region of Greater Seattle-Bremerton—similarly formed out of the structural intersections of military power and local land speculation, abject boosterism, and rent-seeking. As the US Navy expanded its security presence into the Pacific Ocean after the Spanish-American War in 1898, it sought a new

northern naval station in the Puget Sound region. A German immigrant with interests in Sinclair inlet, located in Kitsap County just west of Seattle across the sound, purchased 190 acres of waterfront property, and soon thereafter sold a little less than half of that at a significant loss to the U.S. government for a naval base (Caldick, 2010). The (lucrative) half that William Bremer kept, though, became the city of Bremerton. A naval community in the "military-metropolitan-industrial complex," Bremerton benefited from the hot and cold wars of the twentieth century; but like much of the South Sound it struggled to diversity its naval economy. Population growth, especially after the 1970s, was even less dramatic than in Tacoma.

Under William Allen, Boeing now entered the new commercial aviation market more forcefully in the 1950s. Allen developed the 707, Boeing's first jet airliner. But military/security contracts remained crucial. At the start of the 1950s, two-thirds of the company's Seattle employees worked on US Air Force contracts (Kirkendall, 1994, p. 143). Demand for B-52s and the Korean War ensured further ties. Hence from 1968 to 1971, as the USA reeled geopolitically from the Tet Offensive and subsequent de-escalation in Vietnam, Seattle reeled economically from the collapse of the Boeing base. After opening a massive new assembly plant in Everett—the fourth major node in the city-region—Boeing soon gutted employment, from 105,000 to 38,000 (MacDonald, 1987), just as it had done in previous "post-war" political-economies when the demand for industrialized global warfare receded. Seattle and the wider region suffered. Ironically, the negative regional impact was because, as Kershner (2015) notes, "airplanes had become so complex that it made sense to farm out some parts to specialists. Some of these suppliers were clustered in the Puget Sound area and were founded by former Boeing employees who struck out on their own."

There was indeed rain, but no economic thunder. By the early-1970s, the still-industrial city of Seattle seemed increasingly like many others in the US urban system—well past its vigorous prime (Fig. 5.2). It is very hard to recall today, but Seattle had lost population annually since its demographic peak in 1960. By 1980 Seattle had joined the rising ranks of the country's shrinking cities, with 60,000 fewer people at the start of Ronald Reagan's presidency than at the end of the John F. Kennedy administration. The "Jacobsian" qualities of the early decades now seemed rather less evident. Meanwhile, Tacoma had (just) managed to hold steady, very gradually adding about 15,000 more people over this same period of time. Though seen as grittier and more like other failing cities, Tacoma, with a devastated downtown, in fact avoided the "near-death" experiences of Camden, Baltimore, and Saint Louis.

Larger developments thus shaped these experiences. In particular, they were, in part, a post-war consequence of the new industrial geographies forged by the rise of the Cold War "gun belt" that increasingly favored West Coast cities like Los Angeles and Seattle (Markusen, Hall, Campbell, & Deitrick, 1991). Los Angeles had its own William Boeings, of course, its own "Jacobsian" entrepreneurs in US



Fig. 5.2 Decadal growth rates, Seattle and Tacoma, 1890–1990 (Source: US Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/index.html)

aviation history like Donald Douglas and Jack Northrup. Los Angeles further benefited from significant locational, scale, and especially climate advantages over more peripheral Seattle, which translated into denser agglomeration economies (ibid.) and thus more expansive urbanization. (Following only New York, after all, Los Angeles is the most important city in the USA). That said, from its beginnings in WWI, Boeing and the Seattle-area economy profited handsomely—like Los Angeles—from federal strategies that championed products in the service of national security. As Greg Hooks (1991) has argued, the military-industrial complex emerged as the US military enhanced its post-war capacity to set *de facto* an American industrial policy.

The now familiar regional space-economy emerged. As Boeing expanded its economic presence in these decades, it *imprinted* upon the region a specific type of industrial structure, a specific geometry of wealth, labor relations, and economic culture that Gray, Golob, and Markusen (1996) identify as a classic "hub-and-spoke" district. Anne Markusen (1996) contrasts the "hub-and-spoke" form symbolized by Boeing with other types of industrial districts that have characterized late capitalism in advanced economies. The "Marshallian" industrial district, for instance, is usually dominated by many small, locally owned firms and low degrees of linkage external to the district. Famous Marshallian districts include craft-based

regions like Emilia-Romagna, Italy, and Silicon Valley, in the San Francisco Bay Area of California. In contrast, key hub-and-spoke districts cluster around one or several core, vertically integrated firms, such as Boeing. They are surrounded by smaller and less powerful suppliers, which can limit overall agglomeration economies and localized economic diversification, even as they are still quite capable of generating high regional growth rates (ibid.). At the same time, they render a region more vulnerable to cyclical and secular decline (Gray et al., 1996, p. 651).

But as in the 1870s, surface appearances in the 1970s ultimately turned out to be deceptive. Seattle again proved resilient, albeit with a new twist. The regional divides in urbanization patterns persisted. For the turn away from the "metropolitan-military-industrial complex," to again use Kirkendall's (1994) term, had now legitimately commenced. Yet it also favored Seattle/King County. Extant competencies in high-tech manufacturing provided fertile ground to capture important pieces of a new economic dynamic, as did the region's reputation for a high quality of life.

This last factor refers to the immediate bioregion as a culturally beloved asset, or what Portland-based urban scholar Ethan Seltzer calls the "time-deep and abundant" nature of the Cascadian region as a whole. It helps to explain why laid-off Boeing engineers and other technical personnel did not emigrate elsewhere. Markusen et al. (1991, p. 156) note that "[t]he determination of most ex-Boeing workers to stay in Seattle was a long-term blessing for the city [. . .,] [preventing] a kind of 'brain drain' of highly skilled employees that has decimated the economies of [other] cities. . .." Puget Sound's beloved 'nooks and crannies' somehow remained generative of urban development processes. And so, as Markusen (1996, p. 302) elsewhere explains, if anchor firms like Boeing "create a critical mass of skilled labor and business services around them, they may set off a more diversified developmental process." In other words, new firms benefit from urbanization and agglomeration economies associated with inherited economic structures. One new firm is especially noteworthy to the story here.

The Microsoft Corporation was founded in Albuquerque, New Mexico to take advantage of contracts with computer manufactures. But cofounders Paul Allen and Bill Gates relocated their new firm to Bellevue, near their hometown of Seattle, in large part so they could attract better talent. Microsoft's decision undoubtedly helped over time to beget a dense if regionally uneven ecosystem of high-tech firms—again, mainly in King County—over the 1980s and nineties now focused on information technology and ancillary products and services, i.e., desktop software, gaming systems, online retail, cloud computing, and, in the twenty-first century, novel sectors in enterprise software, cyber security, and interactive media (Prosperity Partnership, 2012). In short, the Boeing hub helped to create an industrial base for Microsoft (Gray et al., 1996, p. 658), which in turn helped to forge a wider economic culture for new firms like Amazon.[2] As Heike Mayer (2013) explains in

[2]Nearly 90% of the region's high-tech jobs were located in King County in 2012 (Prosperity Partnership, 2012, p. 21).

her study of "spin-off" firms, Microsoft's presence in the evolutionary wake of the hub-and-spoke economy helped to facilitate an "entrepreneurial ecology" conductive to localizing spinoffs and start-ups:

> Spinoffs inherit knowledge and skills from their parents and therefore they benefit from knowledge spillovers. Yet they diversify into new markets and therefore create new layers to the regional economy in not identical but closely related industries. This process ... [which others call 'regional branching'] ... and the ways in which these knowledge spillovers work may explain the mechanisms by which regions diversify over time (p. 1731).

Microsoft's late 1970s decision to choose Bellevue, not Seattle, also illustrates the "new regionalization" of urban economic activity across the USA (Soja, 2000). In particular, it illustrates the transformation of "suburbs" that had grown up in the post-war era around automobiles, the development of the interstate system, and the federally subsidized decentralization of the urban population. Critical companies like Microsoft were now in "suburban" areas rather than Seattle. Other successful firms founded originally in Seattle, such as REI, Costco and Eddie Bauer, also moved to new suburban locations. This process transformed the region's employment geography, expanding urbanization dynamics outwards, as once peripheral areas like Bellevue, Redmond, Kent, and Tukwila gained jobs (Fig. 5.3).

In fact, many of King County's "suburbs" never easily fit that term. Both Redmond and Bellevue, for instance, attracted non-Native settlers at roughly the same time as Seattle, and underwent various economic phases and stages of functional development and cultural change. Bellevue was first platted in 1904 and had various "lives" as a farming center, inland port, and milling center (McDonald, 1984). While also once favored by the wealthy as a retreat from Seattle, its strictly "suburban" period in the decades after WWII looks more exceptional and shallow than definitive or geo-historically accurate, somewhat like defining a woman's long life by her teenage years. Bellevue's current status as a major employment center seems less surprising when we consider that "from the start," as Alan Stein (1998) reported, "city planners looked to Bellevue's future as a thriving city, not as a sleepy town. Some streets were designed to have six lanes, unheard of at the time in most nearby communities."

The East Channel Highway that first traversed Mercer Island to Seattle, though conceived originally in the mid-1920s by Miller Freeman and other boosters, was formally completed in 1940. This stimulated an influx of newcomers and the inevitable development of retail-commercial facilities, especially Bellevue Square, after WWII (built by Miller Freeman, of course). Invariably, public problems started to mount, including insufficient and increasingly unsafe water and sewerage provision as well as pollution in Lake Washington (dwarfing original concerns such as where to local schools and post offices). Yet incorporation to manage these problems professionally was arduous, and was finally achieved only in 1953 by excluding the now-separately run municipalities of Beaux Art and Clyde Hill, as residents in these and other areas either feared higher taxes to fund corrective government services or simply opposed the possibility of more stringent land-use regulations.



Fig. 5.3 Job per capita and "self-containment" across Puget Sound, 2015 (Source: calculated by author based on US census data at https://www.census.gov/econ/census/)

Incorporation took time to matter. The new city council, for instance, did not even own a chair to sit in. They had to meet in an old school house until the 1960s. But as the city's first city planner recalled: "People ... were planning-conscious before they had the legal and municipal machinery to work with. Planning was not a strange idea to them, though a lot objected to it" (McDonald, 1984, p. 116).

That tension between pubic planning and market liberalism was reflected repeatedly in major development decisions and growth policies during the 1960s and seventies, when the community transformed its identity. By the early 1980s, reverse commuters from Seattle were now common; the burgeoning city had to rezone its downtown to permit skyscrapers (McDonald, 1984, p. 101). For its part, nearby Redmond actually incorporated in 1912, going through similar phases in economic and demographic change. Its current density of 3328 persons/square mile, moreover, is a bit lower but roughly comparable to the 3990 persons/square mile in the city of Tacoma. Bellevue's overall density today is almost the same as Tacoma's density. Unlike Seattle, neither Bellevue nor Redmond ever experienced sharp demographic decline.

In quantitative terms, however, the city of Seattle has remained the dominant employment node across the wider region, in 2014 offering over 500,000 jobs. This represents today about 28% of Greater Seattle's 1.8 million jobs. Still, relative to its large population of 630,000, Seattle is defined less by *job density* than are these key

misleadingly "suburban" communities. Bellevue's jobs/capita ratio is 0.92, far higher than Seattle's ratio of 0.79, despite Seattle's absolute size advantage. Bellevue also has a higher ratio of jobs to people than Tacoma, which is only 0.47 (lower than both Renton and Kent). Redmond and especially Tukwila actually have far more jobs than people, with ratios considerably over 1.00. If the economic definition of a city is the spatial production of agglomeration, these communities are all robust cities, albeit within a city-regional framework. Figure 5.3 also shows that all of these communities are economically self-contained, save one. Tacoma's "self-containment" rate (i.e., total local jobs/employed residents 16 or older) is below 1.00, *last* among the largest eight cities in the metropolitan region. Unsurprisingly, Seattle has a higher self-containment rate at 1.29, but this too is below Bellevue, Everett, Redmond, and Tukwila.

For scholars like Allen Scott (2011), the regionalization of Seattle's hub-and-spoke economy over the last few decades represents nothing less than a "world in emergence." "Seattle" no longer really means only the city, in other words, it means the global city-region, constituted as *and by* an expansive four-county area (Scott, 2001a). Suggesting that we should move "beyond post-Fordism," Scott argues for a theoretical resynthesize of urban-economic geography. He links the profound shifts in urban form and the built-environment, including the rapid rise of "edge cities" like Bellevue and Redmond as well as new growth pressures on the neo-rural fringe of metropolitan areas, to more fundamental processes of regional economic (re) development under the current regime of state-facilitated capitalist accumulation. In particular, Scott argues that the "digitization" of the global economy, the erosion of standardized (Fordist) labor, and the rise of a new class of "cognitive-cultural" workers like those that populate Microsoft and Amazon are effecting interurban structures of production and work, and, concomitantly, core patterns of urban and regional growth. This is also producing new forms of social stratification (p. 849). Scott argues that a now heavily regionalized and digitized urban social space is being "radically altered by gentrification, i.e., the colonization of former blue collar neighborhoods in inner-city neighborhoods by members of the cognitariat" (p. 855). Scott could have been referring to Seattle.

The historical path-dependencies discussed so far have highlighted the uneven nature of economic and demographic growth across the city-region. In particular, the discussion underscores the economic dynamism and recurrent resiliency of Seattle, and more recently King County, which have grown much faster than Tacoma and the South Sound region. These historic patterns are not only persistent but, following Scott, are *getting even more pronounced* as King County in particular specializes in hosting "cognitive-cultural" workers. This is shown in Fig. 5.4 below. At the end of the twentieth century, in large measure due to the economic history just outlined, medium household income in Kitsap and Pierce Counties were well below the medium household income in King County. Since 1999, the gap has been growing even wider. Historically buffered by the massive presence of Boeing in Everett, the most recent changes in the regional economy have also created new incomes divides with Snohomish County, to the North. Household wealth in



Fig. 5.4 Median household income relative to King County, 1999–2014 (Source: calculated by author: US census data https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/income.html)

particular has been piling up disproportionately in King County, both with local as well as regional impacts.

Seattle's geographies reflect this wider shift. At the local scale, inner city Seattle has established a new reputation over the past 15 years for dramatic and large-scale real estate-led redevelopment around high-tech renewal, i.e., other words, "the colonization of former blue collar neighborhoods in inner-city neighborhoods by members of the cognitariat" (op cit.). Since the late 1990s, in particular, Paul Allen's Vulcan Corporation has built 6.6 million square feet of office, life sciences, residential, and mixed-use projects. About 80% is located in South Lake Union, in the urban core, and is anchored by global firms like Amazon. By 2015, the South Lake Union portfolio included 24 different projects with 1400 residential units—many elite mixed-use buildings. In his work on urban democracy, Mark Purcell (2008, pp. 118–119) suggests that South Lake Union reflects a neoliberal political economy of green revitalization (a theme I return to below). Voting for zoning changes and tax breaks (Young, 2007), Seattle has, in his view, "imagined away" low-to-moderate-income residents, instead pursuing those who can better activate the long-term vision of a "24/7 urbanism" increasingly associated with new forms of accumulation. "Over the past 20 years," Vulcan's marketers counter-propose, "our investments have remade Seattle's downtrodden South Lake Union neighborhood into a thriving creative district, brought the space race to the private sector and

saved the Seattle Seahawks [NFL team] from relocation" (Vulcan Real Estate, 2014).

The (saved) Seattle Seahawks won the Super Bowl in 2014, but many of its most ardent fans have lost out on these changes. While Seattle's trendiest neighborhoods in recent years—South Lake Union, Ballard, and Capitol Hill—receive the most press attention, historically African-American neighborhoods like the Central District have undergone equally dramatic transformations. By 2010, the Central District, which was about 80% black in 1970, had become majority white (Balk, 2014), a near-total reversal of former concerns in American urban affairs with "white flight." In 2000, the medium household income of $45,200 for all races in Seattle was 7.5% higher but at least roughly comparable with the national average of $42,800. By 2013, however, the median figure of $70,200 for Seattle was 34% higher than the national figure of $53,000. As Seattle's total African American population has declined, moreover, it has also become much poorer. In 2000, medium household income for African-Americans was $32,000. By 2013, this figure had plummeted to $25,700.

Shifts in the social geography of Seattle are related to shifts in median household income across the wider region. These further reflect changes in the national and international economy. So questions of gentrification, segregation, and race/class patterning, as Chris Fowler (2015) has recently argued, are "multiscalar" rather than "multi-level." Multi-scalar relationships are more complex to grasp because they are co-constitutive of one another. They take time to develop and fully manifest themselves. As this chapter has shown, social and economic trends like uneven regional development are highly path-dependent. They forge "sticky" industrial structures that shape city and regional growth dynamics for years and even many decades. These dynamics also tend to (re)valorize specific neighborhoods and cities over others. All this influences a myriad of micro-economic decisions by individuals and households about present and future migration, housing, and jobs. Unpacking these interscalar processes of socio-spatial transformation is not at all straight-forward.

Fowler locates, for instance, key patterns of segregation in South Seattle from 1990 to 2000, using what he calls spatial clusters of similar functional forms. "Segregation changes with scale," he writes, so that, for instance, we might see some degree of segregation at smaller scales (like specific census blocks) but less segregation at neighborhood scales (while the reverse can also be true). We can "see" or "miss" segregation depending on the single scale we deploy, and how we define economic and racial segregation. In his view, interscalar processes of segregation in the fast-globalizing urban Puget Sound region—the kind just discussed—have generated forms that are now visible across South Seattle. From 1990 to 2010 Fowler finds that Seattle retained most of its socio-economic diversity. However, "those same neighborhoods are presently [c. 2014–215] undergoing significant change in response to major investments in housing and infrastructure" (p. 13). According the US Census Bureau, between 2007 and 2011 about 43% of Seattle's renter households were burdened by housing costs and more than one-fifth were *severely* burdened. This has prompted the city to explore locally novel but also

highly controversial policy changes in regard to housing development, including efforts to limit parking requirements from developers and even to reduce the sacrosanct exclusivity of single family zoning (Westneat, 2015).

To date, Tacoma has experienced little such pressure. In fact, Tacoma has struggled for many years now to encourage minimal private-sector investments in similarly "upzoned" areas, even in its wealthier and more prestigious neighborhoods. Where it has marginally succeeded, it has faced NIMBY backlash (Driscoll, 2015). Lacking density, it has struggled to finance basic infrastructure outlays, particularly in regards to street and road repair, which has further depressed private sector interest. Growing overall at barely 1% per annum for years, Tacoma's problem—so far—is neither outright decline nor overheated gentrification but what Williams and Pendras (2013) call a political economy of "stasis," wherein neither traditional pro-growth coalitions nor alternative-progressive regimes have ever captured the urban policy agenda. Instead, even small changes to established neighborhoods in recent years, signaled by planning policy reforms made nearly a decade ago, have prompted baffling concerns with "cram and stack 'em high" models of urban redevelopment, "best illustrated by what's happening in South Lake Union and Ballard" (Virgin, 2016b).

5.4 Political Order II: Progressive State-Reformism

Stopping the story with segregated accumulation is not enough to grasp smart growth. As I argued in Chap. 3 but worth reemphasizing here, APD approaches to history seek to diagram what are assumed to be the multiple "times" always working themselves out across and *through* particular spaces, the multiple developmental or policy stories that crisscross and interpenetrate one another (cf. Fig. 3.1). So as we have just seen, stories typically reveal unevenly developed path-dependencies and temporarily variegated lines of continuity—such as segregated accumulation—which are usefully illustrated through "fugue-like" narratives that highlight the addition, subtraction, and repetition of familiar themes. Moreover, "across political space," as Lucas (2015, p. op cit.) has again argued, we necessarily find "multiple political orders coexisting at once, each with different purposes, internal organization, and ideological commitments."

On the one hand, public policies, e.g., state-sponsored land alienation, military procurement, uneven patterns in municipal incorporation, infrastructure investments, rezoning and ancillary code reforms, etc., have each directly facilitated, and continue to facilitate today, *a stubborn order of segregated accumulation*. On the other hand, following APD, change never occurs "in only one direction" (op cit.). As contradictions and problems mounted with the industrialized urbanization of Greater Seattle, a parallel "order" based on "progressive" state interventions sought (and seeks) to shape regional development patterns and improved territorial functionalities.

I explore this second order by focusing more narrowly on two key policy arenas: (1) the long-term struggle for public transit alternatives in the region; and (2) the incorporation of environmental conservation goals, especially where these goals involve planning reforms.

5.4.1 *Fighting for Regional Transit Alternatives*[3]

The regional transit history of Greater Seattle and certainly Seattle is about contested mobility choices, but also about wider questions of real estate and economic development; growth management and urban design; public versus private control; and conflicting political visions of space—or what William Crowley (1993, p. 8) effectively and accurately summarized in the early 1990s as strategic political questions in history around "alternative patterns of regional development." Transit policy thus provides a useful lens through which to study our second city-regional order.

Consider the origins. From 1852 to 1871 overland travel around Puget Sound was largely conducted on foot or by wagon. Water was still the easiest option. In truth, a "Mosquito Fleet" was the first real public transport system, although a private operator offered wagon connections from Yesler's Mill in downtown Seattle to Lake Washington in 1871. As the population of Seattle swelled in the 1880s, a horse-drawn street railway system emerged. In addition, cable railways inspired by San Francisco connected Pioneer Square with (then still distant) Leschi, Madison Park, and Queen Anne in 1887, as engineers had not yet regraded Seattle's heretofore hilly core (Williams, 2015). Electric streetcars appeared in 1889, while "interurban" lines joined Seattle with Renton and Georgetown (which is today part of Seattle). Only after the city core was drastically regraded were street railways ultimately consolidated under private ownership in 1900, despite growing public alarm reflective of Progressive Era culture. And thus, as Crowley (1993) further argues, "by WW I, Seattle could boast of a truly regional rapid transit system," albeit a largely private one (p. 2). All this faded.

Channeling the new planning culture of the City Beautiful Movement, Virgil Bogue's 1911 Plan of Seattle—which majestically imagined a future city of one million people spread over more than 150 square miles—proposed a public rapid transit system, a major rail hub, and an imposing civic center, among other major elements (Bogue & Seattle Municipal Plans Commission, 1911). Voters overwhelmingly rejected it, not only because business opposition was fierce, as important as that was, but also because the plan "was a topographically insensitive design based on its author's premise that engineering could subdue landforms no matter

[3]This subsection is based largely on the work of William Crowley (1993, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2000e, 2000f, 2002; Crowley & Oldham, 2001), though is also supplemented by various documents developed by Sound Transit (2009, 2014, 2016).

what the cost" (Wilson, 1984, pp. 171–172).[4] West Seattle, then still a separate municipality, was the only community with a municipally run street railway system, although Seattle voters did support municipal streetcar lines in 1911 and 1913, which ran successfully until 1941, when the public transit system ultimately switched from "rail to rubber."

The postwar surge in automobile use that was underwritten by a massive federal commitment to highway development hindered public transit in the 1950s even as it facilitated rapid suburbanization and sprawl (Modarres & Dierwechter, 2015). This encouraged progressives to ponder institutional changes at the local level that involved but also went well beyond transportation policy. By the late 1950s, in particular, James Ellis, inspired by Toronto, argued for a new kind of intergovernmental entity that "could organize and carryout key regional services, transit, sewerage, comprehensive planning, water supply, parks, parks, garbage disposal" (Crowley, 1993, p. 4).

Familiar tensions emerged. Just as in 1911, King County voters in 1958 rejected the creation of a powerful public entity charged with such a comprehensive regional remit, although a second, narrower vote on sewerage treatment did succeed (Crowley, 2002), of which more below. Opposed by the Automobile Association of America as well as the Washington State Department of Transportation, transit advocates again failed with voters in 1962 to get rail alternatives included in the original development of Interstate-5. In 1968 ($1.15 billion) and 1970 ($1.32 billion) voters once again rejected efforts under the "Forward Trust" campaigns to bond an alternative regional rail and bus system; interestingly, both measures topped 50% but required an undemocratic threshold of 60%. The "Boeing bust" discussed earlier ultimately sapped the second vote in 1970.

Yet this long period of political and policy failure ended. The shift was abetted by: (1) growing resistance from the activist left to highways in the late 1960s (Crowley & Oldham, 2001); (2) the perceived successes of Metro in administering regional sewerage policy ; (3) the political maturation of an environmental movement in and around Seattle; (4) a progressive city majority under mayor Wes Ulman (LeSourd, 2007); and, finally, (5) the strategic involvement of the Puget Sound Council of Governments (PSCoG). Similar to the "freeway revolts" seen in New Orleans, Boston, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Cleveland, Baltimore, Washington, D.C. and elsewhere, in particular, community and environmental activists in Seattle helped to kill a long-planned E.H. Thomson Expressway that, had it been built, would have stretched along the full length of Seattle's eastern edge, "from Interstate 90 in South Seattle through the Central District, Mont Lake, and the Washington Park Arboretum, and onward through Lake City towards a northern interchange with an also-proposed Bothell Freeway" (Stevens, 2011).

[4]Bogue proposed, for example, a new rail transit line linking Seattle and Kirkland "via a tunnel beneath Lake Washington, and possible acquisition of Mercer Island as a city park" (McRoberts, 1998).

Now co-sponsored (more insistently) by the PSCoG, voters in 1972 eventually supported—on the third and last "Forward Thrust" vote—a strategic expansion of Metro into an "all-bus" regional transit service. Eschewing bonds, voters specifically supported a 0.3% countywide sales tax to fund these services. The newly christened "Metro Transit" focused in the 1970s on improving regional bus services, rationalizing complex fare zones, and pioneering local innovations (e.g., wheelchair lifts, the use of articulated buses, free ride areas). Voters again supported Metro's practical successes with a 0.6% countywide sales tax in 1979. Despite a sudden rollback of federal support for urban transit under Ronald Reagan, new efforts were also made at this time to improve bus services to fast-growing and job-rich municipalities like Bellevue, Redmond and Kirkland. Other innovations in the 1980s were the development of High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) Lanes, a new downtown transit tunnel, and the use of dual propulsion buses (electric/gas) that worked in both the dense urban core and low-density suburbs.

One institutional story did seem to die for good. Ruled unconstitutional in 1990 (Crowley, 2000a), the Metropolitan Municipality of Seattle (i.e., Metro) was never allowed to be more than a (single county) sewerage and transit provider; it merged quietly with King County in 1994 even as it performed, for one observer, "better than promised" (Lane, 1995). Yet it was part and parcel of a metropolitan-scale regionalism that, in my view, was also starting to give way in the 1980s and nineties to what I am calling here, with Alan Scott (Scott, 2001a, 2001b) and many others (Jonas, 2012; Jonas, While, & Gibbs, 2010), the growing economic and political imperatives a new post-Fordist global city-regionalism. It was no longer possible to think in terms of politically separated urban counties *evolving separately*.

As early as 1981, the PSCoG, the federally designated planning body that spanned the more complex "city-regional" space of four, increasingly integrated counties around a now fully urbanized Puget Sound, had explored in greater detail the potential use of light rail for the most heavily used transportation corridors. They worked with Metro to explore advanced technology rail-and-bus options in the "North Corridor" of King County in 1984, which was then extended spatially to Everett-Snohomish County in 1986. By 1987, the PsCoG formally amended its federally required "Regional Transportation Plan" to incorporate recommendations for rail transit in the north, south, and east transportation corridors, a more extensive vision than any yet seen. In other words, "it became increasingly evident that high capacity transit planning should be undertaken as a regional effort, not a single-county one" (Sound Transit, 2016).

That effort required multi-scalar institutional changes subject to a variety of democratic procedures at various stages of implementation. In 1990, arguably a watershed year in the policy history of Washington, the state legislature passed the High Capacity Transit Act (HCT), which provided new planning funds and local-option taxing authority, as well as the even more influential and far-reaching Growth Management Act (GMA), which now required better coordination between "local" land use policies and "regional" transit planning (Trohimovich, 2002) along with a host other management tools (Dierwechter, 2008). The HCT also facilitated the creation of a Joint Regional Policy Committee composed of (still largely

separated) Pierce, King and Snohomish transit authorities in order to coordinate "city-regional" transit policies and long-term investment and service strategies. Finally, in 1992 the state legislature called for the creation of a multi-county regional transit authority—known originally as the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority and since 1996 as "Sound Transit."

Like the first efforts under Forward Thrust in 1968, the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority also "went big" as it prepared a $6.7 billion plan for voters to approve that now included not only Seattle and suburban King County, as in the days of Metro, but also Pierce and Snohomish Counties. Building on the spade work of the PsCoG in the 1980s, the new plan envisioned: (1) a new rail system stretching from Lynwood to Tacoma via Northgate, the University District, downtown Seattle, Rainier Valley, and SeaTac airport; (2) an "east-west" line across I-90 to Mercer Island, Bellevue and Redmond/Overlake; and (3) major investments in all-day, frequent Express Bus services linking employment centers with supporting capital facilities (Sound Transit, 2016). Yet "the phantoms" again returned (Crowley, 1993, p. 1). A healthy majority of the region's voters, outside Seattle, balked in 1995, seeing this initial vision as too costly and/or insufficiently attentive to more peripheral areas of growth (discounting both the costs of inaction and the ecological and social externalities of the status quo.) Bellevue developer Kemper Freeman Jr., for example, only supported a cheaper "bus-way" alternative while Snohomish County voters "were offended when light rail to Everett was eliminated in the final proposal" (Crowley, 2000f). Technical rationalities were defeated again by (geo-)political realities and by obdurate ideas and institutions.

The region's (sub)urbanized voters ultimately passed a much downsized, $3.9 billion version of the plan called "Sound Move" in 1996, in part, it appears, because the Sound Transit Board adopted a "subarea equity policy." This meant, in effect, more "local" tax revenues were spent "locally" rather than distributed across the region into a single fund. "What happens in Lynnwood" one journalist joked, "stays in Lynnwood" (Lindblom, 2016, p. B1). Specifically, voters authorized increased sales tax and auto-license fees generated in their "own" areas, anticipating a shorter implementation timeline of 10 rather than 16 years (Shefter, 1996). In effect, voters wanted less costly, and more locally targeted, "regional" transit services over less time. This significantly delayed the full build out and efficient development of the overall regional system.

In 2008, after yet another failed vote in 2007, the district's voters approved an extension of this politically modified regional transit vision via "Sound Transit 2" (ST2). Some of the older proposals were successfully revived (such as light rail to the university district in Seattle). In addition to expanded express bus services, ST2 included a major expansion of the "Link" light rail system, which had started operating in downtown Tacoma in 2003 (under "Sound Move" funds) and was subsequently extended from downtown Seattle to Sea-Tac International Airport in 2009. Specifically, ST2 developed underground links from downtown Seattle to the University of Washington in 2016, and also funded (yet-to-be-built) "North Corridor" links to Northgate and Lakewood; "East Corridor" links to Bellevue and Overlake Transit Center (2016); and "South Corridor" Links to Redondo/Star Lake near Federal Way (Sound Transit, 2009).

This positive momentum carried into 2016. The district's regional voters easily approved Sound Transit 3 (ST3), providing fresh funds through new taxes to fully regionalize over time the commuter and light rail system to Tacoma, Everett, and other key urban centers. Though ironically voted down among Pierce County's more "purple" voters, the ongoing economic dominance of King County, and especially Seattle, just discussed have steadily shifted the raw voting-demography of political and electoral power towards more progressive public transit policies.

5.4.2 The 'Environmentalization' of Growth Policy

Greed is a strong human motivation. Fear is stronger still. Fear helps to explain the anti-Chinese campaigns, for example, that tainted the early histories of both Seattle and Tacoma. On February 7, 1886 a mob rounded up Chinese families then living in Seattle and forced them to board a waiting steamer. A similarly contrived exodus by rail had occurred in Tacoma a few months earlier, abetted enthusiastically by Tacoma's German-born mayor. In 1886, the Territorial Legislature passed a disgraceful law barring ethnically Chinese ownership of property. A generation after the Civil War ended, Jim Crow was taking on new forms in the segregated spaces of the temperate rainforest.

But fear comes in other forms. The massive conflagration that burned down the burgeoning core of Seattle in 1889 was just a matter of time. Like many American cities, Seattle was essentially "a transmuted forest and often burned like one" (Klingle, 2007, p. 54). Still, it was a jolt to the existing order. Avoiding another (perhaps even worse) fire meant significantly reorganizing this transmuted forest, which in turn meant that infrastructure, parks, land uses, transit choices, etc. had to be better coordinated and reliably serviced (which all cost money, as local voters well knew). Engineering, architecture, law, planning—these were professions that might help deliver that world. As earlier mentioned, this initially involved an assault on the topography of the city that one local observer described as nothing short of a "slaughter" (op cit.).

Yet the "slaughter" left an acid stench, making space for other fears gathering pace across the country. Uncontrolled growth brought urban fires. It also abetted a national sense of territorial closure and, more generally, a recognition of environmental limits that, by the early 1900s, helped to forge a major political crusade in the USA: conservationism (Hayes, 1959). That crusade, championed by Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot, arrived on the shores of Lake Washington in August 1909, when the recently formed Washington Conservation Association hosted the first National Conservation Congress (NCC) as part of the Alaska-Yukon World's Fair. As Ott (2008, p. n.p.) notes, topics discussed at the NCC included irrigation, soils, good roads, mining, forestry, but also "the relation of Capital to Labor in the work of general conservation of natural resources." Conservation was an environmental imperative, but it was fundamentally a political-economic challenge, an early example from Seattle of the broader themes that today constitute sustainability theories and practices.

Pinchot's environmental philosophy, initially directed at forests and broadened later to other areas of concern, involved "the practical knowledge of how to use [resources] without destroying them" (Mayer, 1997, p. 269). Towering environmental figures like John Muir sought to lock away nature's intrinsic and aesthetic values from economic rationalities, or from what he called "the stupefying effects of the vice of over-industry and the deadly apathy of luxury" (p. 282). Pinchot instead articulated the "wise-use" doctrine, which, arguably, has remained the principal plank of state-progressive engagements with sustainability since this time. Reflecting themes I presented in Chap. 2, Pinchot provided the essential ideology for a twentieth century state-progressive order vis-à-vis multiple ecosystems in a nominally democratic society:

> First: wisely to use, protect, preserve, and renew the natural resources of the earth. Second: to control the use of the natural resources and their products in the common interest, and to secure their distribution to the people at fair and reasonable charges for goods and services. Third: to see to it that the rights of the people to govern themselves shall not be controlled by great monopolies through their power over natural resources (cited in Mayer, 1997, p. 271).

The struggle for public transit just recounted, which is today seen as a central element in environmentally responsible policy formulation (Guiliano & Agarwal, 2009), illustrates just how hard these state-progressive values have been to implement. Moreover, it shows internal tensions. When people "govern themselves" they do not necessarily vote for ecologically progressive goals designed "to protect, preserve, and renew the natural resources of the earth." When they do, they frequently lack wider social content. In large part, this is because voting is strongly shaped by extant geographies of (class and race) segregation and circuits of accumulation. People guard against change, forging scalar tensions which "abut and grate" with the alternative dreams of progressives who imagine an elusive and sometimes ethereal common interest. Voters in communities like Renton, Lake City, and Bothell, for example, collectively rejected Seattle's majority call for giving Metro wider-ranging planning and development control powers in 1958, "express[ing] fear of Seattle and higher taxes" (Sale, 1976, p. 199). So rapid transit services and regional comprehensive planning were also rejected, punted action to future generations at invariably higher costs.

Voters did authorize Metro, once again, to create an integrated wastewater treatment district, and expressly to coordinate and treat expanding sewerage discharges in Lake Washington and Puget Sound. Water quality in these two bodies improved during the 1960s, but not without displaced costs and risks to others, a major point I revisit below (Abel, White, & Clauson, 2015). Although called a "minor miracle of politics" by one local observer (Jones, 1972, p. 227), the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle nonetheless failed to evolve over time into a powerful and effective regional planning and urban development authority with strong environmental or social justice capacities (Klingle, 2007). This was not even Portland Metro, which today boasts democratically elected regional councilors and a wider regional remit. At the same time, there was never a "Municipality of Metropolitan Tacoma," a parallel story of (albeit inchoate) 'city-regionalism' within the *South* Sound, wherein the City of Tacoma, Pierce County, and all its neighboring jurisdictions recognized for their part the need for at least moderately improved service and development coordination.

As Seattle and King County experienced the full weight of post-war growth pressures, particularly during 'Boeing Booms,' citizens experienced more intensely the ecological costs of such pressures. This eventually influenced political developments at multiple scales of governance, including differences in institutional approaches to managing urban change as well as variegated policy geographies associated with mounting ecological problems. Vulnerable shorelines—riverine, large fresh lake, and marine—received greater legal protection under the Shoreline Management Act (SMA) of 1971 from locally unplanned and/or poorly coordinated development. In addition, the state adopted the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) that same year. All this reflected a deeper state commitment to environmental conservation that, for progressive planners at least, cannot be folded too readily into the antecedent if still obdurate political order of segregated accumulation and ecological irresponsibility.

Indeed, both laws strongly influence local-scale urban planning regulations today, and arguably have done as much as anything else to "environmentalize" the pro-growth policies of these antecedent decades. The SMA, in particular, has created a powerful regulatory scheme which enables local governments, reviewed and supported by the Department of Ecology, to inventory and designate permissible uses through prior approval on riverine, large fresh lake, and marine shorelines within their respective jurisdictions. Still, the political and/or technical inability of most local governments to manage suburbanization and/or urban decline effectively, along with the obvious limits (or total absence) of region wide policy coordination, further led the state legislature to adopt major land-use reforms in 1990/1991, which attempted to amplify the environmental efficacy of SMA and SEPA provisions, albeit largely now by reining in suburban sprawl (Ryder, 1995). Until this point, local governments were operating under highly permissive planning legislation that dated from the 1930s (Dierwechter, 2008).

Accordingly, the last major piece of state planning reform in the USA to deploy the legal language of "growth management" rather than "smart growth," Washington's Growth Management Act, as briefly discussed earlier, now required local comprehensive planning, the regional coordination of urban growth boundaries, countywide planning policies, concurrency rules, land-inventory systems, and passage of critical areas ordinances, among other major planning reforms. As I have argued in a previous book, the GMA system soon led to new territorialities of scale and power—and thus to new a "urban geopolitics" of growth, planning, and development (Dierwechter, 2008).[5] And as we shall see later in this book, GMA

[5]These reforms strengthened the territorial role of the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC), which had evolved out of the PSCoG and, before that, the Puget Sound Regional Planning Conference established in 1958. Though technically the area's Federally designated metropolitan planning organization since 1973, the renamed PSRC was empowered legally in 1991 to enforce key GMA goals going forward (including certification of transportation elements in local comprehensive plans). In addition, the Federal Government's Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), passed the same year, infused major MPOs like the PSRC with even more oversight powers and funding tools.

goals have been reinterpreted (or updated) over the past 20 years or so by many local government in Greater Seattle through the smart growth doctrine. One example suffices for the moment. "Like the State's Growth Management Act," the City of Kirkland (2013) has recently suggested in its comprehensive planning updates, "the term 'Smart Growth' is an urban planning concept that advocates focusing growth in compact livable communities to avoid sprawl."

Smart growth has been one of the main conceptual bridges connecting urban planning practices with global climate action (Read, 2010). A veritable explosion of urban policy initiatives worldwide are now directed at both mitigating and adapting to global climate change through carbon regulation and control at multiple territorial scales (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; Rice, 2010; While, Jonas, & Gibbs, 2010). By all accounts, though, cities have led the way (Cartwright, 2012; Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 2013; Lee, 2012; Lee & van de Meene, 2012; Rosenzweig, Solecki, Hammer, & Mehrotra, 2010).

The city of Seattle has been a major leader in urban climate action—locally, nationally, and to some extent internationally. In 2000, for example, Seattle became the first city in the USA to adopt a green building code for new municipal facilities. Seattle was also the first city to base its comprehensive plan around sustainability. In 2005, Seattle City Light was the first large electric utility to become carbon neutral. That same year, in the wake of Federal inaction, Seattle's mayor helped to launch the Mayor's Climate Protection Agreement, which, along with earlier and more substantive participation in ICLIE-Cities for Sustainability's Climate Protection Program dating to 1997, accelerated a new kind of urban carbon politics (Krause, Yi, & Feiock, 2015). By 2006, Seattle was one of the first large US cities to adopt a Climate Action Plan (CAP), and in 2013 the city committed to net carbon neutrality by 2050. This was a logical outcome after decades of grassroots activism that includes the historic preservation of the iconic Pike Street Market in the early 1960s as well as the globalized green activism of the 1999 "Battle in Seattle" over the WTO (Sanders, 2010), which I return to below.

Still, a single core city does not an overall region make. Few of the region's newer and lower-density suburbs reflected this same level of carbon commitment during this crucial period of time. By late 2011, only eleven out of eighty municipalities had conducted greenhouse gas inventories or developed climate action plans (Dierwechter & Wessells, 2013, p. 1374). The key exceptions to this pattern were mostly the municipalities with high jobs per capita ratios discussed earlier, i.e., Bellevue, Redmond, Everett, Renton, etc. (Dierwechter, 2010). For its part, Tacoma signed the Mayor's Climate Protection Agreement in 2007 and subsequently created an Office of Environmental Policy and Sustainability roughly similar to the reforms made in Seattle (and Portland). But there is little question about Tacoma's original motivation. "The roots of this whole effort," one government official frankly admitted, "were very much with the city council looking out on the horizon, and asking what are the opportunities to develop a new business sector in Tacoma" (quoted in Read, 2010).

One reason for the "carbon turn" in urban environmentalism, overall at least, is because local communities have faced difficulties when trying to interpret the "impossibly broad" discourse of sustainable development inherited from the mid-1980s (Meadowcroft, 2011). A second reason is that carbon and other noxious gas emissions can be quantified, assessed and *territorialized* (Rice, 2010), which provides local communities with the technical promise of scientific rationality. "Objects" that can be measured can, also in principle, be valued, which resonates in societies that are suffused with market-oriented cultures, institutions, and policy values (Dierwechter & Wessells, 2013). A third and final reason is that policy-makers in places like Tacoma perceive ecological policies like planning for climate change through local smart growth strategies, "as broadly compatible with their ongoing efforts to make their economies more competitive in a globally integrated arena" (Dierwechter, 2010, p. 64).

All three of these reasons, but especially the last one, can be framed comfortably within the "state-progressive" political order described here and originally in Chap. 2, wherein better state-managed ecologies and (slowly de-segregated) *circuits of accumulation* are more efficiently and technically "balanced" in the broader, longer, publically organized search for a new "common good." Tacoma's efforts, for instance, are emblematic of "green economy" innovations that link together over time 21st carbon governance with Pinchot's original "wise-use" attempt to marry ecologies and economies in the pragmatic service of financially healthy democratic politics. That local governments have raced ahead of the Federal government, moreover, sits even more easily in a tradition that valorizes decentralized Jeffersonian agency over statist powers of distant coercion and blunt oversight. In contrast, the carbon turn can also be framed as the latest strategies of a business-captured state to occasion a neoliberal political economy of green revitalization, which in turn highlights a more radical dismissal of the superficial environmentalization of public policies and regional planning approaches across Greater Seattle no less than anywhere in the USA.

In consequence, the long struggle for (and over) urban sustainability—regional transit infrastructure, shoreline protections, growth management, the uneven carbon turn in urban planning, etc.—might be interrogated ultimately as the *intercurrence of multiple orders* co-mingling together, if always uneasily, wherein tangible victories associated with a more radical critique of state-progressive limitations in sufficiently reshaping the stubborn spatialities of segregated accumulation highlight an order better able to secure social justice and ecological resiliency. I follow this line of argument below, drawing explicit attention to the counter-political project of "just resiliency," not only within Seattle but, of late, in Tacoma too.

5.5 Political Order III: Just resiliency . . . as counter-movement

The labor historian James Gregory (2015) has argued that, like San Francisco and few other US cities, Seattle is today characterized by a "left coast formula" of urban politics. Central to this formula is "a set of institutions and expectations that keep radicalism alive while allowing political elites identified as liberal or progressive to stay in power pretty consistently" (p. 65). "Two Seattles co-exist," he suggests, one focused since the WTO riots in 1999 on "resurgent radicalism" (e.g., livable wages, immigrant and LBGT rights, fair trade, unionism, a sustainability ethos); the other on "radical re-urbanization," especially as this pertains to the fast-densifying, if corporatizing neighborhoods discussed earlier like South Lake Union, the anchor home of Amazon, where a trendy kind of work-life space for some 30,000 engineers, programmers, designers and headquarter staff has been emerging steadily over the past several years. Yet Seattle in 2015 also had an immigrant-born-Trotskyite city councilor and an openly gay major; and once again, a former mayor, Greg Nichols, co-founded the politically influential Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (Dierwechter, 2010).

The "two Seattles" Gregory documents are, in my judgment, actually based on the uneasy and ongoing intercurrence of three different political orders and the intercurrence of both contrasting "institutions" and diverse "expectations," moreover, has major implications for how we interpret the highly uneven and often contradictory spatialization of smart growth across the Greater Seattle city-region as a whole. In one sense, the reurbanization of Seattle, a shrinking city throughout the 1970s, comports strongly with state-progressive theories of urban sustainability, in general, and smart growth, in particular. Such reurbanization makes public transit alternatives easier, for example, and arguably takes at least some pressure off suburban greenfield development (see Carlson & Dierwechter, 2007). In another sense, though, the liberal/progressive elites "allowed" in stay in power have not been able to confront effectively the impacts of socio-spatial *segregation* that the latest rounds of (greened up) accumulation seem to keep producing (Purcell, 2008).

This is a familiar pattern as well. As Klingle (2007) has further shown, Boeing, Monsanto, Bethlehem Steel, Cascade Gasket, and many other related firms had already helped to reconstruct the Duwamish River into "an industrialized waterway" (p. 203) by the mid-1950s. It would soon become little more than a dumping ground—a "tired old river"—for the sewerage discharges of various King County communities that, until the work of Metro after 1958, had previously polluted Lake Washington. In Klingle's view, Metro's sewerage solution was, therefore, "expedient, simplistic, and in tune with the philosophy of the time: remove the waste from Lake Washington and put it into the Duwamish," a strategy that, he concludes, "supported. . .many comfortable Seattleites and suburban neighbors," but did not "serve larger principles of environmental and social equity" (p. 204). Put theoretically, state-progressive institutions and philosophies had worked awkwardly to "displace" urban environment problems to powerless others, recycling the "one-

side contest. . .for progress" that George Turnbull had lamented decades earlier, when the aggressive reengineering of urban ecologies took off. And, of course, when the widely beloved salmon swimming in the Duwamish inevitably started to die, "the Indian peoples still fishing along its shores would be blamed" (p. 205).

Learning from the Civil Rights Movement, the Environmental Justice Movement that flowered in the 1980s and early nineties, but which had discernable roots in the 1960s, increasingly challenged state-progressive environmentalists across Greater Seattle, many of whom were (and are) middle and upper class whites in the professional sectors, to engage more directly with uncomfortable questions of class, race, and unequal institutional and ideational power (Bryant & Hockman, 2005). The slow death of the Duwamish River, and especially the spatially uneven burdens and benefits meted out by urban ecological degradation and locally segmented restoration, respectively, were repeated a thousand times across the country in similar ways (e.g., locally unwanted land uses, uneven pesticide exposure, etc.). So just as the conservationist ethic of the Progressive Era landed in Seattle, so too did the tumultuous legacies of the 1960s help to set up and reshape the institutional and ideational order inherited politically from previous decades. Specifically, advocates of various kinds of social justice goals now sought improved alliances with local and national environmental actors otherwise focused more narrowly on the protection of endangered ecosystems.

Both groups, moreover, sought alliances (sometimes together, sometimes separately) with actors and institutions in organized labor, including the building trade unions associated historically—and often conservatively—with a strong "pro-growth" agenda critiqued by environmental and justice reformers both inside and outside the local state. This has not been an easy "counter-politics," then, as some policy arenas facilitate coalition building across class, race, and ecology issues better than others.

Until 1990 or so, as Ian Greer (2007) shows, many of Greater Seattle's traditional unions—particularly across King County—supported "economistic" goals that benefitted the wages and rights of union members tied to pro-economic development policies. Some still do, perpetuating a "business unionism" built largely by local labor leaders like Dave Beck in the 1920s (Berner, 1992). Since then, however, "postmaterialistic" goals far wider than, for instance, a politics of pro-construction by heretofore pro-growth electricians, bricklayers, plumbers, etc. have emerged around other developmental challenges like social services, income inequality, workforce training, minority hiring, jobs access, and finally environmental (un)sustainability. Tensions that have reverberated for decades remain palpable, of course, as earlier coalitions of labor/business/elected officials that long foregrounded class politics over racial justice, in particular, vie with environmental and civil rights groups who set up advocacy organizations outside of AFL-CIO unions, such as the "Worker Center" and "Jobs with Justice." But under the leadership of people like Ron Judd of the King County Labor Council (KCLC), a broader and more formidable counter-movement that sought a new, arguably more radical politics of growth and urban redevelopment finally emerged

in toto, reaching its "high point" with the World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle in 1999. According to Greer et al. (2007, p. 117):

> Despite disagreements over tactics, the anti-WTO coalition made a lasting difference. . .. The planning and tension-filled week of the protests created durable and long-lasting personal relationships between labor activists and their partners. Involvement in the WTO led the KCLC to support, for example, Jubilee 2000 as a way to deepen ties with activist leaders from the faith community and their congregations. It [also] set the stage for a future blue-green political effort (blue for labor, green for environmentalists) to elect a new commissioner of the Port of Seattle [. . .]

This same coalition also helped to elect Greg Nichols, the mayor of Seattle who co-founded the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement in 2005, and who subsequently pushed for the promotion of better affordable housing policies, improved cooperation with immigrant groups, new project labor agreements, and open support for striking grocery workers (p. 118).

Similarly, as Warner (2002) argues, the scope of the environmental justice critique of state-progressive policies also widened in ways that, in my view, eventually permeated into the "heartlands" of contemporary smart growth concerns with the physical and socio-economic production of land-use patterns, policy regionalism, urban renewal beneficiaries, sustainability problems, housing mix and costs, and transport equity:

> In the past, citizen efforts to manage urban growth often focused on the environments that were threatened on the edges of spreading metropolitan regions. In recent years, more regional approaches acknowledge the variety of costs of metropolitan growth that are paid by inner cities and the older suburbs (p. 36).

Writing in 2002, Warner found that "Sustainable Seattle" was one of the first public organizations in the USA to operationalize sustainability; pragmatically, the city "began to develop and track community indicators and created a model of community participation that many other groups have emulated" (p. 39). At the same time, he found little compelling evidence (yet) that environmental justice was linked to sustainability strategies in terms of education, policy or implementation (op cit.). Since 2002, in principle, environmental justice concerns in Seattle have deepened, symbolized by, for instance, the 2015 appointment of an "Equity and Environment Initiative program manager" within Seattle's famed Office of Sustainability and Environment (Conklin, 2016). Similarly, King County established a new "Office of Equity and Social Justice" and an "inter-branch" team in 2105 that now seeks to "integrate" and "embed" equity and social justice values into, inter alia, the comprehensive plan and the Strategic Climate Action Plan (King County, 2015, pp. 6–7).[6]

Yet the path-dependencies and socio-spatial contradictions of previous political orders remain obdurate. In their recent exploration of environmental gentrification and post-industrial transition in Seattle, for example, Abel et al. (2015, p. 15743)

[6]That effort was started in 2008 by former King County Executive, Ron Sims, who later served in the Obama administration as Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

conclude that over the past several decades the city's geography has undergone "a significant, but skewed transformation," resulting in two different urban development trajectories. Indeed, one reason for the formation of the Office of Equity and Social Justice in King County in the first place is because 95% of the net new households created since 2000 "earn either less than $35,000 a year, or more than $125,000" (King County, 2015, p. 2). Such reforms, however effective (or not) in the coming years, might be seen as mainstreaming a more radical politics of inclusion. They might just as easily be seen as radicalizing the state-progressive order at the core of Greater Seattle into new arenas theretofore underdeveloped or underexplored. While the Duwamish debacle and radical reurbanization in Seattle have received more scholarly and popular attention, slower-growing Tacoma has also, albeit much more recently, seen a new, more intense, urban politics of (un) sustainability that has increasingly challenged state-progressive/business/labor-led discourses of "green jobs" and "environmentally responsible economic development" that underpinned, once again, the city's own "carbon turn" in 2007.

Defined more by blue-collar industrial/port-city culture than Seattle, Tacoma's neo-industrial transition into the milk-and-honey of green accumulation accordingly has been difficult—and is arguably getting more so. The industrial exploitation of the Duwamish River represents Seattle's urban ecological and social nadir; the large-scale contamination of Tacoma and the wider "South Sound" region produced for decades by the Asarco copper-smelting plant, located until its closure in 1985 at the mouth of Commencement Bay, arguably represents Tacoma's defining urban-ecological experience. The waters of the Duwamish were the eco-dumping ground in Seattle-King County; the ambient air (and soils) around the Asarco plant performed the same role in Tacoma-Pierce County. The Asarco "plume" deposited arsenic, lead and other contaminants so comprehensively that, even today, children—rich, poor, and middle-class—are discouraged from playing with exposed topsoil in their own backyards. Many have memories of the "toxic rain" that fell in the region (Plate 5.2 below).

The multi-scalar transformation of the old Asarco site from a "space of production" into a trendy new "space of consumption" at Point Ruston is itself an important piece of the larger smart growth story of Greater Seattle that I shall engage again in the chapters that follow. For the moment, I want only to emphasize the "ideational" effects of the Asarco experience on the eco-politics of neo-industrial Tacoma. Specifically, the Asarco experience represents what APD theorists call "an imprinting event," which in turn has helped to (re)shape a local political culture that does not—and never has—reflected "a single ideology" over time and political space. In addition, because all classes in Tacoma and the sub-region have borne the effects of the Asarco plume, environmental justice discourses have been, in my view, different (if hardly absent) from Seattle-King County, again reflecting the complex ways in which uneven regional development influences contemporary policy-political issues. For example, there are no institutional equivalents in Tacoma of the Office of Social Equity and Justice. Instead, the Asarco experience has helped to buttress a citizen-driven skepticism of industrial ecology as a plausible strategy of green economic development.

Plate 5.2 Asarco Plant in Tacoma, 1973 (Courtesy of Tacoma Public Library, Image Archives http://search.tacomapubliclibrary.org/images/)

That skepticism exploded on the political scene in 2015 when the Port of Tacoma—a separate local government with elected but largely unmonitored commissioners—announced a provisional agreement with a Chinese-based conglomerate, Northwest Innovation Works, to build what would have been the world's largest natural gas-to-methanol plant only a short distance down harbor from the old Asarco plant.

The idea, originally supported by the strongly pro-environmental Governor of Washington, Jay Inslee, was to transform liquefied natural gas fracked in North Dakota, Canada, etc. into methanol, which in turn would be used (instead of coal) in the Chinese manufacturing of olefins, a petrochemical used in plastics. This would have directly created some 260 well-paid jobs in Tacoma, which attracted support from several labor unions, the city council, and economic development advocates; but it would also have consumed 10.4 million gallons of water per day while introducing potentially very large new industrial risks into the local economy, particularly given the region's well-known vulnerability to earthquakes and volcanic lahars. Politically, it laid bare the ideational complexity of change in a heavily layered world constituted over time by multiple orders that today institutionally abut and grate with one another, viz.

> The legality of changing water-use laws via ballot measure, water-use policy itself, the methanol plant proposal itself, the strained relations between officialdom and the community…, jobs, industrial operations, the future of the port and the Tideflats and economic development strategy and goals for the region (Virgin, 2016a, p. D1).

In one sense, the surprise rejection of Chinese-financed industrial ecology represents a parallel shift within Tacoma to the "post-material" politics also seen in Seattle—with uncomfortable questions around the "place" of industry in smart growth urban policies. It also represents, of course, a mounting concern among citizen-activists that the state-progressive approach to urban sustainability is too focused on pro-corporate accumulation policies to provide a compelling new foundation for ecological resiliency going forward (Ruud, 2016), which is now receiving its own powerful push back from the business community (Dunkelberg, 2016b). Finally, the more expansive scale of ecological damage, past and feared, means that "justice" arguments in Tacoma and Pierce County, including alliances with the Puyallup Tribe upon whose land the plant was planned, reject especially risky forms of economic growth and opportunity *simply* because the growth has piled up disproportionately in Seattle-King County retards local development. Put another way, justice in Tacoma is not only an "intra-urban" problem, but an "intra-regional" one—a territorial as well as class issue. It is no longer the case that any sort of economic growth in Tacoma and the South Sound that is otherwise directed at closing regional economic divergence will be welcomed.

5.6 Conclusions

"The past is never dead," William Faulkner wrote, "it's not even past." Throughout this chapter, I have argued that the history of urban Puget Sound structures the present, at least in part, through path-dependences of production, reproduction, mobility choices, and socio-spatial development patterns. Change obviously occurs and often dramatically so, as we shall specifically see later in the book for "smart" urban neighborhoods like South Lake Union and Ballard in Seattle as well as large "New Urbanist" projects like Northwest Landing and the popular brownfield redevelopment of the Asarco site of Point Ruston in Pierce County. But as APD scholars suggest, changes are part and parcel of a longer, deeper geo-history of uneven regional development experiences that in turn shape today's regional policy and planning problems.

The divergent development of Tacoma from Seattle, for instance, has led not only to internecine problems of local competition. It has facilitated a culture of economic inferiority and political resentment that has enervated the suppositional possibilities of enhanced cooperation on region-wide affairs, most especially around transit, affordable housing, and sharp employment imbalances. The militarization of the region, moreover, has created often deep periodicities of economic boom and especially bust that, paradoxically, once galvanized the importance of labor unions in the region's political economy (Berner, 1992) even as political

culture has subsequently expanded (if sometimes uneasily) into new cultural and ecological affairs (see Dunkelberg, 2016a; Stevens, 2014). Other key concerns include the steady regionalization of employment and self-containment, new types of class segregation and inner-city gentrification, and ongoing challenges with building city-regional transit alternatives *on top of* a metropolitan form built to move cars. State-progressive reforms that have emerged since the early 1970s—the Shoreline Management Act, the State Environmental Policy Act, the Growth Management Act, and the more recent "carbon turn"—have deployed new institutional powers to "environmentalize" growth, but the perceived limits of these reforms have also galvanized latent concerns with justice and resiliency.

Multiple questions face "Greater Seattle." Can slow-growth Tacoma be anything more than a "spillover city"? If not, must it simply perform its long-term role as a port-based metropolis that is not quite sure it wants to (or can) be a "real city" (Driscoll, 2015)? In contrast, is faster-growing Seattle now well on its way to being just another "elite emerald," a high-tech playground where, as Elliot Tretter (2013, p. 4) notes for Austin's own smart growth experiences, "environmental issues are only about internalizing the effects of urbanization on non-human species"; where kayaking hipsters without children get environmental amenities from dominant business groups whose only real quid pro quo is lucrative urban regeneration at the collective cost of a firm commitment to social justice? If so, what are the most significant implications for regional development patterns in the coming years and decades? And what of the suburbs, edge cities, counties, tribal lands, and other metropolitan spaces (and actors) that further constitute (re) development patterns? Finally, how do larger region-wide politics rescale these classically "urban" questions around new identities?

The next chapter considers these and other questions in greater detail, focusing on emerging patterns, problems, and potential in residential (re)ordering across a city-region now ostensibly committed to "smarter" forms of growth in the synoptic service of the wider discourses that champion the pursuit of urban sustainability.

References

Abel, T., White, J., & Clauson, S. (2015). risky business: sustainability and industrial land use across Seattle's gentrifying riskscape. *Sustainability*, *7*(11), 15718–15753.

Abrams, C. (1969, June 1). The economy of cities: Review. *New York Times,* p. BR3.

Ames, E. G. (1925). Port Gamble, Washington. *The Washington Historical Quarterly*, *16*(1), 17–19. doi:10.2307/40475478.

Bagley, C. (1916). *History of Seattle from the earliest settlement to the present time*. Chicago: S.J. Clarke.

Balk. (2014, November 12). As Seattle gets richer, the city's black households get poorer. *Seattle Times*. Retrieved from http://blogs.seattletimes.com/fyi-guy/2014/11/12/as-seattle-gets-richer-the-citys-black-households-get-poorer/

Berner, R. (1992). *Seattle 1921-1940: From boom to bust*. Seattle: Charles Press.

Bogue, V. G., & Seattle Municipal Plans Commission. (1911). *Plan of Seattle: Report of the Municipal plans commission, submitting report of Virgil G. Bogue, engineer, 1911*. Seattle: Lowman & Hanford.

Bryant, B., & Hockman, E. (2005). A brief comparison of the Civil Rights Movement and the Environmental Justice Movement. In N. Pello & R. Brulle (Eds.), *Power, justice and the environment*. Boston: MIT.

Bulkeley, H., & Betsill, M. M. (2005). Rethinking sustainable cities: Multilevel governance and the 'urban' politics of climate change. *Environmental Politics*, *14*(1), 42–63. doi:10.1080/0964401042000310178.

Caldick, J. (2010). Bremerton voters approve incorporation by vote of 167 to 17 on October 1, 1901. *History Link, Essay 9597*.

Carlson, T., & Dierwechter, Y. (2007). Effects of urban growth boundaries on residential development in Pierce County, Washington. *Professional Geographer*, *59*(2), 209–220.

Cartwright, A. (2012). *Climate change at the city scale : impacts, mitigation and adaptation in Cape Town*. Abingdon, UK: Earthscan.

Castán Broto, V., & Bulkeley, H. (2013). A survey of urban climate change experiments in 100 cities. *Global Environmental Change*, *23*(1), 92–102. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.07.005.

Castile, G. P. (1990). The Indian Connection: Judge James Wickersham and the Indian shakers. *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, *81*(4), 122–129. doi:10.2307/40491147.

City of Kirkland. (2013). Comprehensive Plan Update, 2013: The benefits of smart growth principles. Retrieved from http://www.kirklandwa.gov/Assets/Kirkland+2035/K2035+Comp+Plan+Smart+Growth+Principals.pdf

Coleman, E. T. (1932). Puget Sound, and the Northern Pacific Railroad. *The Washington Historical Quarterly*, *23*(4), 243–260. doi:10.2307/23908798.

Conklin, E. (2016). Seattle may finally get its environmental justice act together. Retrieved from http://invw.org/2016/04/20/seattle-may-finally-get-its-environmental-justice-act-together/

Crowley, W. (1993). *Routes: An interpretive history of public transportation in metropolitan Seattle*. Seattle: Metro Transit.

Crowley, W. (2000a). Federal District Judge William Dwyer rules that Metro Council is unconstitutional on September 6, 1990. *History Link, Essay 2705*.

Crowley, W. (2000b). King County voters approve creation of Metro Transit on September 19, 1972. *History Link, Essay 1998*.

Crowley, W. (2000c). King County voters endorse faster rail transit planning in advisory ballot on November 8, 1988. *History Link, Essay 2695*.

Crowley, W. (2000d). Regional Transit Authority commuter train begins demonstration runs on January 28, 1995. *History Link, Essay 2719*.

Crowley, W. (2000e). Sound Transit inaugurates Sounder commuter rail service between Tacoma and Seattle on September 18, 2000. *History Link, Essay 2672*.

Crowley, W. (2000f). Voters in King, Snohomish, and Pierce counties reject regional transit plan on March 14, 1995. *History Link, Essay 2677*.

Crowley, W. (2002). King County voters reject Metro transit authority on September 11, 1962. *History Link, Essay 3962*.

Crowley, W., & Oldham, K. (2001). Seattle voters scrap proposed Bay Freeway and R. H. Thomson Expressway on February 8, 1972. *History Link, Essay 3114*.

Dierwechter, Y. (2008). *Urban growth management and its discontents: Promises, practices and geopolitics in US city-regions*. New York: Palgrave.

Dierwechter, Y. (2010). Metropolitan geographies of US climate action: cities, suburbs and the local divide in global responsibilities. *Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning*, *12*(1), 59–82.

Dierwechter, Y., & Wessells, A. (2013). The uneven localisation of climate action in metropolitan Seattle. *Urban Studies*, *50*(7), 1368–1385.

Driscoll, M. (2015). Friction is to be expected, but development in Proctor shouldn't catch anyone by surprise. *Tacoma News Tribune*. Retrieved from http://www.thenewstribune.com/2015/05/20/3801181_matt-driscoll-friction-is-to-be.html?rh=1

Dunkelberg, S. (2016a). Over-capacity crowd voices support, opposition to methanol plant. *Tacoma Weekly*. Retrieved from http://www.tacomaweekly.com/news/article/over-capacity-crowd-voices-support-opposition-to-methanol-plant

Dunkelberg, S. (2016b, June 10). Port, business groups fiel suit to stop signature gathering. *Tacoma Weekly,* p. 1.

Fowler, C. (2015). Segregation as a multiscalar phenomenon and its impliciations for neighborhood-scale research: the case of South Seattle, 1990-2010. *Urban Geography,* (*Published online before press*). doi:10.1080/02723638.2015.1043775.

Gray, M., Golob, E., & Markusen, A. (1996). Big firms, long arms, wide shoulders: The 'hub-and-spoke' industrial district in the Seattle region. *Regional Studies*, *30*(7), 651–666. doi:10.1080/00343409612331349948.

Greer, I. (2007). Labor in the new urban battlegrounds. In L. Turner & D. Cornfield (Eds.), *Special interests and public goods: Organized labors's coaltion politics in Hamburg and Seattle*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Greer, I., Byrd, B., & Fleron, L. (2007). Two paths to the high road: The dynamics of coaltion building in Seattle and Buffalo. In L. Turner & D. Cornfield (Eds.), *Labor in the new urban battlegrounds*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gregory, J. (2015). Seattle's left coast formula. *Dissent*, *62*(1), 64–70.

Guiliano, G., & Agarwal, A. (2009). Public transit as a metropolitan growth and development strategy. In N. Pindus, H. Wial, & H. Wolman (Eds.), *Urban and Regional Policy and its effects* (vol. 3, pp. 205–252). Washington, DC: Brookings.

Hayes, S. (1959). *Conservation and the gospel of efficiency*. Cambridge: Mass Harvard University Press.

Hooks, G. (1991). *Forging the military-industrial complex: World War II's Battle of the Potomac*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Jacobs, J. (1969). *The economy of cities*. New York: Random House.

Jonas, A. (2012). City-regionalism as a contingent 'geopolitics of capitalism'. *Geopolitics*, *18*(2), 284–298.

Jonas, A., While, A., & Gibbs, D. (2010). Managing infrastructural and service demands in new economic spaces: the new territorial politics of collective provision. *Regional Studies*, *44*(2), 183–200.

Jones, N. (1972). *Seattle*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Kershner, J. (2015). Boeing and Washington's aerospace industry, 1934-2015. *History Link, Essay 11111*.

King County. (2015). *King County equity and social justice annual report*. Seattle: King County. Retrieved from http://www.kingcounty.gov/elected/executive/~/media/498C87D111204694A47C691C298DD16C.ashx.

Kirkendall, R. S. (1994). The Boeing Company and the Military-Metropolitan-Industrial Complex, 1945-1953. *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, *85*(4), 137–149. doi:10.2307/40491582.

Klingle, M. (2007). *Emerald city: An environmental history of Seattle*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Krause, R. M., Yi, H., & Feiock, R. C. (2015). Applying policy termination theory to the abandonment of climate protection initiatives by U.S. Local Governments. *Policy Studies Journal,* n/a-n/a. doi:10.1111/psj.12117.

Lane, B. (1995). *Better than promised: An informal history of the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle*. Seattle: King County Department of Metropolitan Services.

Lazarus, M. (1987). An historical analysis of Alien Land Law: Washington Territory and State: 1853-1889. *University of Puget Sound Law Review*, *12*, 197–246.

Lee, T. (2012). Global cities and transnational climate change networks. *Global Environmental Politics*, *13*(1), 108–127. doi:10.1162/GLEP_a_00156.

Lee, T., & van de Meene, S. (2012). Who teaches and who learns? Policy learning through the C40 cities climate network. *Policy Sciences*, *45*(3), 199–220. doi:10.1007/s11077-012-9159-5.
LeSourd, P. (2007). CHECC: Its role in the transformation of Seattle, 1967-1978, Part 1. *History Link, Essay 8139*.
LeWarne, C., & Ficken, R. (1988). *Washington: A centennial history*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Lindblom, M. (2016, June 13). Sound transit CEO: Suburbs should help pay for 2nd tunnel. *The Seattle Times,* p. B1.
Lucas, J. (2015). Urban governance and the American political development approach. *Urban Affairs Review*. doi:10.1177/1078087415620054.
MacDonald, N. (1987). *Distant neighbors: A comparative history of Seattle & Vancouver*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
MacIntosh, H., & Wilma, D. (1999). Northern Pacific Railroad announces Tacoma terminus on July 14, 1873. *HistoryLink, 922*.
Markusen, A. (1996). Sticky places in slippery space: A typology of industrial districts. *Economic Geography*, *72*(3), 293–313.
Markusen, A., Hall, P., Campbell, S., & Deitrick, S. (1991). *The rise of the gunbelt: The military remapping of industrial America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mayer, H. (2013). Entrepreneurship in a hub-and-spoke industrial district: Firm survey evidence from Seattle's technology industry. *Regional Studies*, *47*(10), 1715–1733. doi:10.1080/00343404.2013.806792.
Mayer, J. (1997). Gifford Pinchot, John Muir, and the boundaries of politics in American thought. *Polity*, *2*(2), 267–284.
McDonald, L. S. (1984). *Bellevue: Its first one hundred years*. Fairfield, WA: YE Galleon Press.
McKean, G. L. (1941). Tacoma, lumber metropolis. *Economic Geography*, *17*(3), 311–320. doi:10.2307/141282.
McRoberts, P. (1998). Seattle defeats Bogue improvement plan on March 5, 1912. *History Link, Essay*, *160*.
Meadowcroft, J. (2011). Engaging with the politics of sustainability transitions. *Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions*, *1*, 70–75.
Modarres, A., & Dierwechter, Y. (2015). Infrastructure and the shaping of American urban geography. *Cities*, *47*, 81–94.
Morgan, M. (1979). *Puget's sound: A narrative of early tacoma and the Southern sound*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Orren, K., & Skowronek, S. (2004). *The search for American political development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ott, J. (2008). First National Conservation Congress opens at the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition on August 26, 1909. *History Link, Essay 8775*.
Prosperity Partnership. (2012). *Regional economic strategy for the Central Puget Sound Region economy*. Seattle: Puget Sound Regional Council.
Purcell, M. (2008). *Recapturing democracy*. New York: Routledge.
Read, A. (2010). *Getting smart about climate change*. Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association.
Rice, J. L. (2010). Climate, carbon, and territory: Greenhouse gas mitigation in Seattle, Washington. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, *100*(4), 929–937. doi:10.1080/00045608.2010.502434.
Rosenzweig, C., Solecki, W., Hammer, S. A., & Mehrotra, S. (2010). Cities lead the way in climate-change action. *Nature*, *467*(7318), 909–911.
Ruud, C. (2016, June 16). Save Tacoma water turns in signatures for water measure. *Tacoma News Tribune,* p. 3A.
Ryder, B. A. (1995). Greenway planning and growth management: Partners in conservation? *Landscape and Urban Planning*, *33*(1), 417–432. doi:10.1016/0169-2046(94)02032-B.
Sale, R. (1976). *Seattle, past to present*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Sanders, J. (2010). *Seattle and the roots of urban sustainability: Inventing ecotopia*. Pittburgh University of Pittburgh.
Scott, A. (2001a). Globalization and the rise of city regions. *European Planning Studies*, *9*(7), 813–826.
Scott, A. (Ed.). (2001b). *Global city-regions: Trends, theory, policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scott, A. (2011). A world in emergence: Notes toward a resynthesis of urban-economic geography for the 21st century. *Urban Geography*, *36*(2), 845–870.
Scott, A. (2012). *A world in emergence: Cities and regions in the 21st century*. Cheltonham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Shefter, D. (1996, October 6). Looking at The New Transit Proposal. *The Seattle Times,* p. 1.
Soja, E. (2000). *Postmetropolis*. London: Sage.
Sound Transit. (2009). *ST2 Plan and project list*. Seattle: Sound Transit. Retrieved from http://www.soundtransit.org/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/st2/transitexapansion/st2_plan_web.pdf
Sound Transit. (2014). *Regional transit long-range plan*. Seattle: Sound Transit. Retrieved from http://www.soundtransit.org/longrangeplan
Sound Transit. (2016). Planning history documents. Retrieved from http://www.soundtransit.org/About-Sound-Transit/News-and-events/Reports/System-planning
Stein, A. (1998). Bellevue—Thumbnail history. *History Link, Essay 313*.
Stevens, J. (2014). September 14, 1961: First hill vs. I-5. *Radical Seattle remembers*. Retrieved from https://radsearem.wordpress.com/about/
Stevens, J. (2011). May 4, 1969: Hit the highway, freeway. In J. Steven (Ed.), *Radical Seattle remembers* (Vol. 2016). Seattle.
Talton, J. (2015, May 10). Seattle's economic boom stronger than Tacoma's *Seattle Times*. Retrieved from http://www.seattletimes.com/business/economy/tacomas-economy-still-sits-in-seattles-shadow/
Tate, C. (2000). Voters elect businessman Robert Moran as mayor of Seattle on July 9, 1888. *History Link, Essay 2788*.
Tellier, L. N. (2011). *Urban world history: An economic and geographical perspective*. Montreal: Presses de l'Université du Québec.
Thrush, C.-P. (2007). *Native Seattle: Histories of the crossing over place*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Tretter, E. (2013). Contesting sustainability: 'Smart growth' and the redevelopment of Austin's Eastside. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *37*(1), 297–310.
Trohimovich, T. (2002). *The Growth Management Act (GMA) after more than 10 years: Another look & a response to criticisms. Seattle: 1000 Friends of Washington*. Retrieved from http://www.futurewise.org/assets/resources/GMA_another_look.pdf
Virgin, B. (2016a, June 12). Battle over water use is fairly complex. *Tacoma News Tribune*.
Virgin, B. (2016b, June 5). Is Tacoma taking Seattle-like growth tactics too far? *Tacoma News Tribune*.
Vulcan Real Estate. (2014). Investments. Retrieved from http://www.vulcan.com/areas-of-practice/investments/key-initiatives/real-estate
Warner, K. (2002). Linking local sustainability initiatives with environmental justice. *Local Environment*, *7*(1), 35–47. doi:10.1080/13549830220115402.
Watson, K. (1999). Native Americans of puget sound—A brief history of the first people and their cultures. *History Link, Essay 1506*.
Westneat, D. (2015, July 7). Get rid of single-family zoning? These conversations shouldn't be secret. *Seattle Times*. Retrieved from http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/get-rid-of-single-family-zoning-in-seattle-housing-task-force-says-in-draft-report/
While, A., Jonas, A., & Gibbs, D. (2010). From sustainable development to carbon control: eco-state restructuring and the politics of urban and regional development. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, *35*(1), 76–93.

Williams, C., & Pendras, M. (2013). Urban stasis and the politics of alternative development in the United States. *Urban Geography*, *34*(3), 289–304.
Williams, D. (2015). *Too high and too steep: reshaping Seattle's topography*. Seattle: University of Washington.
Wilson, W. H. (1984). How Seattle lost the Bogue plan: Politics versus design. *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, *75*(4), 171–180.
Withuhn, W. L. (2008). Rails to paradise: The history of the Tacoma Eastern Railroad, 1890-1919. *The Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, *99*(3), 147–148. doi:10.2307/40492232.
Young, B. (2007). South Lake Union growth goes full throttle. *Seattle P-I,* December 11.

Chapter 6
Plans: Policy Geographies of Sustainable Growth

> *Among practitioner-theorists, we do not see one paradigm substituted by another. . . . Planners . . . produc[e] new theories of planning at the same time they [return] to old ones. . . . [T]heory [is] everyday rather than aloof.*
>
> —Andrew Whittemore (2015, p. 82)

6.1 Introduction: The Practices of Theory

Public planners, elected officials, and citizen-activists face a daily terrain that valorizes pragmatic engagements with a host of intractable problems. The strong tendency is to imagine such engagements as self-explanatory, as "reality" itself. In contrast, "theories" of procedural action, spatial order, uneven power, appropriate knowledge, urban sustainability, etc. putatively float high above the pig wrestling of public regulation and the commotion of community meetings. In fact, such a dichotomy is unpersuasive. As Andrew Wittemore (2015) shows, "planners theorize, too"; so do politicians and citizens, albeit without the formalism of scholarship. In truth, theory is "everyday" rather than "aloof." Theory is practiced. Any kind of directed social action is impossible without normative concepts of how to act, who to believe, and ultimately what to pursue or evade. Planners and others engaged in the (re)production of shared territorial space produce new theories of planning "at the same time" that they return to old ones. Old "paradigms" coexist with trendy ones; trendy paradigms, including smart growth, draw upon rather than efface long-persistent ideals to confront new problems.

Building on conceptual arguments I first presented in Chaps. 2 and 3, in this chapter I explore empirically what I am calling the "intercurrence of intensions" that characterize, in my view, the policy geographies of smart growth across Greater Seattle. Focusing methodologically on the substantive content of adopted plans at various territorial scales of authority—from the neighborhood to the Federal government—I argue here for the ideational and institutional coexistence of multiple orders as Greater Seattle seeks to reshape the uneven geography of local metropolitan life into putatively more sustainable forms and functions in the

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Dierwechter, *Urban Sustainability through Smart Growth*, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54448-9_6

coming years. Accordingly, the discussion is built around the four normative arenas of smart growth theory presented originally in Fig. 2.3 in Chap. 2: viz., location, connectivity, design, and procedures (Knaap & Zhao, 2009). Again, these arenas are the products of existing theories, while their subsequent deployment across regional space reflects the abutting, grating, and contradictions of the institutional histories and ideational legacies just recounted in Chap. 5.

To set this up, I first establish the role of public plans as intentional visions, paying close attention to the contemporary planning system within Washington and Greater Seattle. I then turn to a detailed empirical discussion of each policy arena, using a variety of plans at various scales to make key points. Throughout the discussion, examples—or "mini-case" studies—are broached to help illustrate the broader themes and arguments both of this chapter and of the wider book.

6.2 Plans as Intentional Policy Spaces

Plans come in many forms. Comprehensive plans are also known colloquially as community plans, "comp. plans," master plans, and strategic plans. They most animate the recognized profession of city and regional planning in the USA (Altshuler, 1965; Neuman, 1998). A century ago, at the time the (rejected) Bogue Plan was developed for Seattle, for example, "public plans" where less comprehensive than physical, dealing mainly with the material order of publically controlled urban space. Today, plans are defined first and foremost by their functionally *comprehensive* character, in Washington State as in other states and societies. Comprehensive public plans are thus typically rather lengthy and multidimensional, and while land use issues arguably form their core analytical concern, they can and typically do include long-term goals and policies for the local and/or regional economy, housing, transport, capital facilities, utilities, historic preservation, community character, parks, environmental quality, etc.

Local communities in Washington cannot reject plans by plebiscite vote anymore, although they do shape their content and optional policy areas vary considerably. Since 1990/1991, as already discussed briefly in Chap. 5, all communities in most of Washington's counties as well as the counties themselves are required by the Growth Management Act (GMA) to prepare and regularly update comprehensive public plans that demonstrably address fourteen statewide goals associated with what is still (problematically) called "growth management," a point I return to in my conclusions. Revealingly, these statewide goals are:

1. Sprawl reduction
2. Concentrated urban growth
3. Affordable housing
4. Economic development
5. Open space and recreation
6. Regional transportation

7. Environmental protection
8. Property rights
9. Natural resource industries
10. Historic lands and buildings
11. Permit processing
12. Public facilities and services
13. Early and continuous public participation
14. Shoreline management

Scale problems are inevitable. Statewide goals often are in institutional and ideational conflict with another when localized on the ground, e.g., property rights vs. environmental protection; economic development vs. shoreline management. Still, most communities develop elaborate visions of their preferred futures that, in principle, guide subarea (e.g., neighborhood) and sectoral (e.g., public works) development strategies in the present. In addition, Washington's overall planning system ostensibly mandates "regional coordination," mainly through the development of countywide planning policies and the inter-jurisdictional designation and recurrent analysis of urban growth areas (UGAs) as well as through stouter Metropolitan Planning Organizations like the Puget Sound Regional Council.

Although distinctive from place to place, local comprehensive public plans in most Washington's counties include five key "elements": land use, transportation, housing, capital facilities, and utilities, which are considered the most important components of local and regional development policy. In addition, counties must include a "rural element" in their comprehensive public plans and, where applicable, local communities must establish shoreline policies. Finally, Washington has recently required the inclusion of parks and economic development elements, albeit contingent on the future provision of state funding (Vincent, pers com.). Unsurprisingly, one professional body in Seattle has argued that Washington's GMA system elevates the "primacy" of comprehensive public plans, making them both the "starting point" and the "centerpiece" of local development regulations (e.g., zoning, subdivision), while further obliging state agencies, at least in principle, to comply with local plans and their tightly coupled development regulations (MRSC, 2015). In other words, a state agency cannot abrogate local development rules that designate location, design, setbacks, etc.

At the same time, local political communities cannot legislate and implement locally gestated policies based on narrow voter-blocks. They cannot abrogate countywide and state-level rules and development goals, again in principle. Nor are these policy spaces unaffected by resources, rules, and requirements from regional, state, and federal institutions of all kinds (Katz, 2000). It is not only that statewide growth management goals "cascade down" into local policy spaces, that in particular comprehensive public plans in Washington State must always consider how to reduce sprawl, for instance, even as they protect property rights. Local policy spaces are structured by other extra-local forces (Fig. 6.1). These vary. Some communities "draw down" resources better than others. Still other communities are repeatedly valorized from above as part and parcel of what, once again, Martin



Fig. 6.1 Local policy space across Greater Seattle as inter-scalar relationships

Jones (1997) calls the "spatial selectivity of the state." The "composition" of local communities—their internal power structures and institutional capacities—matters (Feoick, 2004); in particular, leadership matters. But local policy spaces are interscalar, and thus subject to the geographic, demographic, and economic "position" of a community within any given city-region (Lewis & Neiman, 2009).

Plans therefore reveal a great deal worth knowing. For various planning scholars, local comprehensive plans—and especially their land use elements—are key governance spaces through which diverse values and interests in what are often contending visions of sustainability invariably emerge (Berke & Conroy, 2000; Campbell, 1996; Cowell & Owens, 2010; Godschalk, 2004). Of special interest here, comprehensive plans communicate differences in whether growth per se, as Tim Chapin (2012, pp. 8–10) notes, is "a problem to be controlled," "a problem to be managed," or indeed "an opportunity to be embraced." In this sense, they are particularly useful documents to consider the empirical world of normative planning for urban sustainability in changing metropolitan regions. At the very least, they indicate formal if often conflicting intentions for the public management of territorial order.

In what now follows, I aim to read comprehensive (and other) plans critically at various territorial scales within and across Greater Seattle, embracing Brent Ryan's (2011) general argument that "Plans are also ideological artifacts, vessels for larger intellectual concepts that are likely to have emerged before a given plan and are likely to survive it as well;" that, in addition,

> plans are cultural artifacts whose content and appearance shed light on both the society that produced them and the larger cultural artifact (the city or region) treated by the plan. Finally, plans are historical artifacts that occupy a place in the planning profession, the plan's subject neighborhood, city, or region, and the society or societies that produced the plan. Beyond "plain sense," a discerning reader may discover a panoply of additional readings and meanings in each and every plan (p. 310).

Thinking of policy documents directed at the future as "artifacts" is, paradoxically, another way of thinking about the intercurrence of our contemporary intentions. To make my effort here broadly manageable, however, I necessarily focus on select ideas and normative policy concepts in only a handful of the literally hundreds of public plans in the region, including most importantly the following key documents: the Puget Sound Regional Council's Vision 2040; the comprehensive plans and countywide planning policies of King, Pierce, Snohomish, and Kitsap Counties; and the local comprehensive plans of the cities of Seattle, Tacoma, Bellevue, Redmond, Everett, Bremerton, and University Place. In addition, I also include references to federal, state, and non-state actors where appropriate and helpful.

6.3 Leveraging Smarter Patterns: Growth Plans in Snoqualmie

Washington's first two "statewide goals" for future metropolitan growth—again, "sprawl reduction" and "concentrated urban growth"—are, in essence, different ways of saying the same thing. Growth is practically theorized as "smart," in other words, if and when it can help to reduce sprawl precisely because it is "concentrated." Growth per se is not necessarily unsustainable, particularly if it can become more diversified and attentive to social equity and ecological resiliency. It is initially, therefore, a fundamental question of appropriate geographies. New growth can either create or solve problems, depending first on its specific location—in particular, the ongoing problems of urban unsustainability discussed at length in Chaps. 2 and 3. In discussing the role of a regional growth strategy within the broader project of sustainability, for example, the Puget Sound Regional Council, the region's MPO, has argued that the "Regional Growth Strategy" it has crafted since the early 1990s,

> provides guidance to cities and counties for accommodating [projected] growth. The strategy is designed to preserve resource lands and protect rural lands from urban-type development. The strategy promotes infill and redevelopment within urban areas to create more compact, walkable, and transit-friendly communities (Puget Sound Regional Council, 2009).

Indeed, the PSRC places a regional growth strategy at the very heart of what it calls its "policy structure for sustainability," arguing for, in essence, preservation through redevelopment; rurality through urbanity; ecological resiliency through urban vibrancy; and thus, in explicit APD terms, continuity through change.

Such policy guidance can be, and often is, ignored in technical practice. But the PSRC's long-term vision is arguably aided "from above" by Washington state's political decision to mandate legislatively the implementation of specific planning tools designed explicitly to preserve open space, farmland, and critical areas while concomitantly strengthening and directing development towards existing

communities: namely, critical areas ordinances (CAOs) and regionally coordinated urban growth boundaries (RC-UGBs), respectively. In addition, it provides a wider framework within which local communities typically revise relevant zoning and development regulations and set residential and employment and targets for areas favored by the PSRC as well as other public authorities (Puget Sound Regional Council, 2009).

Countywide planning policies across the region reflect these commitments. King County, for instance, revised its countywide rules in 2012 with explicit reference not only to the PSRC's Vision 2040 plan, but also in light of wider urban sustainability concerns:

> As made clear in the Regional Growth Strategy, all jurisdictions in King County have a role in accommodating growth, using sustainable and environmentally responsible development practices. The 2012 King County Countywide Planning Policies support this strategy and provide direction at the county and jurisdiction level with appropriate specificity and detail needed to guide consistent and useable local comprehensive plans and regulations (King County, 2012, p. 2).

Appropriate "specificity" entails a host of formal policy commitments to support "compact, centers-focused patterns of development that use land and infrastructure efficiently and that protects Rural and Resource Lands" (p. 17), as exemplified by Development Pattern Policy 11 (DP-11), for instance, which deals with growth targets. In particular, DP-11 charges the King County Growth Management Policy Committee, a regional body similar to the GMCC in Pierce County discussed in previous chapters with allocating both residential and employment targets to all cities as well as unincorporated areas for a 20-year period. The Office and Financial Management (OFM) in Olympia estimates residential targets; the PSRC calculates employment figures. In principle, allocation agreements based on these numbers, while intensely political in actual practice, are also governed "rationally" by a series of interlocking and measurable planning criteria for decision-making, such as: "the capacity of existing and planned infrastructure, including sewer and water systems" (p. 19); "jobs/housing balance" (p. 20); and "Potential Annexation Areas" (p. 20).

Tensions pervade this process. It is easier to imagine these policies working in the context of existing municipalities with serviced (if otherwise) vacant lands in need of redevelopment, whether in older cities or even newer suburbs (Pagano & Bowman, 2000). It is more challenging when we consider "potential annexation areas," which at first blush seem amenable to lower-density greenfield developments abutting rural lands, further removed from jobs, and less oriented towards "compact, centers-focused" patterns of land-use development. Quantifying growth targets across inter-jurisdictional space—though certainly important—is not the same thing as influencing the *quality* of new growth into smart, sustainable forms that also meet concurrency, deepen justice, and/or ameliorate jobs/housing balance within and across adjacent communities in shared labor markets. Put another way, how can sprawl be reduced and growth concentrated—per state law and smart growth theory—when individual communities in fast-growing counties are *laterally* annexing fresh territory for new rounds of development?

Consider, for example, the case of Snoqualmie, located 25 miles east of Seattle. Snoqualmie signed an inter-local service agreement in 2011 with King County to annex an area for future growth known as Snoqualmie Mill, in other words, an area within the urban growth boundaries coordinated across the county (City of Snoqualmie, 2011). Annexation laws in Washington state require that "certain criteria are satisfied" (ibid.), including extensive consultation with property owners and property rights protections, even as planning laws stipulate that comprehensive plans seek consistency with the requirements of both the GMA and countywide planning policies.

Snoqualmie's comprehensive plan illustrates how this works. Updated in 2014 after a multi-year process of civic participation, policy review, and administrative revision, the plan seeks to embed the city's synoptic desire to occasion a "complete community," "sustainable development" and "prosperity" within the wider "regional vision" of the PSRC's growth targets (City of Snoqualmie, 2014). Sustainable development is defined (narrowly) in the plan as ". . .a pattern of resource use that meets human needs, while preserving the environment for present and future generations" (p. B1-1). But a more expansive ethic of urban sustainability (as a state-progressive project) that involves social and economic systems nonetheless pervades the entire document. This includes detailed policy efforts to extend geographically the architectonic goal of "completeness" to annexed areas rather than simply to permit traditional subdivisions associated strongly with low-density residential developments. Examples in the plan include zoning policies (e.g., policy 7.2.1) which not only "allow" but "encourage mixed-use areas that integrate residential, commercial, office and public uses so that housing, jobs, daily needs and other activities are within easy walking distance of each other" (p. B1-21), and related efforts (e.g., policy 7.2.4) "to direct development of higher-density housing to areas in close proximity to shops, public facilities and transit stops to help create place and identity, reduce commuting expenses, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and encourage physical activity" (B1-22). In principle, such practices, particularly with respect to zoning, represent a response to concerns that, as one 2003 report noted,

> our codes and practices [in the US local government context as a whole] either discourage developers from carrying out the smart growth vision, *or they actually prohibit it*. Mixed-use, mixed-income neighborhoods are seldom *allowed*. [. . .] In many places, the benefits of public spaces and appealing streetscapes have been forgotten (Local Government Commission, 2003, p. emphasis added).

Snoqualmie was incorporated in 1903, and was relatively far removed from Seattle at that time. It remained a small, largely self-contained, walkable, mixed-use, village for many decades. It only needed to annex new land for fresh development in 1952. However, as it transformed steadily into an auto-dependent "suburb" within the region after WWII, it grew physically and therefore annexed land more frequently: e.g., 1957, 1958, 1965, 1966, 1972, 1975, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1986, 1987, 1990 (twice), 1999, 2001 (twice), 2004 (thrice), 2010, and 2012. Naturally, each annexation reflected both perceived needs and development policies in force at

the time—resulting today in an historical "palimpsest" that, taken as whole, looks uneven, inconsistent, fractured, even contradictory. Planners, then, do not only deal with *present* pressures; they deal with the legal and architectural obduracy of past codes and property rights as well as future aspirations. Since about 1990, for example, local land use designations, as just discussed above, have shifted decisively from "residential" zones to "mixed use" neighborhoods, circling back ideologically to the kinds of historical patterns first seen in 1903.

The western half of the municipality, in particular, is consistent with smart growth philosophies of development, even as other parts of the city are "locked" into mid-century land use forms and functions. The shift to mixed-use reflects, as Witttemore (2015) once again notes, "new theories" of the planned community, including those associated New Urbanism.[1] Yet the comprehensive plan itself—lengthy, detailed, ambitious—is a conceptual artifact of past theories of procedural urban planning practices that emphasize "comprehensive rationality" and the institutional capacity of the planning profession to provide strategic coherence among narrower specialists in the both public and private sectors of within and beyond this community (including regional and state actors as well as non-local real estate developers).

What to make of this effort? Arguably, "compacting" recent residential growth pressures though mixed-use zoning and development regulations since the 1990s or so, i.e., leveraging smarter locational patterns, has better enabled the municipality to imagine a more robust, "post-suburban" commitment to jobs/housing balance associated with synoptic theories of urban sustainability. Ironically, though, such post-suburban values evoke functional features associated with Snoqualmie's "pre-suburban" geo-history, when again it was more economically self-contained and physically integrated. As one local official reported on the policy shift in 2007: "We did envision people taking their bikes or walking to work" (Krishnan, 2007). While these areas are today more functionally diverse than standard suburban subdivisions, like many such developments across the USA they have struggled to articulate housing with jobs, exposing them not only to the intellectual critique that they are little more than "suburbs in disguise," but that they continue to reproduce highly unsustainable lifestyles. Another public official admitted the same year: "We're all disappointed that it didn't happen all at once" (ibid.)—that, in other words, master planning for a new form of urbanism did not result in the simultaneous arrival of

[1]The city is explicit about its deployment of New Urbanism, noting for example, that Snoqualmie Ridge, which was developed on land annexed after 1990, "is a master-planned community centered on the values of "New Urbanism," a design movement that began in the 1980s focused on creating walkable communities with a diverse range of land uses" and that accordingly includes: "Alley Loaded Lots with sidewalks set back from the street by a landscaping strip; Numerous hard and soft surface trails connecting all neighborhoods (sidewalks) and parks; Grid system of roads allowing for numerous internal connections between neighborhoods; Pedestrian focused neo-traditional main street with parking behind the retail storefronts; A zoning mix of commercial, retail and residential to create a work, live, play environment; Urban Forestry Program; "Green" Building Codes; and, finally, Livable, Workable, Walkable, Communities" (see:http://www.ci.snoqualmie.wa.us/ SustainableSnoqualmie/NewUrbanism.aspx).

Table 6.1 Where Snoqualmie residents work (source: http://onthemap.ces.census.gov/)

2014	Jobs	%	2002	Jobs	%
Seattle	1181	22.1	Seattle	160	22.6
Bellevue	729	13.6	Bellevue	84	11.8
Redmond	677	12.6	Redmond	59	8.3
Issaquah	295	5.5	*Snoqualmie*	*36*	*5.1*
Snoqualmie	*276*	*5.2*	Issaquah	35	4.9
Renton	148	2.8	North Bend	35	4.7
Kirkland	132	2.5	Kent	33	2.8
North Bend	121	2.3	Kennewick	20	2.3
Kent	102	1.9	Kirkland	16	2.3
Everett	95	1.8	Tukwila	12	1.7
Tukwila	91	1.7	Richland	10	1.4
Tacoma	83	1.5	Bothell	9	1.3
Totals	5356		Totals	709	

multiple development objectives: livability, quality design, accessible retail, walkability, sustainably, easier commutes, public safety, and especially, local well-paying jobs sufficient to meet housing costs and neighborhood standards.

Widening our scalar view also reveals important patterns. In 2014, for instance, only about 5% of working-age residents of Snoqualmie actually worked in Snoqualmie—a figure hardly changed from 2002 (Table 6.1). This sort of problem reflects what Beauregard (2005) has elsewhere called the challenge of "functional interdependence," which refers to the synergistic timing among variegated property sectors. Successful large-scale housing developments, he notes, require jobs nearby, retailers that provide neighborhood goods and services, sufficient public services, etc. Yet residential, retail, and office sector investments, in particular, are each subject to their own "micro-logics" that typically resist synchronization in space and time. "Consequently," he argues, "developers and investors in one sector are likely to respond to market signals at variance with their counterparts in other sectors. A speculator and a parking garage developer react to the same market signals, but do so in ways distinct from residential or movie theatre developers" (p. 2433).

Residents complain as consumers, but vote as citizens. Problems of synchronization, however subject to the "micro-logics" of property markets, enervate the multi-scaled state's struggle for "strategic coherence," forcing fresh discussions about how to alleviate these problems. This is seen in policies developed explicitly for the Snoqualmie Mill annexation area mentioned earlier. Despite residential growth pressures from adjacent communities, the Mill area reflects ongoing efforts to pursue "post-suburban" goals of improved completeness at various scales through more aggressive employment planning.

Yet policy details sensu stricto promise progress. Snoqualmie officials seek a "small city economy that offers jobs providing salaries that match local housing costs … [and that] generates revenue to support City services" (City of Snoqualmie, 2014, p. 14). Policies to support this synoptic goal include efforts to

provide "sufficient, appropriate zoned land to support targeted industry clusters, and the local jobs/housing balance," (3.2.1) in part by also providing "high-quality project review services for business development projects, including pre-allocation review and expedited permitting" (3.2.3), even as, no less importantly, deeper ecological concerns with "water capacity and wastewater treatment" (3.2.7), "flood hazard" standards (p, 38), and trans-local recreational "trails" and open space preservation (p. 45) are prominently considered. Building on its distant industrial past as a lumber mill, targeted industrial clusters in the Mill and other preferred areas include: medical devices; environmental remediation; aerospace; finance and business services; and information technologies (p. 45).

Taken at face value, Snoqualmie's comprehensive plan is a useful example of how planning for urban sustainability deploys smart growth's theoretical presumptions as part of the multi-scaled state's overall effort to provide "strategic coherence" through comprehensive planning in a world marked by ideational and institutional intercurrence. Snoqualmie is struggling to manage a new time-geography of "multiple orders": spatial, scalar, and historical. In one sense, the comprehensive planning vision—and the myriad of cross-purposed goals it seeks to integrate functionally over time—represents an ideological break with recent forms of modernist urban development and territorial regulation. This is hardly the simple outcome of a "monocausal" political economy focused exclusively on accumulation (Stone & Whelan, 2009). As Keil and Whitehead (2012, p. 522) might note, the planning logic here reflects the "all-encompassing nature of urban sustainability thinking," addressing an array of concerns around energy, architecture, public space, transport, and especially the spatial patterns of land use vis-à-vis natural systems. Moreover, statewide planning goals pursued since the 1990s, notably sprawl reduction and concentrated urban development as well as environmental protection, "cascade down" strongly into local policy space, even as the PSRC's regional growth vision emphasizes the imperative of completing new developments by improving local jobs-housing balance.

But moving beyond the "plain sense" of the plan (Ryan 2011), as instructive of it might be, also suggests that Snoqualmie is, arguably, moving forward by, in certain key ways, glancing backwards: to cultural forms of physical urbanism that preceded the 1950s. The city's pursuit of smart growth through a controlled application of New Urbanist master planning, particularly in its western zones, reflects both political and policy dissatisfaction with strip zoning, mono-functional subdivisions, and the attendant erasure of riparian drainage basins. The community has lost what contemporary actors at least perceive to be its past "character"—and ostensibly want that character back, seeing new types of (old) design as vehicles for improved quality as well as ecological stewardship. And indeed, slow, marginal shifts in the geography of work show incremental if rather narrow improvements (Fig. 6.2 below).

The profound difficulty is that such physical forms, however seemingly novel, are less easily supported by the complex new space-economies of 21st capitalism, whose various "micro-logics" deposit employment opportunities into space unevenly and contingently across wider spatial scales working themselves out via



Fig. 6.2 Job density in the City of Snoqualmie, 2014 (source: http://onthemap.ces.census.gov/)

different temporal rhythms within globalized city-regions like Greater Seattle. Moreover, other communities are also strongly chasing firms that make medical devices; deliver environmental remediation; link into aerospace value chains; provide finance and business services; and offer trendy new information technologies. For such firms not only provide the private accumulation that supports the public solvency to fund improve technical efficiencies that putatively occasion enhanced ecological resiliency. If successfully localized, they also abet wider efforts to alleviate the growing congestion on shared highways.

While local comprehensive planning for new growth across municipalities like Snoqualmie has a crucial role to play in the locational logic of development, then, mobility flows within labor markets clearly transgress local boundaries in ways that necessarily implicate regional planning bodies and regional transit service providers, who ostensibly seek to challenge the overwhelming hegemony of the private automobile. Let us next consider this parallel pursuit of smart growth spatialities within the empirical context of "The Link" light rail policy shifts also evident since the early 1990s, focusing instead on Seattle and Tacoma as the illustrative mini-cases.

6.4 Forging Sustainable Connectivity: Light Rail Expansion in Tacoma

Smart growth's practiced theory of urban sustainability, as discussed in Chap. 2, is also predicated squarely on forging a greater variety of transportation choices. At the local level this often means policy efforts to support walking and biking, for instance by investing in "complete street" enhancements. While insufficient funds are always a core problem, particularly in poorer communities and/or older cities with aging infrastructure, so too are technical constraints and antiquated (but obdurate) engineering rules and design standards. As McCann (2011, p. 63) notes, "many transportation agencies still maintain standards that prioritize high-volume, high-speed automobile travel. They still require onerous variance procedures for anything considered out of the ordinary." That design standards supportive of more sustainable behavior like biking are still too often considered "out of the ordinary" by many urban professionals and routines is a small but powerful example of how "intercurrence" actually works in banal practice.

At the regional level, though, expanding choice means shifting investments to bus, commuter, and especially tram, trolley, and light rail systems (Cervero, 2000; Ferbrache & Knowles, 2016; Handy, 2005; Levinson, Allen, & Hoey, 2012). Ideally, such investments are tied closely with (equally reformed) local land use policies and public work priorities that are directly and consistently supportive of well-designed and equitably shared transit-oriented developments (TOD), which in turn create an appropriate range of housing opportunities.

At a minimum, this entails "steering growth to rail stops" (Cervero, 2003, p. 70) or alternatively, using existing patterns of growth to underwrite transit. For Cervero and Sullivan (2011), the popularity of TOD approaches around the world represents a "sustainable form of urbanism." They further argue that in recent years "ultra-environmental" TODs—what they call "Green TODs"—have emerged in a number of world cities but especially in Europe, e.g., Hammarby Sjöstad in Stockholm, Sweden or Vauban District in Freiberg, Germany. Green TODs like these European exemplars combine "classic" TOD features such as non-motorized access, targeted parking, mixed land uses, and reduced land consumption, with "green urbanist" qualities like green roofs, water-table recharging, methane digesters, and grey water reuse capacities. Hammarby Sjöstad, in particular, seeks to replace a linear (or "throughput") metabolism of energy flows with a cyclical, reuse model. Wastewater from showers and toilets becomes a resource; phosphorous is converted into fertilizer; and biosolids are converted into biogas (Elliot, 2012).

Once again, however, the constraints on implementation elsewhere are not simply financial or even ideological, but institutional, cultural, and scalar. In the USA, they are constraints of American Political Development. Successful TODs require, in short, "harmonizing and integrating transportation, land use, and housing" systems and rules (Cervero, 2003, p. 76), which ultimately means getting "municipalities to 'think regionally and act locally.'" Yet as Cervero explicitly observes but does not really theorize, "The separation of local land use decisions

and regional and statewide transportation planning decisions [in the United States] will continue to hamper coordination to some degree" (ibid.).

The regional transit history already outlined in Chap. 5 shows, I now argue here, the ways in which the search for alternative mobility systems around rail and bus in particular have long coexisted, albeit uncomfortably, with the otherwise dominant ideological, policy, and political meta-narratives of automobile-dependent metropolitanization across Greater Seattle. Rather than a "long order" of pure modernist planning thought and practice, we instead see past policy geographies of "multiple orders"—of ideas, reports, critiques, suggestions, plans "overlapping and counteracting" with one another; of submerged themes of continuity reemerging forcefully in the 1990s to explain the apparently sudden changes in regional commitments to light rail systems thereafter. A steady stream of official transit studies from 1969 to 1991, in particular, kept transit space not only theoretically alive, but institutionally feasible (e.g., Coffman, 1969; Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 1990). None of this suggests that such ideals have not often conflicted with the rituals of electoral politics, with a constant dialing back from public transit before, eventually, moving forward, with referenda lost before won.

Greater Seattle's regional transit agency (RTA), Sound Transit, is actually one of several transit providers in the area, including Metro-King County, the City of Seattle, Pierce Transit, and Community Transit (Snohomish County), which complicates policy and service coordination across the fragmented governance and service geographies associated with transit requirements. In addition to a long-distance commuter rail line that connects Lakewood (a suburb of Tacoma) with Everett (north of Seattle), Sound Transit also operates a so-called "Link" light rail system. In fact, this system is, at present, *two functionally separate systems*: the "Central Lin" system, which is a light rail line that connects the international airport south of Seattle with the University of Washington in Seattle; and the "Tacoma Link," a much smaller, 1.6-mile line with only six stations that (as of mid-2016) connects the Tacoma Dome stadium area near Intertstare-5 with Tacoma's Central Business District (Fig. 6.3 below). The two-part Link system was approved and funded by RTA district voters: first Sound Move in 1996 and then Sound Transit 2 in 2008. Current funding streams, which are based on a combination of retail and vehicle excise taxes, are also being used to expand the "Central Link" system to Northgate and Lynnwood; to develop out an "East Link" corridor to Bellevue/Overview Lake and, in future, Redmond; and finally, to expand the Tacoma Link system, using additional federal funds and local contributions to do so.

The voter-approved Sound Move package provided funds to plan and build the 6-station at-grade Link system within the city of Tacoma, which started operating new services in 2003. Between 2004 and 2008, a series of studies explored "alternative scenarios" for system expansion within (and/or beyond) Tacoma as regional transit district planners and officials prepared for the two Sound Transit 2 votes in 2007/2008. A technical advisory committee (TAC) composed of Tacoma actors argued that the purpose of the Tacoma Link, both present and future, should be to improve mobility and access to the regional transit system for Tacoma's residents, employees and visitors by connecting the existing system with Tacoma's



Fig. 6.3 Sound Transit Tacoma Link light rail route, with planned extension

"major activity centers" and destinations within the city (Sound Transit, 2013, pp. 1–5).

At the same time, the committee reasoned, future infrastructure investments should also help to achieve a series of related urban policy objectives, most importantly "to serve traditionally underserved populations and neighborhoods"

(ibid.). As in Snoqualmie's documents, access to the regional transit system, including commuter rail and express bus services, reflected the PSRC's "Vision 2040" goals for growth and transport management as well as countywide planning policies within Pierce County along with policy priorities established by the city's *own* comprehensive (and other) plans. In particular, the committee highlighted local efforts to connect the downtown with neighborhood growth centers capable of supporting transit-oriented developments; strengthen land-use planning goals in various subareas; support economic development; and ultimately help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (through improved transit rather than car use) at the core of Tacoma's 2008 Climate Action Plan. That plan committed the city to reduce emissions 80% by 2050, requiring major, even radical reductions in transportation-related pollution difficult to imagine without a considerable shift away from private automobile usage (City of Tacoma, 2008).

This is a lot of policy weight to load on to a single project. Starting in 2012, planners, citizens, elected officials, and project consultants accordingly explored eleven different "corridors" and 24 different "routes," each of which benefitted some groups (and goals) more than others. The evaluation—and subsequent elimination—of all but one of these alternatives was partly technical, partly participatory, partly political. Technical criteria included the elaboration of a "screening process" that evaluated overall projects goals with various data sources and perceived policy imperatives. For example, specific routes were studied in terms of relative "consistency" with Sound Transit's long range regional transit plan, which was approved officially in 2005; the location of already long designated mixed-use neighborhood and manufacturing/industrial "centers" in the city; the degree of economic and racial diversity within specific buffer areas; and, perhaps no less significantly, a multitude of unevenly distributed "engineering challenges" associated with right-of way constraints, overly steep slopes, utility conflicts, and overhead catenary systems, among many other concerns.

The "screening process," on the surface at least, represents a near-perfect example of the ongoing power of comprehensive/instrumental rationality in the theorized practices of local planning work, both in the public and private/consultancy sectors. Only 6 of the 24 original alternatives for expansion survived the initial screening process, falling one by one for variously rational and logical if still contestable reasons. Some routes were eliminated because, subject to the theoretical "screen" through which they passed, they neither served "underserved populations" nor possessed "sufficient economic development potential." Either deficiency on its own, much less together, proved more than sufficient to eliminate any proposed route. Many other routes also suffered from the screen's formulae to assess costly engineering challenges, a constant concern for planners, as increasingly limited and competitive Federal funds were manifestly required for the future implementation of any light rail expansion in the city. Following additional evaluations by the Federal Transportation Agency, the National Environmental Protection Agency and, at the state level of policy review, the Washington State Environmental Protection Agency, the Tacoma Link Extension was finally green-lighted for good when the Obama administration awarded Sound Transit a "small starts"

grant of $75 million in February 2015. Indeed, the Obama administration grant consolidated the final route selected, which extended the CBD-anchored line northward, into the Stadium District, commercial area before "looping" back through the city's hospital-health complex, which is located just north of the city's historically African-American "Hilltop" neighborhood (Fig. 6.3).

Policy geographies attempt to merge disparate institutions through specific idea (l)s, or preferred narratives, about how space ought to (and can be) organized over time—and why. Politicians at various scales, all Democrats ideologically sympathetic to theoretical claims about the relationship between public transit investments and urban sustainability, championed *ex post facto* the expanded Tacoma Link's imagined role in the city and/or wider-city-region. Senator Patty Murray, for instance, argued that the expansion would be "the key to connecting our neighborhoods, creating new jobs, strengthening our economy, easing congestion and providing safe, reliable transit for students, workers and families"; Congressman Derek Kilmer specifically suggested that "the expansion of light rail will better connect all corners of Tacoma." For his part, the Sound Transit Board Chair and King County Executive, Dow Constantine, remarked: "As a major urban center, Tacoma needs twenty-first century infrastructure to keep pace with its growing economy and our growing region." Tacoma's first female African-American major, Marylyn Strickland, was similarly thrilled to see the project go forward as part and parcel of the city's wider efforts to revive and internationalize (Office of Derek Kilmer, 2015, December 26; Strickland, 2016, April 30). Such boosterism is predicable, if illuminating.

For planning theorists like Bent Flyvbjerg (1998), as discussed in Chap. 3, investments in transit infrastructure that ostensibly leverage urban sustainability are less about rationality than rationalization. Power, in his view, is the discursive capacity to make rationalization look rationale, to make dissenters feel lonely, to deploy the appearance of technical planning to conceal already closed-off interests. Planning confirms only what has already been decided. So critically theorized, elected officials (and others) mobilize various theories of city-building and mobility choices to rationalize investments that serve a political economy of uneven power.

In APD, however, the geography of preferred public investments and variegated policy goals is more about what I am again calling in this chapter the intercurrence of intensions. Here intercurrence—the simultaneous operation of multiple, often conflicting, "orders" or "modes" of territorial and social-economic regulation and prioritization—is ideational *and* institutional, scalar *and* temporal, path-dependent *and* transformative. The concomitant state-level of pursuit of "regional transportation" and "economic development," for instance, highlights institutional and ideational tensions between "steering growth to rail stops" (op cit.) vs. steering new rail stops to existing growth patterns, which is just as apt in downtown Tacoma (Fig. 6.4 below).

The Tacoma Link is, at present, less about transit choice per se than about local economic development even as tensions pervade the long-term evolution of the system. Tacoma's need for growth, its very long-term regional economic underperformance, pulls resources *into* the city rather than integrating the city's



Fig. 6.4 Downtown Tacoma job clusters and "mixed-use" urban centers, 2016

core with the Central Link line moving southward at as very low pace. Is the Tacoma Link the initial stage in a new regional space-economy integrated through transit-oriented development and, eventually, "green TODs" that can ultimately

provide a regional alternative to automobile-dependent space; or is, instead, more about development-oriented transit (DoT); more about how transit investments in light rail can amplify already-existing urban economic advantages? At the same time, is it fair to suggest that Tacoma has "bypassed" equity, as some students of other regional transit planning experiences have concluded (Lowe, 2014), when concerns with racial-ethnic diversity, long-underserviced communities, and social equity were such central themes in the screening process deployed? Is not possible that multiple orders—different values and goals and routines—work themselves into the planning process, as different institutional actors weigh in to shape decisions? As Page (2013, pp. 588–589) notes in his recent analysis of light rail policies in Seattle:

> Urban mega-projects are beyond the scope of any single public or private organization to design, finance, and construct, and affect a wide variety of stakeholders (e.g., neighborhoods, businesses, environmental groups). Interorganizational partnerships, public-private contracts, and inclusive public involvement are essential. [. . .] Of the different types of urban infrastructure, rail transit projects are especially prone to these challenges. [. . .] Rail transit projects thus face a variety of collective action challenges related to authorization and implementation.

One practical example of these "challenges" is the agreed tax-and-financing rules for new transit infrastructure outlays already discussed in detail in Chap. 5. "Although the eastside suburbs [outside Seattle] were generating unexpectedly high tax revenues for Sound Transit," Page observes, "those funds were unavailable to cover the costs [of implementation needs elsewhere in the regional transit district] due to the subarea equity rule" (p. 592); that, as also discussed earlier, "what happens in Lynnwood stays in Lynnwood"; at that, therefore, the sustainable transit system has had to be (re)built piecemeal upon an uneven economic terrain, a world of "prior construction," as APD theorists put it, wherein policy change is shaped by bureaucratic-political continuity. For Kevin Cox (2011), such uneven patterns of public financing reflect "a sequestering of fiscal resources by the wealthy" (p. 2663)—or what he calls regionally enervating forms of "quasi-privatization" associated with the relatively extreme local political fragmentation particularly characteristic of American governmental space (Dreier, Mollenkopf, & Swanstrom, 2001).

Spatial divisions of consumption, then, have been incorporated into US metropolitan areas through the politics and policies of local economic development, land-use planning, and ultimately local housing markets. While "twenty-first century" transit infrastructure is increasingly seen by regional leaders like Dow Constantine as absolutely necessary for green accumulation, the "sequestering" process resulting from the "quasi-privatization" of consumption politics, in places like Snoqualmie, for instance, paradoxically slow such efforts. In short, institutions are bundles of conflicting rules and norms that interact and indeed often grate with other institutional intentions (e.g., Lindblom, 2007), even as all institutions—some old, some new, some local, some not—interface at various scales with broader societal ideals, including major intellectual currents in national and global history like sustainability itself.

6.5 Designing Compactness, Choice, and Mix: Seattle's Yesler Terrace

As transit alternatives expand (slowly) into slow-growing Tacoma, fast-growing Seattle faces even more fundamentally what many high-tech, trendy, otherwise politically progressive West Coast cities now face: a veritable crisis in affordable housing. Long in the making and complex in nature, Seattle's housing crisis has undoubtedly worsened since the Great Recession. Like San Francisco and to some extent Portland, Seattle is now in danger of becoming "a metropolis for the ultra-wealthy" (Richards, 2015)—an elite emerald rather than an emerald city.[2] This has had wider city-regional implications for multiple urban systems (housing, transport, employment, ecological, etc.).

Indeed, as discussed at length in Chap. 5, Seattle's recent economic transformation has already altered the social and class geography of the city as well as the wider region, particularly in historically African-American communities within the Central District but also in (once) middle- and working-class neighborhoods like Ballard. The housing problem—a problem of reproduction—has also placed considerable pressure on preexisting policy agendas associated with smart growth theories of urban redevelopment, including the work of institutions like the Seattle Housing Authority in places like Yesler Terrace.

In addition to more compact forms of urban development through suburban sprawl reduction and the parallel search for a wider range of transit alternatives to cars by promoting TOD and related approaches, smart growth planning theory, once again, also seeks to leverage urban sustainability through different approaches to urban design, housing affordability, and land-use mix. Yesler Terrace is arguably the most prominent public housing development not only in Seattle, but also in the state of Washington—and, to some extent, even in the USA as a whole. Started in 1941 in the policy wake of the 1937 Housing Act during the New Deal, which first established the role of the federal government in public housing provision, Yesler Terrace in Seattle was highly unusual because it was racially integrated from the start. In contrast, public housing developments in New York and Chicago, for instance, were notoriously segregated, and deliberately so. Located at the southern end of First Hill, just below Yesler Avenue (the original "skid row," where logs were sent down to the port area), in 2011 Yesler Terrace was also one of the first five national projects selected to showcase the Obama administration's new Choice Neighborhood Initiative program (i.e., Choice).

[2]At the time of writing, for example, registration for the Housing Choice Voucher (Section 8) waitlist lottery in Seattle was "currently closed to new applicants," with the Seattle Housing Authority noting that, "If your household registered for the lottery between March 23 and April 10, 2015, you should have received a letter from us in the mail by May 15, 2015, letting you know whether or not your household was selected at random to be placed on our new waitlist" (http://seattlehousing.org/housing/vouchers/).

The Choice program extends the older HOPE VI program, which ran from 1992 to 2010. In brief, HOPE VI focused on the demolition and replacement of public housing estates with a mix of new public housing units, tenant-based assistance, low-income housing tax credits, and, perhaps most famously, unsubsidized market-rate units—aiming especially for a new local mix of income classes and urban functions and thus the "deconcentration" of in loco poverty. That has meant that residents were necessarily displaced from the public housing neighborhoods, though often only to nearby areas (Kleit & Galvez, 2011). According to Pendall and Hendley (2013), the Choice program expressly "maintains HOPE VI's emphasis on public–private partnerships and mixed-financing for replacing or rehabilitating assisted housing." It also extends eligibility to privately owned, federally subsidized developments.

The Choice program differs from HOPE IV, however, because it provides funding for neighborhood improvement projects, while also supporting an ecosystem of local partnerships that focus on social services, youth programs, public safety, education and training, arts development, and commercial enterprises, etc. In a word, the focus of Choice is on "the broader community and on services beyond housing, particularly services and amenities that have wide appeal across incomes, including schools, retail, and parks" (Keller, Stevens, Laasko, & Tashiro, 2013).

Like the Obama administration's early strategic efforts in the "Sustainable Communities" initiative, the Choice program similarly appears to recognize the fundamental problem of intercurrence, notably the parallel—typically "siloed"—funding and regulatory streams of federal bureaucracies as they separately interact (over different grant timelines) with local governments and other development actors (United States Congress House Committee on Financial Services, 2010).[3]

[3]Upon introduction of the new program to Congress in 2010, a flavor of this problem is seen when the Chair of the House Committee for Financial Services remarked that, "I understand that when you provide housing for people, you also want to provide them with a decent living environment, a good education, public safety, recreational space, and transportation, but not out of a HUD budget that's already too limited. We have a HUD budget that is constrained. I agree with the comprehensive approach. I disagree strongly with the notion that these other services ought to be funded out of HUD. For example, transportation. Yes, adequate transportation is important. It can also be expensive. We have a transportation trust fund, and I—as well as others on this committee—will have some serious concerns about the funding coming from the HUD budget for programs that ought to be funded out of other budgets. Now fortuitously, the Appropriations Subcommittee that's relevant here has both HUD and the Department of Transportation under it, and I intend to work closely with our colleague there, who has been very cooperative with us, so that if we're going to be talking about funding here, the funding has to come from more than one source. *Obviously, there are some incidental overlaps that are unavoidable*. But I don't see, in anything the Administration has sent me, requests that the Departments of Transportation, Health and Human Services, or Education provide some of their funds for housing. *It seems to be a one-way street here. I understand there's a need for some cooperation, but I will be very, very skeptical of efforts to deplete HUD funding, which is already, in my judgment, inadequate, not because of the Administration's fault, but because of budgetary realities for other purposes:*" (op cit., p. 3, emphasis added).

And here there are strong if not mimetic parallels with the "Models Cities" programs of the 1960s (Salsich, 2012). The Choice program offers, for instance, planning and implementation grants, the latter of which again "go well beyond the traditional focus on redeveloping housing" (op cit., p. 36) to neighborhood transformation if not LBJ's "War on Poverty." Boston's Quincy Corridor Transformation Plan, which received $20.5 million in the first round of Choice grants in 2011, began working with the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative, who in turn began working closely with the Department of Education to integrate educational reforms with transportation services and economic redevelopment. For its part, the Seattle Housing Authority has deployed $10.5 million in Choice implementation grants as part of its $63 million planning for the comprehensive redevelopment of Yesler Terrace's 561 public housing units. That plan has called for extensive partnerships with The City of Seattle, Seattle University, King County, Seattle Public Schools, as well as many other neighborhood, consultancy, and local advocacy groups, including Perry Rose Development, which specializes in green urban infill (Salsich, 2012).

Precisely what constitutes "neighborhood transformation"—and how much such transformation through partnerships might impact individuals, households, economies, urban identities, ecologies, and local even polities—unfortunately lies beyond the present discussion. That said, often unexamined expectations of joint planning between urban "partners," as Howie Baum (2009, p. 235) writes, sometimes generate "fantasies" about the presumed benefits of a metaphorical and literal "cross-fertilization" of otherwise attractive bodies which, "as if by immaculate conception, give birth to … a program of action that will miraculously bring a solution." Suffice to note only that Yesler Terrace is, whatever its long-term future may hold, well on its way its present to a physical transformation that many local planners, officials, architects, and advocates see as part and parcel of how smart growth theories of compactness, choice, and mix relate to wider concerns with urban sustainability (Fig. 6.5).

In 2011, the Seattle City Council re-designated Yesler Terrace as a master planned community rebuilt around mixed-use and cohesive urban design that "supports goals and policies on [sic] smart growth" (City of Seattle, 2011). Composed originally of row housing which are relatively rare on the West Coast, paradoxically Yesler Terrace was already a reasonably compact form of urban development when compared with the rest of Seattle. Like most American cities, Seattle is today generally composed of single-family detached homes with expansive yards stitched together by private cars and parking needs that are protected legally by strong zoning and development rules baked into market prices. Still, the redevelopment of Yesler Terrace reflects a profound increase in the density and compact nature of the site itself, as well as the overall population, income diversity, and urban functional complexity.

Hemmed in but growing fast, Seattle has little choice but to "grow up" to accommodate development. Yesler Terrace, which is well-located in terms of panoramic views and convenient access to I-5, downtown, and other employment areas, will include (at build-out) about 5000 units of total housing; concerned with

Fig. 6.5 Yesler Terrace Redevelopment Vision (Seattle Housing Authority, 2016)

the long-standing problem of displacement/gentrification in older urban renewal and HOPE VI approaches, moreover, affordable housing is set to increase from 561 to 1801 units, with the balance provided by private developers like Paul Allen's Vulcan development group. Housing and income "mix" and thus housing choice will include affordable ground-related units for large families (3–4BR); affordable, small family units (2BR) in mid-rise buildings up to seven stories; affordable one-bedroom units in mid-rise buildings or in high-rise buildings up to seventeen stories; market-rate units in mid-rise buildings or in high-rise buildings up to 26 stories; and, with a few exceptions in certain areas, a total of eleven high-rise residential buildings (Seattle Housing Authority, 2011).

The redevelopment plan also calls for 88,000 square feet of new retail space intended to serve the local residents and adjacent community. "Restaurants, coffee shops and other neighborhood-oriented small-scale service establishments," the plan argues in its best Jacobsian voice, "add to the vibrancy of the community, increasing foot traffic, street life and security" (p. 10), even as the vertical density approach arguably reflects the ongoing power of Le Corbusier's central design claim that we should "stretch cities to the sky." New planning ideals also permeate the plan, particularly those associated with green urbanism, such as "green roofs" that, in theory, decrease energy demand and also support urban agriculture; "natural drainage"; "tree protection" that buffers noise, mitigates both carbon and the urban

hit island effect; and a transit-supportive circulation design that not only connects with the First Hill street car system, but that also enhances pedestrian and bicycling improvements and mobility choices.

The policy geographies that infuse the plans and projects of Yesler Terrace—what Henry Lefebvre (1991) famously called society's "spaces of representation"—communicate a collective, utopian aspiration for new spatial practices. Through smarter planning and sustainable design, through multitiered funding and cooperation, through horizontal partnerships and stakeholder involvement, Seattle's first public housing project, originally integrated by race, can eventually become a more class-integrated space, a new kind of neighborhood "where tech workers in market-rate housing live near office janitors in subsidized housing" (Stiles, 2016).

So goes the dream. Everyone, moreover, can walk, bike or catch a nearby streetcar. Everyone can use less climate-changing energy, or enjoy the shade of trees that sink carbon. Everyone has a view on the city and the sound (though some views are better than others). Eventually, $1.5 billion of urban redevelopment money—public, but mostly private—landing in inner city Seattle will test the synoptic strategy that affordable housing can be underwritten by selling property to the same developers catering to Amazon on the other side of the CDB; that, moreover, decades of displacement from urban renewal can be counteracted by the Choice program's emphasis on "the right to return"; and that de-concentrating urban poverty will not eventually benefit mostly middle- and upper-class residents and developers. For all this may represent, from a broader political-economy perspective, what Ed Goetz (2011, p. ix) sees as "the repudiation of the New Deal policy orientation that saw merit in large-scale government social intervention."

6.6 Encouraging Participatory and Efficient Regulatory Processes

Much like sustainable development, smart growth seeks a way out of fundamental tensions pulsing unevenly through society as a whole: growth is constant, but problematic; planning is needed, but markets are hard to replace; humans require dynamic economies, yet can't degrade precarious ecologies. What to do? Reshaping suburban growth patterns into a more "complete" Snoqualmie; extending light rail and TOD possibilities into a revived Tacoma; demolishing and then monetizing a public housing project in Seattle to deconcentrate poverty—all these policy efforts (and many others discussed in later chapters) to reshape the geographies of development across one of America's most important city-regions highlight various efforts to ease these tensions. The historic past weighs in on these efforts, as do spatial goals for the future.

Yet smart growth, like any planning theory, is not simply about urban form and function; as discussed in Chap. 3, it is about processes of decision-making, both technical and democratic. Here we see the intercurrence of our intensions, sometimes driven by previous rounds of social thought and institutional action. Specifically, we see efforts to make planning more efficient and regulations more predictable even as we see calls for collaboration, participation, citizen engagement, partnerships, and community involvement. Technocracy, smartness, efficiency, predictability—these are the principles of a world often at practical odds with the slow, inefficient, grinding, repetitive, frustrating world of institutionalized democracy, organized participation, and especially ad hoc protest from energized players, which are sometimes about transparency, justice, and mutual understanding; and other times about Nimbyism, fear, panic. When "local" development policies—about growth, transit, and housing, for instance—reverberate across entire cities and regions, moreover, who (and how) do citizens participate except through distanciated intuitional regulations? And, *when* does participation matter and for how long? And how do scalar politics influence these questions?

Consider one exemplar, among many: viz., Washington's *state*-legislative requirement discussed earlier that, as communities seeks to manage growth into smarter and more sustainable forms, they should ensure "early and continuous public participation" (op cit.). No one can reasonably oppose this at face value. It is easy to support a law like that. In reality, "early" participation can lead to *formal regulatory commitments* that make "continuous" (or more recent) participation more problematic, less effective, or less relevant. As part of its long-running desire to revive growth in Tacoma, for example, the planning department spent years working on policies to "upzone" designated neighborhood centers within the city. This included not only the entire downtown, but more than a dozen such centers in all types of neighborhoods. Such reforms (and related code changes) were predicated on growth strategies allocated "from above," of course, but also extensive outreach and community involvement "from below." The city council accordingly adopted these changes in 2008, and waited for developments that did not come—until around 2013–2014, when the first (now higher) buildings were announced in the upscale neighborhood of Proctor. Predictably, many protested the destruction of local quality of life, arguing that the density like this was "out of place" and a reckless attempt to make Tacoma more like cities in King County, including increasingly unaffordable Seattle. As the old planning joke runs: the only thing people hate worse than sprawl is density (Plate 6.1).

The key point is not that upzoning per se is right or wrong, although in this case it is an appropriate planning strategy given the growth policy environment, but that efforts to institutionalize "early and continuous participation" within a smart growth planning framework for slow-growth cities like Tacoma invariably experiences scalar, temporal, and spatial intercurrence, i.e., the simultaneous operation of one "order" with another; technocracy and predictability and efficiency invariably abut and grate with a second order predicated on idea(l)s around democracy, participation, and citizen voice, and particularly "local" involvement emanating out of ownership of adjacent property vs. municipal residency. In his effort to refine

Plate 6.1 Upzoned development in Tacoma: "early" vs. "continuous" participation (source: Yonn Dierwechter)

regime theory with APD concepts, or what he calls "urban political order," Clarence Stone (2015) notes that governing in city is a "multitiered" process. "Order" is not a "static arrangement" orchestrated by a cohesive local, land-based business class, if it ever was, but "a cluster of evolving relationships anchored in the city and extending into intergovernmental dimensions and reflecting an ongoing process of globalization" (p. 109).

In Seattle, the same dynamics are playing out in upscale neighborhoods like Queen Anne, where "a valid, yet narrow niche" resistance to planning reforms that encourage greater variety in rental space (and density) has recently led to the municipality to redesign the intuitional framework of urban governance first put in place in the 1980s (City of Seattle, 2016, May 3, p. 1). In particular, the city's vaunted neighborhood district council system, instituted to facilitate grassroots participation in urban policy formulation, will no longer receive formal support from the planning administration and Department of Neighborhoods (PON). The concern, as reported in a revealing Mayoral memorandum, is that

> Seattle's population demographics are changing and DON needs to re-envision our approach to public engagement; re-think how to best connect with underrepresented communities; and retool our strategies to reach a broader cross-section of Seattle's population, including ethnic and cultural groups, seniors, youth, home-owners, and renters (ibid., p. 2).

In particular, the memorandum argues,

> expecting District Councils to be the singular focus for expanding community outreach and engagement is unfair and setting them up for failure. This is particularly true when many District Council members choose to define "community" as neighborhoods that are geographically based, leaving out those who build and experience community around non-geographical concepts, like language, ethnicity, religious affiliation, or issue-based interests (ibid., p. 3).

Old institutions and territorialized ideals of "participation" persist, grate, shape, empower, disempower. As new problems pile up, new institutional frameworks and Stone's "evolving relationships" (op cit.) over various scales of authority seek to rework the inherited power-geometries of cities, as class, race, and place comingle over time.

6.7 Conclusions

Efforts to forge urban sustainability through smart growth are, first of all, efforts to create new kinds of spatialities through the long-term implementation of plans (comprehensive, sectoral, sub-area, etc.) that communicate public policies informed by variously institutionalized theories of practice. Theories do not come "after" practices, but directly shape these practices. Practitioners theorize, too (op cit.). Indeed, a multitude of theories are enrolled as everyday plans provide vehicles for the mobilization of different kinds of ideals and societal norms—some new, some inherited.

Smart growth, as both a theory for space and a process of decision-making, shapes policy design and project development, not in isolation, but as normative concepts work themselves into various institutional arrangements over multiple scales of authority with varied histories and origins. Local comprehensive plans, as in Snoqualmie, are only "local" in some ways: they reflect the "smarter" locational aspirations for growth not only of local players, but of regional authorities like King County, the PSRC, as well as state-level and Federal actors. Tacoma furthermore reflects smart growth's emphasis on forging transit alternatives, while Seattle's oldest public housing project, racially integrated from the start, seeks to desegregate the urban poverty of class while remaking "public" housing in ways that do not efface the historical legacies of state-progressive political-economies (Goetz, 2011).

Much has been said, of course, of the waning of the "state-progressive" project in the USA and elsewhere and the parallel waxing of a "new" urbanized neoliberalism consonant with peak globalization since roughly the late 1980s. While classical liberals seek constantly to "unleash markets on ecology," as discussed originally in Chap. 2, radical critics in turn see the state-progressive search for (neo-liberalized) urban sustainability—through new urbanist land-use reforms; through alternative transit and related TOD approaches; through "mixed-income" urban renewal in public housing estates, etc.—as basically "the pursuit of a mirage,

the politics of never getting there" (Foster, 2008). In fact, within both planning and urban studies, as Feinstein (2010) observes, the putative "ideological triumph" of urban neoliberalism favors economic growth over most everything else, and especially social benefits to disadvantaged communities. Carbon-based capitalism *needs* planning, so read, to secure the framework for ongoing accumulation, while the state's structural crisis of public insolvency directs spatial policies towards that same goal. Stripped to bare bones: ecological resiliency is an economic development strategy that provides the taxes needed for local states to remain solvent.

Focusing methodologically on the substantive content of adopted plans at various territorial scales of authority, though, I have argued here for the ideational and institutional coexistence of "multiple orders" as Greater Seattle seeks to reshape the uneven geography of local metropolitan life into putatively more sustainable forms and functions in the coming years. Local public plans are governance spaces through which, on my reading, diverse values and interests in visions of urban sustainability inevitably emerge, albeit unevenly and uneasily. Accordingly, the discussion highlighted here, though necessarily illustrative rather than comprehensive, has considered various multi-scalar policy efforts to reshape the location, connectivity, design, and procedures associated with the uneven growth dynamics across the Greater Seattle city-region. These efforts are consistent, also in my view, with recent efforts in international urban studies to *include*—certainly—but also "to look beyond" urban neoliberalism (Parnell & Robinson, 2012), to consider new ways of seeing and interpreting urban growth politics and spatial-territorial policies that eschew directly "monocausal" explanations of change, without necessarily rejecting the empirics of class, race, and state, nor descending into a kind of loose pluralism.

I am generally sympathetic with some of the key arguments recently advanced by Jonas (2015), who suggests that we still consider but also now move beyond (his own) theory of a "sustainability fix" to develop "a deeper knowledge of how different usages and meanings of the concept have been urbanized" (p. 131). In particular, he conjectures, "there are many spaces of the city where stronger connections are being forged between progressive forms of economic development, environmental reforms, and planning for social justice" (ibid.)—in transport, in housing, in land-use planning too. While much that is socially important, and politically exciting, lies largely *outside* the confines of the formal state, in civil society and broader social movements, much also remains vibrant within local and regional institutions that seek a new territorial basis for urban life—at least in some places some of the time. Highlighting *plans* as spaces of *intercurrence* only initiates this rethinking. We thus move on now, focusing analytically on residential developments at the city-regional scale of analysis.

References

Altshuler, A. (1965). The goals of comprehensive planning. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, *31*(2), 186–195.

Baum, H. (2009). Fantasies and realities in university-community partnerships. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *20*, 234–246.

Beauregard, R. (2005). The textures of property markets: Downtown housing and office conversions in New York city. *Urban Studies*, *42*(13), 2431.

Berke, P. R., & Conroy, M. M. (2000). Are we planning for sustainable development? *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *66*(1), 21–33. doi:10.1080/01944360008976081.

Campbell, S. (1996). Green cities, growing cities, just cities? Urban planning and the contradictions of sustaianable development. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *62*, 296–312.

Cervero, R. (2000). Growing smart by linking transporation and urban development. *Virginia Environmental Law Journal*, *19*, 357–491.

Cervero, R. (2003). Growing smart by linking transportation and land use: Perspectives from California. *Built Environment (1978-)*, *29*(1), 66–78.

Cervero, R., & Sullivan, C. (2011). Green TODs: Marrying transit-oriented development and green urbanism. *International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology*, *18*(3), 210–218. doi:10.1080/13504509.2011.570801.

Chapin, T. S. (2012). Introduction: From growth controls, to comprehensive planning, to smart growth: Planning's emerging fourth wave. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *78* (1), 5–15.

City of Seattle. (2011). *Yesler terrace redevelopment legislation*. Seattle. Retrieved from http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/UrbanForestryCommission/2011/2011docs/YeslerTerraceDPDLaClerguepresentation120711.pdf

City of Seattle. (2016). *Memorandum:Response to council SLI 18-2-A-1 (DON programs and City Council districts)*. Seattle: Office of the Mayor.

City of Snoqualmie. (2011). *Inerlocal agreement between the city of Snolqualmie and King County regarding the annexation of a portion of the Snoqualimie Mill Planning Area*. Snoqualmie: City of Snoqualmie. Retrieved from http://www.ci.snoqualmie.wa.us/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Command=Core_Download&EntryId=14524&PortalId=0&TabId=273

City of Snoqualmie. (2014). *Snoqaulmie 2032*. Snoqaulmie: City of Snoqualmie. Retrieved from http://www.ci.snoqualmie.wa.us/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Command=Core_Download&EntryId=22431&PortalId=0&TabId=273

City of Tacoma. (2008). *Climate action plan*. Tacoma: City of Tacoma.

Coffman, L. (1969). *Summary of comparative analysis of alternative transportation systems*. Seattle: Municipality of Metropolitan, Seattle.

Cowell, R., & Owens, S. (2010). Revisiting ... Governing space: planning reform and the politics of sustainability. *Environment and Planning C-Government and Policy*, *28*(6), 952–957.

Cox, K. (2011). From the new urban politics to the new metropolitan politics. *Urban Studies*, *48* (12), 2661–2671.

Dreier, P., Mollenkopf, J., & Swanstrom, T. (2001). *Place matters: Metropolitics for the twenty-first century*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Elliot, L. (2012). Embrace applied ecology for real environmental change. *Naturehood*. Retrieved from http://naturehood.ca/blog/2012-10-Applied-Ecology.html

Fainstein, S. (2010). *The just city*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Feoick, R. (Ed.). (2004). *Metropolitan governance: Conflict, competition, and cooperation*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Ferbrache, F., & Knowles, R. (2016). Generating opportunities for city sustainability through investments in light rail systems: Introduction to the Special Section on light rail and urban

sustainability. *Journal of Transport Geography*, *54*, 369–372. doi:10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2016.06.004.

Flyvbjerg, B. (1998). *Rationality and power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Foster, J. (2008). *The sustainability mirage*. London: Earthscan.

Godschalk, D. R. (2004). Land use planning challenges: Coping with conflicts in visions of sustainable development and livable communities. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *70*(1), 5–13. doi:10.1080/01944360408976334.

Goetz, E. (2011). *New deal ruins*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell.

Handy, S. (2005). Smart growth and the transportation-land use connection: What does the research tell us? *International Regional Science Review*, *28*(2), 146–167.

Jonas, A. (2015). Beyond the urban 'sustainability fix': Looking for new spaces and discourses of sustainability in the city. In D. Wilson (Ed.), *The politics of the urban sustainability concept*. Champaign, IL: Common Ground.

Jones, M. (1997). Spatial selectivity of the state: the regulationist enigma and local struggles over economic governance. *Environment & Planning A*, *29*, 831–864.

Katz, B. (2000). The federal role in reducing sprawl. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *572*, 66–77.

Keil, R., & Whitehead, M. (2012). Cities and the politics of sustainability. In K. Mossberger, S. Clarke, & J. John (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of urban politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keller, J., Stevens, C., Laasko, J., & Tashiro, C. (2013). Ethnically diverse hope VI redevelopments: A community case study from the Pacific Northwest. *Cityscapes*, *15*(2), 29–46.

King County. (2012). *2012 King County countywide planning policies*. Seattle: King County.

Kleit, R. G., & Galvez, M. (2011). The location choices of public housing residents displaced by redevelopment: Market constraints, personal preferences, or social information? *Journal of Urban Affairs*, *33*(4), 375–407. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9906.2011.00557.x.

Knaap, G., & Zhao, X. (2009). Smart growth and urbanization in China: Can an American tonic treat the growing pains of Asia. In Y. Song & C. Ding (Eds.), *Smart urban growth for China*. Cambridge: Lincoln Institute.

Krishnan, S. (2007, August 14). Living near work? Great idea, in theory. *Seattle Times*. Retrieved from http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/living-near-work-great-idea-in-theory/

Lefebvre, H. (1991). *The production of space*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Levinson, H. S., Allen, J. G., & Hoey, W. F. (2012). Light rail since World War II: Abandonments, survivals, and revivals. *Journal of Urban Technology*, *19*(1), 65–79. doi:10.1080/10630732.2011.649911.

Lewis, P., & Neiman, M. (2009). *Custodians of place: Governing the growth and development of cities*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Lindblom, M. (2007, April 4). Light rail construction is a tangle of trouble in the Rainier valley. *Seattle Times,* p. C1.

Local Government Commission. (2003). *Overcoming obstacles to smart growth through code reform*. Sacramento: Local Government Commission.

Lowe, K. (2014). Bypassing equity? Transit investment and regional transportation planning. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *34*(1), 30–44. doi:10.1177/0739456x13519474.

McCann, B. (2011). Perspecives form the field: Complete streets and sustainability. *Environmental Practice*, *13*, 63–64. doi:10.1017/S1466046610000591.

MRSC. (2015). *Comprehensive planning/growth management*. Retrieved from http://mrsc.org/Home/Explore-Topics/Planning/General-Planning-and-Growth-Management/Comprehensive-Planning-Growth-Management.aspx

Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle. (1990). *Transportation 2000: Metro high capacity transit program rail planning study: Initial operating segment, candidate segments for evaluation*. Seattle: Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle.

Neuman, M. (1998). Does planning need the plan? *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *64*(2), 208–220. doi:10.1080/01944369808975976.

Office of Derek Kilmer. (2015, December 26). *Tacoma Link Light Rail extension receives small starts grant*, Washington.

Pagano, M., & Bowman, A. (2000). *Vacant land in cities: An urban resource*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.

Page, S. B. (2013). Theories of governance: Comparative perspectives on Seattle's Light Rail Project. *Policy Studies Journal*, *41*(4), 583–607. doi:10.1111/psj.12033.

Parnell, S., & Robinson, J. (2012). (Re)theorizing cities from the global south: looking beyond neoliberalism. *Urban Geography*, *33*(4), 593–617.

Pendall, R., & Hendley, L. (2013). *A brief look at the early implementation of Choice neighborhoods*. Washington, DC: Annie E. Casey Foundation.

Puget Sound Regional Council. (2009). *VISION 2040 & the regional growth strategy*. Seattle: Puget Sound Regional Growth Strategy.

Richards, K. (2015, July 29). The hidden reason behind Seattle's skyrocketing housing costs. *The Stranger*. Retrieved from http://www.thestranger.com/news/feature/2015/07/29/22612207/the-hidden-reason-behind-seattles-skyrocketing-housing-costs

Ryan, B. (2011). Reading through a plan: A visual interpretation of what plans mean and how they innovate. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *77*(4), 309–327. doi:10.1080/01944363.2011.616995.

Salsich, P. (2012, March/April). The choice neighborhoods initiative. *Probate and Property*, pp. 34–39.

Seattle Housing Authority. (2011). *Yesler Terrace development plan*. Seattle. Retrieved from https://seattlehousing.org/redevelopment/pdf/DevPlanFinal-web.pdf

Seattle Housing Authority. (2016). *Renewing Yesler's promise: The redevelopment of Yesler Terrace*. Seattle. Retrieved from http://seattlehousing.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Final-8-page-brochure-revised-2-2.pdf

Sound Transit. (2013). *Tacoma Link expansion: Alternatives analysis report and SEPA addendum*. Seattle: Sound Transit.

Stiles, M. (2016, May 26). Yesler Terrace: Soon to be Seattle's densest neighborhood. *Puget Sound Business Journal*. Retrieved from http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/2016/05/06/yesler-terrace-soon-to-be-seattles-densest.html

Stone, C. (2015). Reflections on regime politics: From governing coalition to urban political order. *Urban Affairs Review*, *51*(1), 101–137. doi:10.1177/1078087414558948.

Stone, C., & Whelan, R. (2009). Through the glass darkly: The once and future study of urban poltiics. In R. Dilworth (Ed.), *The city in American political development*. New York: Routledge.

Strickland, M. (2016, April 30). We're fighting for the soul of our city and its future. *Tacoma News Tribune*. Retrieved from http://www.thenewstribune.com/opinion/op-ed/article74682727.html

United States Congress House Committee on Financial Services. (2010). *The administration's proposal to revitalize severely distressed public and assisted housing: The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative : hearing before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, second session, March 17, 2010*. Washington, DC: U.S. G.P.O.

Whittemore, A. H. (2015). Practitioners theorize, too: Reaffirming planning theory in a survey of practitioners' theories. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *35*(1), 76–85. doi:10.1177/0739456x14563144.

Chapter 7
Home: Residential Geographies of Contained (Re)ordering

The fundamental premise of smart growth is that growth is not inherently harmful; rather it is certain patterns of scattered, haphazard development that cause adverse impacts.

—Olivier Pollard (2000)

7.1 Introduction

The strategic pursuit of urban sustainability through smart growth theories means many different things. Yet the animating heart of smart growth *practices*, as Olivier Pollard suggests, are plan-oriented efforts to change "patterns of scattered, haphazard development," i.e., sprawl. Smart growth is nothing if not about attacking sprawl (Song, 2012), particularly as this involves the (re)ordering of residential development. Smart growth seeks to remake the geography of housing. That is reasonably easy to understand as a basic approximation. It is also exceptionally difficult to accomplish, if indeed one accepts this as a desirable goal, which not everyone does. Sprawl is unpopular in the abstract. But so are many of its proposed solutions. "The only thing people hate worse than sprawl," one oft-repeated planning joke again has it, "is density."

Three initial problems stand out. First, sprawl is conceptually more difficult to define than might be assumed (Bruegmann, 2005). Sprawl involves land use patterns characterized by low density, lack of contiguity, insufficient concentration, an absence of clustering, lack of centrality, monofunctionality, and poor proximity (Galster et al., 2001). Yet these patterns vary from place to place, so precisely what constitute sprawl (and what does not) is partly a matter of interpretation (Bogart, 2006). In the main, though, sprawl usually refers to massive, extensive land development "characterized by restrictive zoning, automobile-centered transportation, [and] a preponderance of single-family residences on large lots. . ." (Lindstrom & Bartling, 2003, p. xi). Plate 7.1 below, taken in Pierce County in 1949, captures this dominant view of sprawl.

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Dierwechter, *Urban Sustainability through Smart Growth*, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54448-9_7



Plate 7.1 Residential development in Pierce County, 1949 (Courtesy of Tacoma Public Library, see https://www.tacomalibrary.org/resource/image-archives/)

Countering sprawl, as a second problem, therefore necessarily takes on complex institutional, strategic, and policy forms (Barbour & Deakin, 2012; Fishman & Gechter, 2004; Handy, 2005; Shen & Zhang, 2007; Staley & Gilroy, 2002; Talen & Knaap, 2003). Statewide programs interface with regional and local strategies, even as congeries of Federal rules work both for and against these strategies (Katz, 2000). From 2009, as just discussed in Chap. 6 the Obama administration targeted improved "interagency collaboration" through the Partnership for Sustainable Communities, a Federal program built on a Clinton-era initiative from the 1990s that Greater Seattle has successfully tapped as part and parcel of its long-standing planning reforms (Puget Sound Regional Council, 2010). Yet many federal policies continue to promote sprawl, in Seattle as elsewhere, making it difficult to assess any program's efficacy (Mollenkopf, Swanstrom, & Dreier, 2014).

Finally, scholars working in diverse traditions—geographers, planners, economists, natural scientists—ardently debate the extent to which changing patterns of land use can (and do) deliver urban sustainability, wherein sustainability itself is differently defined and studied (Alberti, 1999; Anthony, 2004; Garde, 2004; Neuman, 2005; Richardson & Gordon, 1998; Ross, 2014; Siedentop & Fina, 2012; Wilkie & Moe, 1997). These debates reflect, in turn, wider philosophical

and ideological conflicts over the political economies of urban sustainability discussed at length in Chap. 3.

As a generalization, of course, "state-progressives" support smart growth policies because they believe or hope that enhanced compactness will eventually improve environmental performance (Alberti, 1999). Whether it does or not, how so, in what ways, and for whom, are nonetheless unresolved, highly contested questions. Like the production of sprawl, the counterproduction of compactness involves an array of shifts over long timelines in the form, density, grain, and connectivity of city-regions (ibid., p. 152). Each of these qualities, moreover, impacts entangled problems that stretch across multiple functional and administrative scales. Or as I would again theoretically suggest: the pursuit of compactness is shaped by the intercurrence of institutions and ideas. The relationship between compactness and sustainability is, at the end of the day, a Gordian knot without an agreed upon sword.

All the same, scholars of smart growth's emerging spaces, however flawed or inchoate they appear, claim that sprawl can only really generate resource-intensive lifestyles. In particular, residential sprawl is profoundly carbon-dependent (Ewing, 2008). They further claim, with an eye on recurrent crises of municipal, state, and federal insolvency, that sprawl invariably raises the overall cost to taxpayers of providing non-optional public services: e.g., capital facilities, roadways, transit, sewerage, trash collection, police protection, fire protection, parks, education, libraries, etc. (e.g., Carruthers & Ulfarsson, 2003). Neither condition is remotely sustainable. Nature's ecosystems will lose more of their resiliency, while society's limited tax bases will continue to attenuate. Salmon will decline, while potholes will flourish.

In this chapter, I focus empirically on policy efforts since the early 1990s across Greater Seattle to counter sprawl using regionally coordinated urban growth boundaries (RC-UGBs), common planning tools in counties such as the UK and the Netherlands (who use greenbelts) but which few large American city-regions other than Seattle and Portland currently deploy (Pendall & Puentes, 2008). In order to make my themes more cosmopolitan and broadly comparative, I refer to this overall planning strategy, institutionalized legally by the Growth Management Act of 1990/1991, as "smart containment." I am particularly interested here in exploring the ongoing tensions between the relatively recent, inter-scalar policy pursuit of sustainability through smart containment and the older, obdurate problems of segregation, picking up synoptic themes I have already touched upon and developed in earlier chapters.

On the one hand, Greater Seattle's smart containment efforts clearly recognize the larger national reality that, as Arthur Nelson (2013, p. 1) usefully notes, "more than $20 trillion will be spent on reshaping America's metropolitan areas between 2010 and 2030 . . . [wherein] [n]ew and replaced residential units will be about a quarter of all units existing in 2010—more than thirty million units." On the other hand, how have efforts across Greater Seattle to reorder residential developments influenced *inherited* patterns of economic and racial segregation? Nationally, as Bischoff and Reardon (2013, p. 32) painfully remind us, "segregation of families by

socioeconomic status has grown significantly in the last 40 years." In particular, they show that "the proportion of families living in poor or affluent neighborhoods doubled from 15 percent to 33 percent and the proportion of families living in middle-income neighborhoods declined from 65 percent to 42 percent" (ibid.). What sorts of emerging spaces is "smart containment" making? Given the central theoretical problem of institutional and ideational *intercurrence*, how should we interpret these spaces in light of both the geo-histories and contemporary challenges that confront Greater Seattle moving forward?

7.2 Sprawl, Containment, and Segregation[1]

Research on US containment policies is contentious—even when we focus on metropolitan-wide regimes, as in Seattle, Nashville, or Portland, as opposed to the hodge-podge of exclusionary local growth controls maligned for decades (Chapin, 2012). The scale distinction, in my view, is critical (Carlson & Dierwechter, 2007). As Pendall and Puentes (2008) note, "growth containment" regimes differ from "growth control" efforts, the latter of which combine locally imposed but uncoordinated growth boundaries with building permit caps. In theory, metropolitan-wide containment involves the "outside" use of UGBs, greenbelts, or urban service lines to manage low-density sprawl, along with a set of complementary "inside" policies that include mixed-use zoning, affordable housing tools, comprehensive plans, land inventories, and/or public transit investments (Weitz & Moore, 1998), which is the case in Greater Seattle.

So defined, no one knows how many such regimes exist in the USA—nor how they perform (Song, 2012). Nelson and Dawkins (2003) once identified 127 "urban containment plans" around the country, breaking them into four main types along two main dimensions (strength and accommodation), and noting that perhaps only 28 of these were actually "regional plans." These are local exceptions to the national rule. According to the Census Bureau, the USA had 36,011 sub-county general-purpose governments in 2007, of which 19,492 were municipal governments and 3003 were counties; an additional 50,432 were "special purpose districts." And then there are, of course, multiple Federal agencies, states, tribes, and so on. Each political entity shapes territorial development in some manner: some by courting growth, some by repelling it, most others by doing rather little at all. Nelson and Dawkins have characterized Seattle as a "strong" containment regime where "strength" reflects, on my reading of their work, the presence of both "outside" and "inside" smart growth policies. Contemporary peers with roughly similar (if hardly exact) regimes to Seattle, at least in these terms, include Portland,

[1]Though significantly modified and developed, this section of the chapter draws in part on an my original article published in *Urban Geography* (see Dierwechter, 2014, pp. 693–695). The material accordingly was adapted with the copyright permission of Taylor and Francis.

Denver, and Sacramento, among a few others—notwithstanding their respective differences in policy design, regulatory power, institutional setting, political culture, and state constitutional environments.

Wassmer (2006, p. 56) has deployed this typology to explore regime effects on urbanized area, or "footprint," concluding that "different forms of local urban containment and statewide growth management policies are achieving one of their intended goals of producing more compact urban development." Using geographical information systems techniques Carlson and Dierwechter (2007) analyzed residential building permits issued in Pierce County over a 20-year period. They found that once vested property had "worked through" the new regulatory system, permitting located beyond RC-UGBs tapered off significantly from the late 1990s onward. However, as Hepinstall-Cymerman, Coe, and Hutyra (2013) note, evidence for the efficacy of RC-UBGs and ancillary techniques in Washington State as elsewhere remains "mixed," depending upon the places observed, the data deployed, and the effects at issue (Cho, Poudyal, & Lambert, 2008; Newell & Marzluff, 2005).

With specific respect to race, as Nelson, Sanchez and Dawkins (2006, pp. 438–439) have argued, "urban containment appears to accelerate racial desegregation among Anglos and African Americans," performing better than, for example, state-mandated housing initiatives; such affordable housing targets, they delicately put it, "may be threatening to local voters [whose] collective weight in the electoral process perhaps dooms such efforts before they are seriously considered." In contrast, more abstract containment strategies implemented through RC-UGBs and similar tools are enveloped by the "subtle movement" that is smart growth—a discourse which tends to emphasize middle-class values like "preserving open spaces, revitalizing urban areas, creating more urbane communities, and expanding housing choice" rather than social justice concerns like "reducing racial segregation." Nelson et al. argue that urban containment occasions racial desegregation as a kind of "collateral benefit." In contrast, Pozdena (2002) charges that such strategies help to forge "a new segregation" because they necessarily inflate property prices—a common yet also contested thesis (Choe, 2002; Downs, 2001, 2005; Staley & Gilroy, 2002). This putatively deters minorities from homeownership, because they tend to have lower household incomes than whites (Pozdena, 2002).

More recently, Ruddiman (2013) has offered a more equivocal argument, navigating the terrain between Nelson's optimism and Pozdena's pessimism. Using matched-pair analysis of smart growth and non-smart growth communities, she concludes that neither a strong "pro" nor "con" message can be taken regarding UGBs as a containment tool. In my view, Ruddiman's ambivalence reflects the actually existing geographical anatomy of smart growth as a complex and variegated policy experience in diverse city-regions. Smart growth's recent containment efforts may indeed be helping to compact and possibly even racially desegregate at least parts of the (sub)urban fabric. At the same time, it is not clear that, even where this occurs, newly compacted areas also reflect class desegregation; nor is it clear,

from a broader perspective, what different kinds of smart growth space might be emerging in the same region.

Is it not possible, for example, that the emergent landscapes of smart growth, in Seattle as elsewhere, emulate Trudeau and Malloy's (2011, p. 443) work on the complexity of New Urbanism (NU)? "There is a continuum of NU in practice," they argue, "[wherein] projects at the urban end provide a social mix and create physical infrastructure that supports a public realm, while projects at the anti-urban end seem to reinforce social homogeneity and lack public spaces" (cf. Moore, 2010). Might we not approach the production of "post-metropolitan" space, in Edward Soja's (2000) terminology, not as "either/or" propositions—but as "both/also" problems? Indeed, is not this the key implication of work that seeks to understand the social production of urban space over time as the intercurrence of contending political orders?

7.3 Exploring "Smart Containment" Through Residential Permit Data

As the above literature suggests, there are numerous dimensions to consider as part of any overall investigation of policy efforts to redress sprawl, even when focused only on residential developments. For the moment, I narrow the overall analysis in order to consider key patterns in the shifting geographies of residential growth across Greater Seattle at various spatial scales, from the entire city-region to specific census tracts in particular jurisdictions, using residential permit data to capture the nature of growth trends over time, by type of housing.

The first part of the analysis deploys data collated monthly and yearly by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from 1980 to 2015, which can be downloaded from http://socds.huduser.gov/permits/summary.odb. Specifically, I explore overall quantitative trends in housing units permitted annually from 1980 to 2015 in the following key categories:

- *All Permits*: residential permits issued by permitting authority for all types of housing units, aggregated;
- *Single Family*: residential permits issued by permitting authority for Single Family homes only, aggregated
- *All Multifamily*: residential permits issued by permitting authority for all types of Multifamily units, aggregated, including 2-unit multifamily, 3 & 4-unit multifamily and 5+ unit multifamily.
- *2-Unit Multifamily*: residential permits issued by permitting authority for total units in 2-unit housing developments only, aggregated;
- *3 & 4-Unit Multifamily*: residential permits issued by permitting authority for total units in of 3 & 4 housing unit developments only, aggregated;
- *5+-Unit Multifamily*: residential permits issued by permitting authority for total units in 5+ housing unit developments only, aggregated.

Using scatterplots, histograms, and other techniques, the objective is to render an overall portrait of housing trends at various territorial scales, focusing especially on the balance of housing stock between single-family and multi-family units. I use various trend lines (linear, polynomial) in the charts to capture visually the main patterns, depending on the extent of variability year up year.[2] I also focus on mapping uneven territorial patterns in residential development, including efforts to capture differences by type of community, including core cities, job-rich municipalities, etc. Such an approach provides an initial outline—albeit only a rough metropolitan portrait—of what parts of Greater Seattle's overall residential space have been changing the most, and just as importantly for my purposes here how they have been changing in terms of types of housing and their relative mix. Where is growth happening, and what kinds of residential spaces have been emerging over the past 35 years? In particular, to what extent can we discuss a broad macro-processes of residential reordering, wherein containment strategies are also leading to more mixed-forms of urban change? Contrasts are also made between specific scales and wider reference spaces. For example, I compare "Greater Seattle" with other US city-regions.

I next shift to a more fine-grained exploration of specific, high-growth census tracts since 1990, as this was the first year of the Growth Management Act, which as discussed earlier in the book mandated the regional-coordination of urban growth boundaries as well as local comprehensive planning. The data, collated by the Puget Sound Regional Council based on census surveys, captures the amount and type of housing at the census tract level that has been created (and lost) for each calendar year from 1990 to 2015, as measured by permitted new units, demolitions/lost units, and net total units for each year. Using GIS mapping, I am especially interested here in the race and class patterns in the relative mixing of housing types by high-growth tract.

Using census tracts to study data and residential trends is not without problems: tracts change over time; are very small in dense urban areas but much larger in less-dense suburban, exurban and rural areas; and do not necessarily cohere with formal or informal definitions of sub-municipal and sub-county neighborhoods. Other methodological problems are also important. Census tracts have arbitrary boundaries, generating what Stan Oppenshaw famously identified as the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP). Data are collected at the household level, but for various reasons are typically aggregated into larger areal units such as block- or tract-level polygons; without a street line geocoding process we do not know *exactly* where any given housing permit is given (Carlson & Dierwechter, 2007). In addition,

[2]For example, simple "linear" trend lines (Lin) in scatterplots are usually sufficient when a variable (e.g., permits per year) changes at a steady rate. In contrast, a polynomial trend line (poly) is more helpful when data fluctuate more dramatically, as indicated by large gains or losses year upon year over the data set. The "order" of the polynomial is then determined by the number of fluctuations in the data or by how many "hills and valleys" appear. See: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/Choosing-the-best-trendline-for-your-data-1bb3c9e7-0280-45b5-9ab0-d0c93161daa8.

focusing on residential development alone leaves out important trends that might characterize retail, industrial, and commercial developments. However, measuring census tract changes in residential building permits provides two useful advantages: (1) it directs our attention to specific places, where we can then explore other kinds of quantitative and qualitative data; and (2) it efficiently indicates the types of changes, albeit only in a residential sense, as well as the degree of "recycling."

7.4 A Comparative City-Regional Overview

Determining whether or not, in what ways, and how Greater Seattle is steadily shifting the geographies of housing production requires attention to multiple spatial scales of change. In addition, it requires us to interpret local trends in a comparative context. How do changes across Greater Seattle look when seen in the wider national context, particularly in regard to other metropolitan regions? In 2012, the US Census Bureau counted 382 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with an urban core population of at least 50,000. Of these, nine MSAs were larger than five million, while an additional five MSAs were larger than four million people. Greater Seattle, which again consists of the policy space that links together the Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue MSA and the smaller Bremerton-Silverdale MSA, is one of about twenty major city-regions across the country that range between (roughly) two and four million people.

Figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 chart housing permit trends between 1980 and 2015 in four city-regions, some slightly larger and others slightly smaller than Greater Seattle, that are also experiencing robust demographic growth rates. They are located in different parts of the USA, so attempt to reflect different historical-institutional environments: viz., Greater Charlotte (Southeast), Greater Phoenix (Southwest), Minneapolis-St Paul (Midwest), and Greater Sacramento (West).

Drawing polynomial trend lines sufficiently sensitive to temporal volatility through the scatterplots of the same variables for the same periods of time reveals key commonalities. Unsurprisingly, the historic focus on the construction of single-family homes predominates in all cases, even as the limited permitting of 2-unit and 3–4-unit developments remains quantitatively negligible (a problem I come back to later on). However, the figures also collectively show the growing importance of larger multi-family housing developments (5+ units), particularly since the Great Recession in 2008–2009. This is not necessarily the case for all 382 MSAs in the country (e.g., Sacramento). Moreover, there are important regional differences between, for instance, Phoenix (Fig. 7.2) and Minneapolis-St Paul (Fig. 7.3). But the trend lines could well show, in general terms, a metaphoric kind of "peak oil" in what could also turn out to be the historic zenith of single-family housing space in the USA.

Homeownership rates are the lowest they have been in nearly 50 years. Median housing costs, moreover, have risen faster than median household incomes, which have flat-lined since the 1970s for the middle classes and declined for lower classes,



Fig. 7.1 Permitted total housing units, by type, 1980–2015 for Greater Charlotte, NC



Fig. 7.2 Permitted total housing units, by type, 1980–2015 for Greater Phoenix, AZ



Fig. 7.3 Permitted total housing units, by type, 1980–2015 for Minneapolis-St Paul



Fig. 7.4 Permitted total housing units, by type, 1980–2015 for Sacramento, CA

at least relative to the wealthy (Dewan, 2014; Swanstrom, 2016). In addition, debt-laden millennials—a massive demographic moving into the job market after, for many individuals, increasingly expensive college years—are delaying marriage and children, creating demand instead for rental units. Lags in new production have inflated average rents, which have consequently helped to reduce the savings necessary to purchase single-family homes. Meanwhile housing developers, responding to market conditions, have been less focused on starter units than on larger homes for wealthier buyers. The Joint Center for Housing Studies (2016, p. 5) details some of these problems:

> The share of adults aged 20–39 with student loan debt soared from 22 percent in 2001 to 39 percent in 2013, while the average amount that borrowers owed jumped from $17,000 to $30,000 in real terms. Although student loan payments should not limit the homeownership options of most households, this may not be true for the nearly one-fifth of indebted young renters whose payments exceed 14 percent of monthly income [. . ..] Ages at first marriage and the start of childbearing have [also] been on the rise for some time, implying delays in first-time homebuying.

If past is prologue, these trends will reverse in the coming years, as many vested observers expect. Changing demography, particularly an aging population, might also challenge that view, as Arthur Nelson (2013) argues, even as critics like Joel Kotkin (2010) see a durable preference within the USA for detached, automobile-based, largely suburban living. Perhaps so. Perhaps not. Much of the debate about whether future landscapes will be like the past is a debate about *open* policy choices, which are themselves the product of conflicting political agendas that reflect different philosophies about state–market space relationships. The two major US city-regions in the Pacific Northwest—Portland and Seattle—already appear to differ from the "normal" policy agenda in their regional planning commitments to reshaping sprawl (Pendall & Puentes, 2008). Specifically, they are both characterized by what I am again calling "smart containment," using regionally coordinated urban growth boundaries (RC-UGBs) to shunt growth back towards existing services. Does this matter?

Figures 7.5, 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, and 7.9 below suggest that it does, albeit unevenly. While the national market trends seen elsewhere are also seen across Greater Seattle, particularly in regard to the still rather limited production of 2-unit and 3–4 unit housing—an important problem for smart growth advocates—the relative intensity of the shift to larger multi-family units has been significant (Fig. 7.5). In addition, the case that trends will return to patterns seen in earlier epochs is plausible but weaker in Greater Seattle than in most city-regions. This claim requires us, however, to shift the analysis to more detailed spatial scales within the city-regional space-economy and state-policy territory, looking for emerging patterns of residential development and geographical reordering.

Since passage of the Growth Management Act (GMA) in the early 1990s, counties in fast-growing regions of Washington have been responsible for negotiating urban growth boundaries among their respective local governments (Dierwechter, 2008). In Pierce County, for example, the *Pierce County* Regional Council (PCRC), a "sub-regional council" to the *Puget Sound* Regional Council



Fig. 7.5 Permitted total housing units, by type, 1980–2015 for Greater Seattle, WA



Fig. 7.6 Permitted total housing units, by type, 1980–2015 King County: "Unincorporated Areas"



Fig. 7.7 Permitted total housing units, by basic type, 1980–2015 for Pierce County: "Unincorporated Areas"



Fig. 7.8 Seattle vs. Tacoma: total housing units as % of medians from 1980 to 2015



Fig. 7.9 Annual housing units permitted vs. annual goals in Tacoma: 2008–2015. Source: annual deficits figures (*negative striped bars*) calculated by author based on reported units permitted to HUDuser from 2008 to 2015 (*gray bars*) vs. published PSRC housing unit growth targets for Tacoma (i.e., 43,250/22 years = 1966 annually, shown in *black*). For raw data see: http://socds.huduser.gov/permits/ and Pierce County (2011)

(PSRC), the federally designated metropolitan planning organization (MPO), facilitates planning between Pierce County, 23 cities and towns, and the Port of Tacoma. Two groups manage this process: the Growth Management Coordinating Committee, made up of local planning officials, and the Transportation Coordinating Committee, made up of transportation officials. These groups estimate housing, population and employment targets; inventory building lands; and update countywide planning policies that are, in principle, consistent with local plans as well as the PSRC's vision of the wider city-region (e.g., Pierce County, 2011). Similar groups exist in most Washington counties subject to GMA rules. The key goal, in theory, is to reduce sprawl. Figures 7.7 and 7.8 show how such groups have performed in terms of single and multi-family housing permits within "unincorporated" areas.

While permits for single-family and multi-family units accelerated in the 1980s, King County significantly reduced permit activity in its "unincorporated" areas after around 1990, shunting growth pressures to its incorporated municipalities (Fig. 7.6). Pierce County struggled more, particularly with respect to "reordering" single-family units into its own municipalities, although recent trends suggest a lag effect (Fig. 7.7). Specifically, Seattle has captured a greater percentage share of overall growth than has Tacoma, measured in terms of median permitting rates over time (Fig. 7.8 below).

It is tempting to see Seattle, like any other city, as a place with an internal, bounded identity. But these various figures need to read together, as they are in my view co-constitutive of one another. Again, the identity of any given place "does not derive from some internalised history," as Doreen Massey repeatedly argued, "It derives, in large part, precisely from the specificity of its interactions with 'the outside'" (Massey, cited in Darling, 2009). Following Massey's theoretical logic, Tacoma-Pierce County *makes* Seattle-King County *and* vice versa, even as both places are together shaped by interactions with still other places forged at multiple scales. Tacoma planners and elected officials have long complained that, even in the new planning era of GMA, Pierce County has "acted more like a city," pursuing growth too aggressively that counters the spatial policy architecture of the GMA system (Stenger, pers. com; Boe, pers. com.).

But as discussed in Chap. 4 and again following Massey here, this effort to "pull" growth is heavily influenced by the structured "push" of residential growth pressures emanating out of King County (Modarres, 2015). In particular, the northern fringes of Pierce County that abut King County have served as spatial outlets for the reproductive needs of King County. Put more directly: Seattle's "success" cannot be explained compellingly without relational references to the larger project of global city-regionalism. In consequence, Tacoma has not been able to meet its regionally allocated growth goals, as established by the PSRC's housing targets agreed to by Pierce County communities. Figure 7.9 shows the annual *deficits* of total housing units in Tacoma actually permitted since 2008. In general, "unincorporated areas" that lay well outside the jurisdiction of local municipalities are not places that most advocates of smart growth policies want to see low-density, nonfunctional, noncontiguous residential subdivisions that demand costly urban-level services (Carruthers & Ulfarsson, 2003). However, a more refined picture is now required as "smart compaction" in Greater Seattle involves the long-term use of growth boundaries outside but near incorporated municipalities. While urban in-fill is strongly encouraged, to what extent are the ongoing greenfield developments seen especially in Pierce County continuous and attached to extant fabric? Ideally, these areas will be annexed over time as densities improve. But where are the region's fast-growing areas? And how do they relate to questions of sustainability and segregation?

7.5 Spaces: Mapping Socio-Spatially Variegated Smart Growth

The analysis now steps down from these comparative metropolitan-scale mappings. Here the discussion narrows in a geographic sense, focusing on specific neighborhoods and not others, but also widens to consider the broader problem of segregation. A typology of the fastest-changing neighborhoods is presented. Deploying additional census data on median household income, home values, and racial

composition, this typology then unpacks the heterogeneous s nature of nascent smart growth landscapes.

As indicated at the outset, the metropolitan-level pursuit of sustainability in Greater Seattle ostensibly has implied, among other things, a deliberate, regionally orchestrated policy effort to reshape extant urban space through a coherent smart growth planning regime legislatively conceived, institutionally refined, and administratively implemented largely over the past two decades. Table 7.1 first provides a "mapping" of residential permitting data for select years in the 1990s and 2000s, respectively. During the sample period in 1990s (1991–1999) about 211,000 units (Net) were added to the region's residential building stock, 55% of which (116,059) were single-family homes (SF). Although King County, home to Seattle, is today about 2.5–2.75 times larger in population than Pierce and Snohomish Counties, respectively, its percentage share of the region's overall growth in single family homes was only slightly higher during this window of time: viz., 33% of the total shift compared with 28% percent each for Pierce and Snohomish Counties. In contrast, Pierce and Snohomish Counties, but particularly Pierce, underperformed with respect to multifamily units (MF).

King County constituted about half of the region's population at the time, yet provided 60% of total multifamily units; Pierce County, where median household income is 20% lower than in King County, delivered nearly half of the region's net gains in mobile and modular homes (MH). While the production of duplexes and accessory dwelling units (MF2) was roughly divided in "thirds" across the region (with only minimal production in Kitsap), King County dominated the supply of fourplexes, larger apartment buildings, and especially large condo developments of 50+ units. Finally, of the region's total census tracts, only 41 during this period in the 1990s either permitted no net gains or lost net units (7% of all tracts). In contrast, 58 tracts (10%) experienced *net gains* of more than 1000 units—with 12 tracts experiencing net gains of more than 2000 units. These very high-growth tracts are further discussed below.

During the sample period for the 2000s (2001–2006), an additional 147,316, units (Net) were added to the region's residential building stock, about 60% of which (88,139) were single family homes (SF). While Pierce County retained its percentage share of total units (roughly one-quarter of permits, as in the 1990s), King County increased its overall percentage share in the region from 45 to 50%, more at the expense of Kitsap and Snohomish Counties than Pierce County. This included a slightly higher regional percentage of single family units (from 33 to 37% over the two periods), but the most important shift was in the new production of multifamily units (MF), growing from 60% of regional production to 71%. In particular, King County's dominance in large condo development (MH50+) widened even further during the early 2000s, growing from 80 to 90% of total regional production in the sample years.

Pierce County led in the development of mobile/modular homes (50%), but it improved its regional share of new multifamily housing between fourplexes and 20–49 units, albeit mostly at the expense of Snohomish County. Pierce County also saw shifts in the amount of total lost units ("Lost"), suggesting more land recycling

Table 7.1 Total permitted housing units for sample periods, by type

	Total	Lost	Net	SF	MF	MF2	MF3–4	MF5–9	MF10–19	MF20–49	MF50+	MH	Other
Data for 1991–1999													
County [raw]													
King [2,007,440]	93,141	(7300)	85,841	38,734	43,834	2189	3444	4934	4923	7959	20,385	3189	102
Kitsap [254,991]	19,432	(695)	18,734	12,239	2818	333	(80)	332	955	523	755	3663	14
Pierce [811,681]	55,153	(1550)	53,603	32,996	10,543	2098	957	1299	4698	1010	481	9946	160
Snohomish [733, 036]	53,906	(1133)	52,773	32,090	16,267	2252	1064	1740	3429	3879	3903	4416	–
CPS region	221,632	(10,678)	210,951	116,059	73,462	6872	5385	8305	14,005	13,371	25,524	21,214	276
Average per year	24,626	(1186)	23,439	12,895	8162	764	598	923	1556	1486	2836	2357	31
County [%]													
King [2,007,440]	42	68	41	33	60	32	64	59	35	60	80	15	37
Kitsap [254,991]	9	7	9	11	4	5	−1	4	7	4	3	17	5
Pierce [811,681]	25	15	25	28	14	31	18	16	34	8	2	47	58
Snohomish [733, 036]	24	11	25	28	22	33	20	21	24	29	15	21	0
CPS region	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Data for 2001–2006													
County [raw]													
King [2,007,440]	81,907	(9660)	72,247	32,241	39,641	4798	3455	3712	3156	5576	18,944	360	5
Kitsap [254,991]	8077	(909)	7168	5685	979	222	73	29	49	402	204	506	(2)
Pierce [811,681]	39,084	(3178)	35,906	26.240	8.004	1616	1199	1683	1386	1111	1009	1662	–
Snohomish [733,036]	33,409	(1414)	31,995	23,973	7217	1970	950	750	1141	1580	826	805	–
CPS region	162,477	(15,161)	147,316	88,139	55,841	8606	5677	6174	5732	8669	20,983	3333	3
Average per year	27,080	(2527)	24,553	14,690	9307	1434	946	1029	955	1445	3497	556	1
County [%]													
King [2,007,440]	50	64	49	37	71	56	61	60	55	64	90	11	167
Kitsap [254,991]	5	6	5	6	2	3	1	0	1	5	1	15	−67

(continued)

Table 7.1 (continued)

	Total	Lost	Net	SF	MF	MF2	MF3–4	MF5–9	MF10–19	MF20–49	MF50+	MH	Other
Pierce [811,681]	24	21	24	30	14	19	21	27	24	13	5	50	0
Snohomish [733, 036]	21	9	22	27	13	23	17	12	20	18	4	24	0
CPS region	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
County [raw]													
Ave/per 9l–99	24,626	(1186)	23,439	12,895	8162	764	598	923	1.556	1486	2836	2357	31
Ave/per 01–06	27,080	(2527)	24,553	14,690	9307	1434	946	1029	955	1445	3497	556	1
% 2000s/1990s	110	213	105	114	114	188	158	112	61	97	123	24	2

and rebuilding in the 2000s than in the 1990s. During the 1990s sample, Pierce County made up about 15% of the region's total lost units; this figure increased to 21% during the 2001–2006 sample period. For the region as a whole the annual rate of redeveloped land, measured as total lost units with net gains, more than doubled (213%)—from an average annual rate of 1186 per year in the 1990s to 2527 in the 2000s. This occurred mostly as fourplexes and very large condo developments, with less dramatic changes in multifamily units between 5–9 and 20–49 units. Finally, only 1% of all census tracts during this period in the 2000s either permitted no net gains or lost net units, further evidence of overall compaction and land recycling across the region.

Greater Seattle, in short, has remained an attractive city-region within the American space-economy. Few census tracts are losing units, while many more are changing quickly. Since the early 1990s, growth has remained steady, and while single family homes still constitute a majority of the demand, Arthur Nelson is right overall to point to shifting interests in other kinds of residential spaces across the region. In particular, the most globally connected and economically dynamic part of the city-region, Seattle-King County, exhibits the central importance of multi-family housing developments. Comparing the two sample periods, multi-family housing overall kept pace in the 2000s with the annual production of single family housing, with specific types of multi-family housing—notably duplexes/ADUs ("MH2"), fourplexes, and large condo developments (MF50+)—*outpacing* the annual rate observed during most of the 1990s, when both the national and regional economy were much stronger.

Other changes are also noteworthy. Despite its urban- and port-oriented economy, for example, Tacoma-Pierce County during the 1990s produced fewer large-scale developments than Kitsap County and far less than Snohomish County. This situation changed in the 2000s. Although all three of the smaller counties produced a lower percentage share than did King County in the 2000s sample—with King County now dominating this part of the regional market—Pierce County permitted per annum far fewer mobile homes and more large-scale developments in the 2000s than in the 1990s. Pierce County recycled more land as well, an important shift to smarter forms of growth.

In general, though, during the 2000s sample period, the region produced fewer units per annum of multi-family units in 5–9 and 10–19 range, suggesting that most redevelopment and recycling activities were leading to large-scale condo developments rather than to the more nuanced, textured kind of mid-range housing types often depicted ideally in the water-color design imaginaries of New Urbanism, smart growth, and urban sustainability (for helpful reviews see Moore, 2010; Trudeau, 2013). The recent production of "post-metropolitan" space, then, reflects "a continuum" (Trudeau & Molloy, 2011), where at least as far as these numbers take us, neither a strong "pro" nor "con" message can be delivered in regard to the overall geographical effects of the smart growth regime (Ruddiman, 2013).

But let us now consider these themes for the question of segregation, focusing on specific places within the region to provide more nuance. Figures 7.10 and 7.11 highlight the most dynamic census tracts for both periods of time, again measured



Fig. 7.10 Composition of new housing, 1991–1999

as total *net* units added. Census tracts included in the 1990s data surpassed a threshold of 1000 net units gained from 1991 to 1999; census tracts included in the 2000s data surpassed a threshold of 750 net units gained from 2001 to 2006. In general, the two figures show three kinds of urban space: census tracts where *all* net gains were in single family units; census tracts where *all* net gains were in multifamily units; and census tracts where net gains varied across different types of housing units—in other words, census tracts where, at least in theory, a relatively diverse range of housing opportunities were being met in ways that, again in theory, meet smart growth aspirations. As might be expected, this third type of urban space is the most complex in terms of composition, percentage of gains by type, and thus overall heterogeneity of change, although a lower amount of highly dynamic mixed tract spaces appeared to emerge in the 2001–2006 period.

Normatively, advocates of smart growth suggest that improved sustainability emerges organically as refashioned neighborhood spaces exhibit greater residential integration. New Urbanism, which Fishman and Gechter (2004, p. 3) think of as "arguably the most comprehensive expression of smart growth principles," holds that daily activities should be within a few minutes' walk from home or work, which in turn requires a greater mix of shops, offices, apartments, and especially homes. Accordingly, the production of mixed-use neighborhoods, so the thinking runs, produces higher density mixed-use projects, which then (potentially) generate more leasable square footage, more sales per square footage, and thus higher



Fig. 7.11 Composition of new housing, 2000–2006

property values and selling prices. In an ideal smart growth world, Figs. 7.10 and 7.11 would be better balanced; most if not all fast-changing census tracts should exhibit an improved range of different kinds of housing opportunities. In reality, of course, several tracts are dominated either by the net addition of single family or multi-family homes. Indeed, the 2000s sample suggests that slightly more of the most dynamic census tracts exhibit this pattern than during the 1990s—not what most policy-makers would prefer.

Greater Seattle, in short, has remained an attractive city-region within the American space-economy. Few census tracts are losing units, while many more are changing quickly. Since the early 1990s, growth has remained steady, and while single family homes still constitute a majority of the demand, Arthur Nelson is right overall to point to shifting interests in other kinds of residential spaces across the region. In particular, the most globally connected and economically dynamic part of the city-region, Seattle-King County, exhibits the central importance of multi-family housing developments. Comparing the two sample periods, multi-family housing overall kept pace in the 2000s with the annual production of single family housing, with specific types of multi-family housing—notably duplexes/ADUs ("MH2"), fourplexes, and large condo developments (MF50+)—*outpacing* the annual rate observed during most of the 1990s, when both the national and regional economy were much stronger.



Fig. 7.12 Regional spatialities of growth

Still, the overall picture remains nuanced, certainly when we isolate key areas within metropolitan space. Figure 7.12 maps the data for the 2000s in order to get a better sense of the actual places being changed. Specifically, Fig. 7.12 shows the

most dynamic census tracts from the 2001–2006 sample of permits, wherein: "Low density" refers to tracts that saw 70% or more in net gains of single family units (i.e., at least a 70/30 split in favor of *single* family units); "high density" refers to tracts that, in contrast, saw 70% or more in net gains of *multi*family units (i.e., at least a 70/30 split in favor of new *multi*family houses); and finally "mixed-density" tracts, which refer to those census tracts in the region that saw net gains of more than 750 units in *both* single family and multifamily units but *between* 30 and 70% overall.

The region's growth boundaries are holding *as designed* and it follows that compaction and contiguity are also improving. As expected, low-density zones with a lot of single family units emerged along the periphery, near the urban growth boundaries, but none of the most dynamic tracts fell *beyond* these boundaries, which comports with prior research on the region (Carlson & Dierwechter, 2007) as well as the data presented earlier here. In addition, high density tracts are "leaking" beyond the expected Seattle core, marking important changes in both Bellevue, the region's one true "edge city" as defined by Joel Garreau's classic criteria, but also in Renton, which is an emerging edge city. Finally, medium-density zones are evolving not only in older suburban areas but also in newer suburban areas and across the region as a whole.

Figure 7.13 refines the metropolitan map further, suggesting a typology of growth spatialities. This typology is empirically derived, focused on actually existing as opposed to theoretical landscapes, and is inspired by Trudeau and Malloy's (2011) findings on the "geography of New Urbanism." The key point, of course, is that empirical as opposed to theoretical smart growth emerges as a continuum of places in complex dialogue with *extant* socioeconomic patterns, built-environmental path-dependencies, nascent market forces, uneven social capital, localized political and legal arrangements, and administrative capabilities. It follows that its effects on patterns of segregation, in particular, will vary as well, suggesting a contemporary urban geographical reality that hovers somewhere between wholesale success and abject failure. This trend has continued into the 2010s. A different way to illustrate this same reality is simply to focus on the "Top 100" fastest-growing census tracts for a single year (out of 780 total tracts). Figure 7.14 below shows that for 2014, the last year for which data were available at the time of writing, most of the fastest-growing tracts across Greater Seattle were not necessarily low-density fields of single-family housing (SF). Indeed, other types of multi-family units made up most of these changes (Other). In some (though not many) tracts, single-family homes are actually being torn down to rebuild at higher densities, depicted below as negative figures on the right.



Fig. 7.13 Fast-growing census tracts across Greater Seattle, 1990s, 2000s



Fig. 7.14 Top 100 fast-changing census tracts in 2014: % single family units (source: http://www.psrc.org/data/pophousing/permits)

7.6 On the Ground: Regional (Un)sustainabilities of Smart Growth

To substantiate this point, consider now the data in Table 7.2A, which contrasts three distinct places in and with general reference to Pierce County as a whole: Dupont-Northwest Landing, which remains the most significant example of "neotraditional" suburban development in the South Sound area (Veninga, 2004). Fife, a community that immediately hugs the Port and City of Tacoma; and Graham/South Hill, an unincorporated Census Designated Place of exurban change that, following the push effects from King County, has experienced significant growth pressures over the past generation. Of the three places, Dupont-Northwest Landing most "looks" the part, wearing all the expected garb of New Urbanist/smart growth. As its home ownership association maps the neighborhood:

> Northwest Landing is a 3000-acre mixed-use planned community located midway between Olympia and Tacoma and next to the Historic Village of DuPont. You'll find all the desirable elements and attributes of a good neighborhood at Northwest Landing. Peaceful atmosphere, open spaces, tree-lined streets, and Craftsman-style homes with porches are just a few of the things that make so many want to call this place home. As with any master planned community, The Residential Owners Association is responsible for helping to make Northwest Landing an exceptional place to live, work, and play. The Owners Association follows the Northwest Landing Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions

Table 7.2 Smart growth spatialities

A: Pierce County	1	2	3	4	5
2010 Census attributes	DUPONT Neotraditional smart growth	FIFE Old suburban smart growth	GRAHAM exurban smart growth	TACOMA reference space	PIERCE CO reference space
Median ValueHome	$309,100.00	$267,700.00	$252,900.00	$239,200.00	$265,200.00
Median HH income	$82,778.00	$55,520.00	$68,795.00	$58,480.00	$58,824.00
% SF	79.8	49.8	75.7	64.7	69.2
% MF2	–	1.0	1.4	3.4	3.4
% MF3-4	4.7	9.2	–	6.3	4.4
% MH5-9	8.7	14.8	–	5.9	4.5
% MH10-19	2.0	13.7	0.1	6.6	5.4
% MH20+	4.9	9.1	0.4	12.8	5.5
% MH	–	2.0	22.4	0.3	6.4
% White	68.7	55.0	82.6	64.9	74.2
% Black	8.1	8.2	4.0	11.2	6.8
% Latino/ Hispanic	9.7	17.4	6.3	11.3	9.2
% Asian	10.2	19.3	2.8	8.2	6.0

B: King County					
2010 Census attributes	RENTON edge city smart growth	REDMOND elite suburban smart growth	SEATTLE CORE S. lake union smart growth	SEATTLE BALLARD urban neighborhood smart growth	KING CO reference space
Median ValueHome	$312,100.00	$460,200.00	$350,929.00	$361,992.00	$402,300.00
Median HH income	$64,829.00	$92,851.00	$57,835.00	$69,554.00	$70,567.00
% SF	55.2	48.2	0.0	22.8	59.8
% MF2	1.9	1.3	1.2	1.4	2.0
% MF3–4	5.1	7.9	3.7	7.2	4.4
% MH5–9	8.6	12.1	8.8	17.9	6.6
% MH10–19	9.4	10.9	18.1	8.7	7.6
% MH20+	16.5	17.7	59.2	17.9	17.4
% MH	3.3	1.9	0.4	23.3	2.0
% White	54.6	65.2	78.1	86.8	68.7
% Black	10.6	1.7	3.6	1.9	6.2
% Latino/ Hispanic	13.1	7.8	5.2	4.8	8.9
% Asian	21.2	25.4	11.0	4.9	14.6

Source: US census

> (CC&Rs) and associated guidelines, rules, and policies to ensure that the community maintains its beauty for years to come. (http://www.nwlandingroa.org/outside_home.asp).

As the data in Table 7.2 also show, this is a well-heeled place, with a 10% higher percentage of single family homes than for Pierce County; median home values about 30% higher than for the City of Tacoma; and median household income more than 40% higher than for the county as a whole. At the same time Northwest Landing is *less* White, *more* Black, *more* Hispanic/Latino and *more* Asian than is Pierce County. Or to put this in terms that Nelson, Sanchez, and Dawkins (2006) have suggested: "neotraditional" Northwest Landing, with its quasi-privatized governance space and original design ideals from Peter Calthorpe, is effectively more *desegregated* than is Pierce County as a whole, and actually has an overall racial/ethnic profile broadly similar to the City of Tacoma. In other words, Northwest Landing is more economically than racially segregated relative to the immediate metropolitan world within which it is embedded.

In contrast, Fife is not where one might look first to find urban sustainability. Bifurcated by Highway 99 and 1–5, and structured by strip development, frontage roads, and what New Urbanists call cartoon architecture, Fife nonetheless exhibits a level of socioeconomic diversity, range, and balance in both its housing and labor markets that disrupts taken-for-granted expectations for progressive urban space. When compared with both Pierce County and the City of Tacoma, Fife is more racially and economically diverse. It has generated an array of housing choices, for one thing, and is populated by higher numbers of African Americans, Asians, and especially Hispanic/Latinos than is Pierce County as a whole—even as its stable median home values suggest it has retained wealthier communities. *Aesthetically*, Fife is the "geography of nowhere"; but socially and economically, where concerns with race, class and housing segregation are more important, Fife arguably embodies social sustainability as well as any place in the region. As Modarres (2009) suggests:

> Familiarity with public transportation, combined with the effects of income and place of residence, has made the immigrants' lives in the U.S. a bit 'greener' than those of the native-born. In fact, one factor that may contribute to their higher usage of public transportation stems from their living in neighborhoods whose densities are, on average, 2.5 times higher than those of the native-born. Immigrants, in essence, are doing precisely what planners want the rest of us to do (p. 1).

Indeed, the case for Fife is strengthened when compared with the exurban landscapes of Graham, which is less diverse and has relied on spatially segregated fields of mobile homes for affordable housing, albeit within the boundaries set for growth.

Back in King County, and especially within the high-tech heartlands of post-Fordist accumulation, a very different kind of elite suburban community, the Microsoft-based world of Redlands, exhibits yet another variant of nascent smart growth space (Table 7.2B). Here single family homes make up less than half the housing stock, and the suburban range of multi-family housing types is more varied than for both King County and the city of Tacoma. Reflecting the global pull of its high-tech economy, Redmond is *less* White, *less* Black, and *less* Hispanic/Latino—but *more* Asian and especially *more* Indian-Asian than King County. It is, literally,

a world apart—with median house prices over $460,000 and median household incomes nearly $93,000.

To its south, the emerging edge city of Renton reflects a still older and increasingly precarious regional economic heritage, with major manufacturing competencies developed originally around Boeing. Poorer than Redmond but richer than Fife, it nonetheless also exhibits greater racial diversity than both King and Pierce Counties. It is far more diverse than the two Seattle core cases, which are overwhelmingly (and increasingly) White, and arguably reflect a new kind of inner-city white self-segregation, particularly from Black and Hispanic/Latino populations. Both areas, though, are widely considered green exemplars of Seattle's much-touched "urban villages" strategy (Kelbaugh, 1997).

South Lake Union, as discussed originally in Chap. 5, has been upzoned in order to receive regional transit investments consistent with Seattle's long-term urban sustainability goals. This shift reflects the real-estate impact and local political power of Paul Allen's Vulcan, Inc. Vulcan's revitalization portfolio, putatively one of the most significant in the USA over the past several years, at present includes dozens of different projects with nearly 1400 residential units—many elite mixed-use buildings like the LEED-certified six-story "Alley24." When seen collectively—"Allentown" to local critics—these changes have overwhelmed the city's housing linkage policies, relatively weak as they are (ibid.). In his work on urban democracy, Purcell (2008, pp. 118–119) suggests that South Lake Union reflects a neoliberal political-economy of green revitalization. Voting repeatedly for zoning changes and tax breaks (Young, 2007), the City of Seattle has "imagined away" low- to moderate-income residents, instead pursuing those who can better activate the long-term vision of a "24/7 urbanism" increasingly associated with contemporary forms of accumulation.

7.7 Sustaining Society, Segregating Smartness, Sustaining Segregation?

Neo-Weberian approaches to social science research, in general, and the APD school, in particular, do not dismiss the influence of micro-economic preferences, such as housing choices, but nonetheless assign "causal weight" to socio-spatial variations in state structures as they make sense of urban developmental stories. Rather than interpret empirical patterns as more (or less) the sum total of aggregated consumer behaviors in a free market space-economy, the urban world is reproduced contingently by legal rules, policy idea(l)s, and often obdurate cultural norms, that nonetheless are each embedded unevenly within congeries of authoritative institutions that appear over time.

"Multiple orders" reflect not only the different norms—ideologies, rules, incentives, routines, penalties—that different institutions project across space and scale, but also the temporal legacies of key imprinting events. As Lucas, Orren and others

once again note, APD emphasizes the importance of prior construction, wherein new institutions vie with old ones. The (re)production of "local" spaces like Greater Seattle is strongly shaped too by rules and norms associated with mature, as well as incipient, "non-local" forces. The *ongoing preference* for single-family housing, for example, is a national, cultural, and economic project influenced by decades of public-institutional choices: US homeowners everywhere, for one thing, enjoy profound tax benefits that renters do not, making homeownership "rational." As we take a spatial cross section of our contemporary world, we peer back into time, even as we also see the institutionalized multiplicities of interests and values abutting with one another.

Smart growth is not the same thing everywhere, as if theory lands in places unadulterated by the geographies of support and resistance it necessarily encounters. In Washington, smart growth is an *extension* of a growth management planning system that, for instance, legally mandates the containment of suburban sprawl through regionally coordinated urban growth boundaries even as it also foregrounds the constitutional importance of property rights through often lax vesting rules (Dierwechter, 2013). Regional Hearing Boards try to resolve these conflicting values, even as courts and elected officials sometimes channel different constituents within a nominally democratic polity, while both vie with frequent referenda votes that gut (or refuse) funding for legislated policies that urban professionals are otherwise supposed to deliver, such as roads and parks. Still, this same planning system is relatively unusual, even rare in the US context, and for all the problems we see Greater Seattle has, in fact, "bent" powerful national trends away from untrammeled Greenfield development (Figs. 7.1–7.7).

Yet partial solutions to old problems typically generate new problems. What works at one scale may not work at another, or more precisely *how* it works likely will reflect already uneven patterns of material development and social change. Unsurprisingly given the lengthy history reported in Chap. 3, GMA-induced containment has worked *far faster and more effectively in King County*, in particular, that it has in Pierce County and this has arguably contributed something important to the radical reurbanization of a once fast-shrinking Seattle but not (yet?) to the satisfactory renewal of Tacoma. So, is this smart enough? Is it sufficiently sustainable? At what *scale* do we make these judgments and who experiences the benefits and burdens? And what is worse: a shrinking, almost dying core city in a still-sprawling region (e.g., Greater Detroit), or a gentrifying city of progressive yuppies and biking hipsters in a more contained region of families and displaced minorities (e.g., Greater Seattle)?

The yearning to say neither is easier dreamed than done. Policy efforts to shunt more residential growth away from the suburban periphery into cities like Tacoma—the daily work of uncelebrated professional groups like the Growth Management Coordinating Committee (GMCC) in Pierce County discussed earlier—in some ways work directly *against* Seattle's deeper structural need for a cheap reproduction zone economically capable of housing necessary workers. Without stretching the comparison too far, there is nonetheless a rather uncomfortable echo here, a familiar fugue-like motif of Seattle's neo-colonial reliance on

Native American labor. This does not mean that nothing has changed, that we read contemporary urban space no differently than we always have. Rather the story is more nuanced, more a question of multiple orders than a single temporal passage from, say, Keynesianism to neoliberalism.

There is, at least when we think of smart growth as *a sociotechnical project*, some movement towards sustaining society, some links between smart growth and urban sustainability, particularly when we acknowledge how difficult it is to bend national trends away from the landscapes of sprawl: i.e., low-density, noncontiguous, haphazard developments, etc. At the same time, there are too many new urban spaces better described as segregated smartness. On the one hand, urban hubs in Seattle like South Lake Union, Capital Hill or Ballard and cities like Redmond and Bellevue enjoy what Margaret Weir (2011) sees as both locational advantages (jobs) and organizational endowments (services). On the other hand, her concern with "extrusion" from opportunity and services characterizes many other areas, particularly along the exurban fringe of Pierce County in aesthetically unattractive zones where mobile homes on cinder blocks are more common than mixed-use buildings serviced by trams and light rail. Indeed, there is a saturnine sense here that all we are really doing is sustaining segregation, albeit in new forms for a new century. The obdurate, American problem of *segregation*—of class and race injustice across an unevenly endowed space-economy—is also reflected in how particularly fast-changing census tracts *actually change*, with too few tracts capturing the full range of housing types that theory otherwise demands.

To be sure, the overall metropolitan picture is more nuanced and refined that synoptic mappings of a unitary geopolitical economy of regulation may otherwise suggest. This is shown, for example, in Table 7.3 below. Some communities, as Weir (op cit.) hypothesizes, are doing (a bit) better than others with respect to the provision of local subsidized housing units. Put in these terms, such communities are at least working *towards inclusion* rather than deepening *extrusion*, even as the overall numbers are arguably insufficient given the rising costs housing, growing income inequality everywhere, and the challenges of transit alternatives that support employment opportunities.

Although the City of Seattle, as might be expected given its size and challenges, provides the most subsidized units in absolute terms, it fades to *relative* mediocrity when compared with smaller communities such as Fife, in Pierce County, and Redmond, in King County. In fact, Tacoma actually does a better job than Seattle in *these specific terms*, although, in fairness, this has a lot to do with Tacoma's slower growth trends overall. In addition, not all suburbs are the same, once again a point made by Lewis and Neiman (2009) in their neo-Weberian interpretation of pro- and anti-growth policies in California. As one example, University Place, just outside of Tacoma, arguably does a much better job than, say, Edmonds, in King County, suggesting local differences around policy design and planning goals seem to matter within the wider city-regional political-economy (Bae & Feiock, 2012).

Table 7.3 Subsidized housing units, by type of community

Absolute rankings Jurisdiction (2013)	Specific projects	Subsidized units	Total units	Percent subsidized	Relative rankings Jurisdiction (2013)	Specific projects	Subsidized units	Total units	Percent subsidized	Regional typology	Popular typology	
Seattle	728	27,165	309,205	8.79%	*Fife*	4	664	3954	16.79%	Larger city	Suburb	↑Towards inclusion Towards extrusion↓
Tacoma	251	9098	86,195	10.56%	Redmond	37	3901	24,874	15.68%	Core city	Suburb	
Everett	88	3753	44,770	8.38%	Issaquah	13	1720	14,347	11.99%	Larger city	Suburb	
Kent	44	3579	45,553	7.86%	Poulsbo	11	460	3969	11.59%	Smaller city	Suburb	
Redmond	37	3901	24,874	15.68%	Port Orchard	9	579	5110	11.33%	Smaller city	Suburb	
Renton	36	2521	39,006	6.46%	Tacoma	251	9098	86,195	10.56%	Metropolitan city	City	
Bellevue	45	4395	56,433	7.799%	Lynnwood	26	1463	14,713	9.94%	Core city	Suburb	
Auburn	31	2074	29,192	7.10%	Woodinville	4	463	5065	9.14%	Larger city	Suburb	
Federal Way	25	1845	36,312	5.08%	*Seattle*	728	27,165	309,205	8.79%	Metropolitan city	City	
Lynnwood	26	1463	14,713	9.94%	Everett	88	3753	44,770	8.38%	Metropolitan city	City	
Shoreline	17	1441	22,135	6.51%	Bremerton	25	1435	17,396	8.25%	Metropolitan city	City	
Bremerton	25	1435	17,396	8.25%	Snohomish	13	327	3968	8.24%	Smaller city	Syburb	
Puyallup	18	1231	16,004	7.69%	University Place	15	1083	13,432	8.06%	Larger city	Suburb	
Kirkland	21	1773	36,963	4.80%	Kent	44	3579	45,553	7.86%	Core city	Suburb	
Lakewood	21	1145	27,023	4.24%	Bellevue	45	4395	56,433	7.79%	Metropolitan city	Suburb	
Burien	17	1140	18,550	6.15%	Puyallup	18	1231	16,004	7.69%	Core city	Suburb	
University Place	15	1083	13,432	8.06%	Arlington	14	530	7209	7.35%	Larger city	Suburb	

(continued)

Table 7.3 (continued)

Absolute rankings Jurisdiction (2013)	Specific projects	Subsidized units	Total units	Percent subsidized	Relative rankings Jurisdiction (2013)	Specific projects	Subsidized units	Total units	Percent subsidized	Regional typology	Popular typology	
Issaquah	13	1720	14,347	11.99%	Auburn	31	2074	29,192	7.10%	Core city	Suburb	
Marysville	25	977	23,618	4.14%	Sea Tac	4	747	10,808	6.91%	Core city	Suburb	
Des Moines	10	776	12,665	6.13%	Shoreline	17	1441	22,135	6.51%	Larger city	Suburb	
Sea Tac	4	747	10,808	6.91%	Renton	36	2521	39,006	6.46%	Core city	Suburb	
Fife	4	664	3954	16.79%	Burien	17	1140	18,550	6.15%	Core city	Suburb	
Port Orchard	9	579	5110	11.33%	Des Moines	10	776	12,665	6.13%	Larger city	Suburb	
Arlington	14	530	7209	7.35%	Federal Way	25	1845	36.312	5.08%	Core city	Suburb	
Poulsbo	11	460	3969	11.59%	Kirkland	21	1773	36,963	4.80%	Core city	Suburb	
Snohomish	13	327	3968	8.24%	Lakewood	21	1145	27,023	4.24%	Core city	Suburb	
Mill Creek	3	319	8074	3.95%	Marysville	25	977	23,618	4.14%	Larger city	Suburb	
Lake Stevens	11	312	10,545	2.96%	Mill Creek	3	319	8074	3.95%	Larger city	Suburb	
Edmonds	5	303	18,829	1.61%	Tukwila	5	257	7731	3.32%	Core city	Suburb	
Bainbridge Island	14	287	10,393	2.76%	Lake Stevens	11	312	10,545	2.96%	Smaller city	Suburb	
Woodinville	4	463	5065	9.14%	Bainbridge Island	14	287	10,393	2.76%	Larger city	Suburb	
Tukwila	5	257	7731	3.32%	Edmonds	5	303	18,829	1.61%	Larger city	Suburb	

7.8 Conclusions

Smart growth is an effort, if nothing else, to do something about uncontrolled sprawl, which this chapter has discussed as the (re)ordering of residential development patterns. Paradoxically, a whole host of federal policies continue to promote low-density, expansive forms of development, in Seattle as elsewhere, even as state-progressives support smart growth spaces that seek greater compactness in order to improve environmental performance. This chapter thus focuses empirically on policy efforts, especially since the early 1990s across Greater Seattle, to counter the dynamics of sprawl using regionally coordinated urban growth boundaries. Particular attention was paid, though, to tensions between the recent, inter-scalar policy pursuit of sustainability through what was called "smart containment" and older, obdurate problems of segregation, picking up synoptic themes touched upon and developed in earlier chapters.

There are some successes, particularly when seen in a comparative light. Ironically, though, while containment has worked faster in King County than it has in Pierce County, policy efforts to shunt residential growth into cities like Tacoma in some ways work against Seattle's structural need for a cheap reproduction zone economically capable of housing necessary workers, creating new tensions around regional reproduction. Again, this does not mean that nothing has changed; rather, following the theoretical claims of this book, it is more a question of "multiple orders" than a single temporal passage from, say, Keynesianism to neoliberalism—a question how, sometimes, change looks a lot more like the cyclical repetition of familiar leitmotifs, albeit in new garb. While the region exhibits new spaces that I would call "segregated smartness" rather than "smart growth," then, it also exhibits geographical variation in levels of "extrusion," for instance, as some communities are producing more affordable housing than others. I conclude that such variability is, at least in part, a product of the intercurrence of institutions and ideas as they shape and reshape metropolitan space over time.

References

Alberti, M. (1999). Urban patterns and environmental performance: What do we know? *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *19*(2), 151–163.

Anthony, J. (2004). Do state growth management regulations reduce sprawl? *Urban Affairs Review*, *39*(3), 376–397.

Bae, J., & Feiock, R. C. (2012). Managing multiplexity: Coordinating multiple services at a regional level. *State and Local Government Review*, *44*(2), 162–168. doi:10.1177/0160323x12446152.

Barbour, E., & Deakin, E. A. (2012). Smart growth planning for climate protection evaluating California's Senate Bill 375. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *78*(1), 70–86. doi:10.1080/01944363.2011.645272.

Bischoff, K., & Reardon, S. (2013). Residential segregation by income, 1970-2009. In J. Logan (Ed.), *The lost decade? Social change in the U.S. after 2000*. New York: Russell Sage.

Bogart, W. (2006). *Don't call it sprawl: metropolitan structure in the 21st century*. Cambidge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Bruegmann, R. (2005). *Sprawl: A compact history*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Carlson, T., & Dierwechter, Y. (2007). Effects of urban growth boundaries on residential development in Pierce County, Washington. *Professional Geographer*, *59*(2), 209–220.
Carruthers, J. I., & Ulfarsson, G. F. (2003). Urban sprawl and the cost of public services. *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design*, *30*(4), 503–522.
Chapin, T. S. (2012). Introduction: From growth controls, to comprehensive planning, to smart growth: Planning's emerging fourth wave. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *78* (1), 5–15.
Cho, S.-H., Poudyal, N., & Lambert, D. M. (2008). Estimating spatially varying effects of urban growth boundaries on land development and land value. *Land Use Policy*, *25*, 320–329.
Choe, M. (2002). *Buildable lands program: 2002 Evaluation report; A summary of findings*. Olympia, WA: State of Washington, Department of Community, Trade, and Economic Development.
Darling, J. (2009). Thinking beyond place: The responsibilities of a relational spatial politics. *Geography Compass*, *3*(5), 1938–1954. doi:10.1111/j.1749-8198.2009.00262.x.
Dewan, S. (2014, April 14). In many cities, rent is rising out of reach of middle class. *New York Times*.
Dierwechter, Y. (2008). *Urban growth management and its discontents: promises, practices and geopolitics in US city-regions*. New York: Palgrave.
Dierwechter, Y. (2013). Smart growth and state territoriality. *Urban Studies*, *50*(11), 2275–2292.
Dierwechter, Y. (2014). The spaces that smart growth makes: Sustainability, segregation, and residential change across greater Seattle. *Urban Geography*, *35*(5), 691–714. doi:10.1080/02723638.2014.916905.
Downs, A. (2001). What does smart growth really mean? *Planning (APA)*, *67*(4), 20.
Downs, A. (2005). Smart growth: Why we discuss it more than we do it. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *71*, 367–378.
Ewing, R. H. (2008). *Growing cooler : evidence on urban development and climate change*. Washington, DC: ULI.
Fishman, R., & Gechter, K. (2004). *Smart growth: Overview and issues*. Boston: Center for Urban Policy and Research: Northeastern University.
Galster, G., Hanson, R., Ratcliffe, M., Wolman, H., Coleman, S., & Freihage, J. (2001). Wrestling sprawl to the ground: Defining and measuring an elusive concept. *Housing Policy Debate*, *12* (4), 681–717.
Garde, A. M. (2004). New urbanism as sustainable growth? *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *24*(2), 154–170. doi:10.1177/0739456x04266606.
Handy, S. (2005). Smart growth and the transportation-land use connection: What does the research tell us? *International Regional Science Review*, *28*(2), 146–167.
Hepinstall-Cymerman, J., Coe, S., & Hutyra, L. (2013). Urban growth patterns and growth management boundaries in the Central Puget Sound, Washington, 1986–2007. *Urban Ecosystems*, *16*, 109–129.
Joint Center for Housing Studies. (2016). *The state of the nation's housing 2016*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Katz, B. (2000). The federal role in reducing sprawl. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *572*(Nov), 66–77.
Kelbaugh, D. (1997). *Common place: Toward neighborhood and regional design*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Kotkin, J. (2010). *The next hundred million : America in 2050*. New York: Penguin Press.
Lewis, P., & Neiman, M. (2009). *Custodians of place: Governing the growth and development of cities*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Lindstrom, M., & Bartling, H. (2003). *Suburban sprawl: Culture, theory and politics*. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield.

Modarres, A. (2009). Immigrants are greening our cities, how about giving them a a break? *New Geography*. Retrieved from http://www.newgeography.com/content/00958-immigrants-are-%E2%80%98greening%E2%80%99-our-cities-how-about-giving-them-a-break

Modarres, A. (2015). *Urban studies forum 2015: Jobs & housing in the South Sound*. Paper presented at the Urban Forum 2015. Public lecture, University of Washington, Tacoma. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL-r-Ht1OarqDwaF43YluA6wo62y_fUDRC

Mollenkopf, J. H., Swanstrom, T., & Dreier, P. (2014). *Place matters: Metropolitics for the twentyfirst century* (3rd ed.). Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.

Moore, S. (2010). More Toronto, naturally' but 'too strange for orangeville': De-universalizing new urbanism in greater Toronto. *Cities*, *27*, 103–113.

Nelson, A. C. (2013). *Reshaping metropolitan America*. Washington, DC: Island Press.

Nelson, A. C., & Dawkins, C. (2003). *Urban containment: American style(s)*. Alexandria, VA: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

Nelson, A., Sanchez, T., & Dawkins, C. (2006). The effect of urban containment and mandatory housing elements on racial segregation in US metropolitan areas, 1990–2000. *Journal of Urban Affairs 26*(3), 339–350.

Neuman, M. (2005). The compact city fallacy. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *25* (1), 11–26. doi:10.1177/0739456x04270466.

Robinson, L., Newell, J. P., & Marzluff, J. M. (2005). Twenty-five years of sprawl in the Seattle region: Growth management responses and implications for conservation. *Landscape and Urban Planning*, *71*(1), 51–72.

Pendall, R., & Puentes, R. (2008). Land-use regulations as territorial governance in US metropolitan areas. *Boletín de la A.G.E. N.*, *46*, 181–206.

Pierce County. (2011). *Countywide planning policies: Appendix A. Adopted 2030 Population. Housing/employment for Pierce County and its cities and towns*. Tacoma, WA: Pierce County Council.

Pollard, O. (2000). Smart growth: The promise, politics, and potential pitfalls of emerging growth management strategies. *Virginia Environmental Law Journal*, *19*, 247–285.

Pozdena, R. (2002). *Smart growth and its effects on housing markets: The new segregation*. Retrieved from http://www.nationalcenter.org/NewSegregation.pdf

Puget Sound Regional Council. (2010). *Sustainable communities inititive: Growth Management Policy Board*. Seattle: Puget Sound Regional Council.

Purcell, M. (2008). *Recapturing democracy*. New York: Routledge.

Richardson, P., & Gordon, H. (1998). Prove it! The costs and benefits of sprawl. *Brookings Review, Fall*, pp. 23–26.

Ross, B. (2014). *Dead end: Suburban sprawl and the rebirth of American urbanism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ruddiman, E. (2013). Is smart growth fair growth: Do urban growth boundaries keep out minorities? *The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology*, *5*(1), 1–34.

Shen, Q., & Zhang, F. (2007). Land-use changes in a pro-smart-growth state: Maryland, USA. *Environment and Planning A*, *39*(6), 1457–1477. doi:10.1068/a3886.

Siedentop, S., & Fina, S. (2012). Who sprawls most? Exploring the patterns of urban growth across 26 European Countries. *Environment and Planning A*, *44*(11), 2765–2784. doi:10.1068/a4580.

Soja, E. (2000). *Postmetropolis*. London: Sage.

Song, Y. (2012). Suburban sprawl and smart growth. In R. Weber & R. Crane (Eds.), *Handbook on urban planning*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Staley, S., & Gilroy, L. (2002). *Smart growth and housing affordability: Evidence from Statewide Planning Laws*. Retrieved from http://reason.org/news/show/127566.html#sthash.nNieHKVk.dpuf

Swanstrom, T. (2016). Reflections on place matters: Poverty, politics, and power in the modern metropolis. *Urban Affairs Review*. doi:10.1177/1078087416628686.

Talen, E., & Knaap, G. (2003). Legalizing smart growth. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *22*(4), 345–359.

Trudeau, D. (2013). A typology of New Urbanism neighborhoods. *Journal of Urbanism*, *6*(2), 113–138.

Trudeau, D., & Molloy, P. (2011). Suburbs in disguise? Geographies of New Urbanism. *Urban Geography*, *32*(3), 424–447.

Veninga, C. (2004). Spatial prescriptions and social realities: New urbanism and the production of northwest landing. *Urban Geography*, *25*, 458–482.

Wassmer, R. W. (2006). The influence of local urban containment policies and statewide growth management on the size of United States urban areas. *Journal of Regional Science*, *46*(1), 25–65.

Weir, M. (2011). Creating justice for the poor in the new metropolis. In C. Hayward & T. Swanstrom (Eds.), *Justice and the American metropolis*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Weitz, J., & Moore, T. (1998). Development inside urban growth boundaries: Oregon's empirical evidence of contiguous urban form. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *64*(4), 424–440.

Wilkie, C., & Moe, R. (1997). *Changing places: Rebuilding community in the age of sprawl* (1st ed.). New York: Henry Holt & Co.

Young, B. (2007, December 11). South Lake Union growth goes full throttle. *Seattle P-I*.

Chapter 8
Work: Labor Geographies of Smart(er) Mobility

The great dialectic in our time is not, as anciently and by some still supposed, between capital and labor; it is between economic enterprise and the state.

— John Kenneth Galbraith

8.1 Introduction

Critical geographers and other scholars of contemporary urbanization and metropolitan development, in the USA as elsewhere in the world, typically seek to explore the empirical actualities versus theoretical potentialities of sustainability through a strong, normatively explicit, concern with deepening the relevance of regional equity strategies (Bullard, 2007; Hayword & Swanstrom, 2011; Williamson, 2011). Social justice goals, in particular, are elevated even as related ecological and economic aspirations remain seminal themes in their work (Etherington & Jones, 2009; Perlman & Jimenez, 2010; Swanstrom, 2001, 2006; Swanstrom & Banks, 2007; Vogel et al., 2010). While some radical critics of urban sustainability, as discussed in Chap. 2, see less room for long-term transformation given what is, in their view, the overwhelming dominance of neoliberalized global capitalism, state-progressives (albeit, of different kinds) tend to draw more attention to what is, for their part, the differently territorialized geo-politics of sustainability reforms across the variegated policy and planning landscapes of the country (see for example Basolo, 2003; Brenner, 2001; Frisken & Norris, 2001; Jonas, 2012a; 2012b; Jonas & Pincetl, 2006; Katz, 2000; Krueger & Savage, 2007).

Scott Bollens (2003), for instance, lists a series of "regional equity strategies" theoretically available to all US city-regions as they seek to govern metropolitan space in ways that enhance urban sustainability through social justice—understood here simply as expanding the choices of those with otherwise relatively few opportunities in life. These strategies include legitimate efforts to (1) deconcentrate poverty throughout metropolitan areas by requiring non-central cities to plan for, or promote, low-and moderate-income housing; (2) connect regional economic development to antipoverty goals, in part by ensuring that large infrastructure projects do

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Dierwechter, *Urban Sustainability through Smart Growth*, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54448-9_8

not neglect minority areas; (3) manage regional growth and investment to restrict suburban sprawl, which, he hypothesizes, increases access to urban opportunity by poor households; (4) use regional authorities to help direct federal funds for housing and transportation mobility for purposes of social equity; (5) analyze and address concerns over environmental justice; and (6) better balance out municipal-scale planning regimes through regional tools like property tax base sharing and stricter municipal incorporation laws (see Bollens, op cit., Fig. 1, p. 6).

One of the synoptic claims developed in this book so far—captured by the two APD concepts of "intercurrence" and "multiple orders," respectively—is that such policies cannot appear all at once, nor everywhere in the same way, nor even in a manner that necessarily suggests institutional coordination; nor will they necessarily *efface* obdurate rules, regulations laws, incentives and, indeed, path-dependences of uneven development and institutional capacities.

The "pursuit" of urban sustainability through smart growth across Greater Seattle, in short, is a geographically uneven affair. Following Bollens' list of strategies, we can certainly find many concrete examples of "non-central cities" who indeed appear to plan for, or promote, low-and moderate-income housing (e.g., Fife, Redmond) and social inclusion, even as numerous non-central communities largely "extrude" these social responsibilities to others (e.g., Edmonds, Gig Harbor), a pattern that also apes policy action on global climate change (Dierwechter & Wessells, 2013). It is possible to claim as well that at least some large infrastructure projects, such as the Tacoma Link expansion, "do not neglect minority areas" even as rich-suburban power over transit financing arguably retards (and warps) the rapid development of effective public alternatives to private automobility; that, as well, Seattle has become more intensively concerned with "environmental justice," even as whole neighborhoods like South Lake Union illustrate "ecological gentrification" (Dooling, 2009); and that, most obviously, the region's "containment model" to combat sprawl through UGBs is a (rare) national exemplar of smart growth theory and regional redevelopment in action *even as* inherited forms of segregated accumulation persist—and in places deepen. It is, then, not so much a facile case of "what you see is what you get" but, instead, a philosophical question of "what you get is what you see." Data are not born innocent; they require interpretation and judgment. APD provides a different way of looking at smart growth as a strategy of urban sustainability.

While Bollens' list of regional equity strategies suggests a book-length engagement, in this final empirical chapter I focus narrowly on just one of the themes that, in my view, cuts across many of these strategies: i.e., mobility and work, or what I shall explore here as the labor geographies of smarter mobility. In part my motivation is because the smart growth literature has not sufficiently engaged questions of labor, in general, and the spatialities of work, in particular (Green Leigh & Hoelzel, 2012). Although smart growth theory, as discussed originally in Chap. 2, makes much of "mixed-use" landscapes and transit-oriented development, both addressed in Chap. 6, researchers have not really explored the relationships between smart growth assumptions and labor geographies, particularly as these implicate wider questions of urban sustainability. In what follows, I first describe

contemporary patterns of wealth and poverty across the city-region. The next section then maps commuting linkages and functional interrelationships. Finally, the discussion highlights efforts to shift mobility choices to transit communities, an inter-scalar state strategy that seeks to strengthen local growth plans, regional sprawl containment, and the search for a new metropolitan functionality across greater Seattle that is, somehow, more supportive of urban sustainability.

8.2 Labor Space: Wealth and Poverty Across the Greater City-Region

Scholars now largely accept the historic passage of the mono-centric model of metropolitan development within the North American urban system. More debate is associated, of course, with the presumptive rise and meaning of the so-called post-metropolitan, post-fordist, or city-regional space—and indeed just how transformed urban morphology appears to be (Hackworth, 2005; Soja, 2000). A key issue is the geography of jobs. Anas et al. (1998) have argued, for instance, that by the 1990s only 50% of US metropolitan employment was located in employment *centers*—a trend that Bogart (2006) feels undermines the jobs-housing goals of urban planners who want to enact smart growth theories. In contrast, Coffey and Shearmur (2002) show that high-order service jobs in Montreal, at least, have decentralized but also concentrated in employment "poles." Similarly, Leslie's (2010) analysis of "urban centers" in Phoenix shows the ongoing importance of clusters. These latter studies arguably support some of the assumptions upon which smart growth theory is based, but they do not illuminate smart growth space per se. How do the emergent spaces of smart growth policies in action relate, for example, to the actually existing geographies of work in the contemporary metropolis?

Figure 8.1 maps the 100 most "job-rich" census tracts within the Greater Seattle area in 2014, without yet distinguishing specific industrial sectors or overall wage quality per se (as extracted and mapped from: http://onthemap.ces.census.gov). While the overall geography of work across the region is better described as "poly-" rather than "mono-centric," many of the themes broached earlier in this book are apparent. King County utterly dominates the region and indeed the Central Business District (CBD) of Seattle, despite decades of "post-metropolitan" development in the USA, remains the most significant economic center. Jobs are also concentrated in the "Eastside" and along a major corridor of development that hugs tightly the flow of Interstate-5. The uneven development patterns of the late nineteenth century first emphasized in Chap. 5 are still evident today.

Though Pierce County's population is fast-approaching 900,000 people—actually larger than North and South Dakota, Alaska, Vermont, and Wyoming—it contributes only a dozen or so of the top 100 "job-richest" tracts to the wider city-regional economy. In particular, the Tacoma CBD is much weaker within its own "subarea" than is Seattle's CBD. With exception of the adjacent Port of



Fig. 8.1 Top 100 census tracts across Greater Seattle with the most jobs (source: rendered by author from http://onthemap.ces.census.gov). *Note: This map ranks all census tracts in the Greater Seattle area by total number of jobs but only shows the top 100 tracts. While most all census tracts have at least some jobs in them (e.g., local services like gas stations or barber shops), the purpose here is to show the most important "employment centers" in the region*

Tacoma and a few other areas (such as in Fife and the mall area), it lacks a significant "hinterland." There is no Eastside equivalent in Pierce County. As the Washington State Employment Security Center notes,

> Many Pierce County residents, looking to replace the manufacturing wages lost during the industrial transition [of the sixties and seventies], began commuting to jobs in King County. Today, more than 25 percent of the workforce in Pierce County travels to jobs in King County. The developing economy in King County, which exerted upward pressure on land values and housing costs, encouraged workers who might normally have lived in King County to reside in Pierce and other neighboring counties (Flemming, 2016, p. no page).

Figure 8.2 captures the reliance of Pierce County workers on King County jobs, mapping where residents of Tacoma worked in 2014. Figure 8.3 similarly maps where residents of Spanaway, a Census Designated Place south of Tacoma, worked in 2014. Figure 8.2 shows that only about 31% of residents of Tacoma worked *within* Tacoma; more than two-thirds worked elsewhere, mainly in King County. In fact, over 10% of Tacoma's workforce labored in Seattle; substantial numbers also commuted to Auburn, Kent, Tukwila, and Bellevue. As an employment center, Fig. 8.3 shows that while Tacoma attracts suburban commuters, it competes substantially with other suburbs as well as Seattle.

The nearly thousand workers, who daily commute northwards to rich Seattle from poorer Spanaway, are just a small part a much larger city-regional story. Like the other drivers they see lumbering along (overwhelmingly alone) on the arterials, highways, and interstate system, Spanaway's workers each add incrementally to problems of congestion and the precious opportunity costs of lost time; to stress, accidents, and fatalities; to the piecemeal wear and tear of fraying road infrastructure; and indeed, to the significant role of commuting by private car in generating the city-region's overall carbon footprint on this planet. The irony, however, is that those unlucky enough to have to traverse these very long distances, to Seattle and elsewhere, are better off financially than those "trapped" by the lower-income work opportunities within Spanaway. Put another way, the irony is that, those in Spanaway who experience "work-life" balance via a short commute to local jobs also experience, on balance, lower wages (source: http://onthemap.ces.census.gov). Finally, the more people who commute very long distances on a daily basis, the more wealth "leaks" from the regional space-economy in the form of petrol and automobile payments, neither of which are locally manufactured. In writing about what he calls Portland, Oregon's "green dividend," Joel Cortwright (2007, p. 1) puts the matter this way:

> Skeptics view biking, transit, density and urban growth boundaries [i.e. smart growth] as a kind of virtuous self-denial, well meaning, but silly and uneconomic. Critics see the seeds of economic ruin. They claim planning, policies and regulations that restrict use or access to resources impede growth and lower household income. Both the skeptics and the critics are wrong. Being green means Portlanders save a bundle on cars and gas, and local residents have more money to spend on other things they value, which in turn stimulates the local economy.

Whether we see urban sustainability from an ecological, social, or economic perspective, there is little in the Spanaway story that merits anything more than



Fig. 8.2 Where Tacoma residents work, 2014 (source: rendered by author from http://onthemap.ces.census.gov). *Note: To ensure visual clarity, this map only shows the "top ten" workplace destinations for residents of Tacoma. Each line thus represents the outflows of commuters, that is to say, the flow of workers living in Tacoma to their place of work in a specific municipality or Census Designated Place. Each line includes the total number of actual workers*

Fig. 8.3 Where Spanaway residents work, 2014 (source: rendered by author from http://onthemap.ces.census.gov). *Note: To ensure visual clarity, this map also only shows the "top ten" workplace destinations for residents of Spanaway. Each line similarly represents the outflow of commuters, that is to say, the flow of workers living in Spanaway to their places of work in a specific municipality or Census Designated Place. Each line includes the total number of actual workers*

Fig. 8.4 Where Seattle residents work, 2014 (source: rendered by author from http://onthemap.ces.census.gov). *Note: To ensure visual clarity, this map only shows the "top ten" workplace destinations for residents of Seattle. Each line thus represents the outflows of commuters, that is to say, the flow of workers living in Seattle to their place of work in a specific municipality. As in the previous maps, each line includes the total number of actual workers. Finally, specific census tracts are shown here to emphasize work-life balance themes*

abiding concern. In contrast, when we instead look upon the situation in Seattle, we see a rather different story, although one not without its own contradictions and regional development challenges.

Figure 8.4 captures Seattle's economic and social transformation from a de-industrializing, shrinking city in the 1960s and seventies to what one national observer in 2009 called "a prototype city of the future. . .where creative people want to come" (Paton, 2009, p. 15). About two-thirds of these creative people are able to both live and work within their own city, an important goal of smart growth planning, although crucial reverse flows to high-tech edge city/suburbs like Redmond and Bellevue are not insignificant. In addition, the ongoing economic imprint of the once dominant Boeing base in Everett, to the north, and Renton, to the south, is still visible—as is the pull of the international airport located in the municipality of SeaTac.

The labor spaces that connect SeaTac with Seattle are not only about commuter flows, moreover, but a new and potentially far-reaching politics of *livability* as well. In 2013, after a 5-year campaign, SeaTac was the first municipality in the region and in the state of Washington as a whole to pass a livable wage ordinance after local voters approved the wage proposition by referendum. That ordinance required airport-related businesses to pay their immigrant-heavy employees at least $15/h and to implement stronger protections for part-time workers. Drawing national media attention, the Vice President of the public sector union in the USA, SEIU, called the SeaTac vote "a signal from the future" (cited in Grow, 2014, p. 1). SeaTac airport workers living in Seattle no doubt appreciated the bump in pay as the creative people living in their own "city of the future" placed rising pressures on the costs of social reproduction across Seattle, especially housing prices. In mid-2014, then, the Seattle City Council similarly voted to raise the minimum wage also to $15 an hour, the first large city in the USA to do so, albeit phasing it in over several years and making rules contingent on business size, with full compliance reached only in 2021 (Wilson, 2014).

The labor spaces of daily commuting and wage livability that link together Seattle and SeaTac (like the Spanaway story) aptly reflect the challenges of *synchronizing* the uneven geopolitical economies of urban sustainability across regional development platforms, of overcoming the multiple orders that define contemporary development patterns. As discussed at length in previous chapters, there is a reason that Seattle is consistently ranked highly in both national and global analyses of urban sustainability. Its record of progressive politics, and at times, even radical challenges to business-as-usual urban policies, whether in cultural, ecological, or labor affairs, are not easily waved away, particularly when compared with other US cities competing in the same national and global context (Portney, 2003). Its recent economic dynamism and rainforest quality of life, its "radical reurbanization" (Gregory, 2015), arguably provide the foundation for the work-life balance depicted in Fig. 8.4, at least as measured by more limited outward commuting flows relative to other communities (and especially other big cities in the USA that arte struggling more, including nearby Tacoma).

Unlike Spanaway, however, this work-life balance is enjoyed disproportionately and increasingly by the wealthy who indeed work in the favored industrial sectors. The livable wage campaigns in both SeaTac and Seattle reflect, in my view, just one example of an effort to deal pragmatically at the local level with this fundamental contradiction, to fight off the perniciously powerful "extrusion" of low-income workers to distance places like Spanaway, where they can seemingly afford to live, own a house, plant a garden. Poorer and more dependent, low-density and peripheral, Spanaway, paradoxically, has little choice at present but to emit round after round of carbon as its workers commute daily in costly-to-maintain private cars to the distant theaters of regional accumulation; wealthy and powerful, Seattle's increasingly privileged residents, in dramatic contrast, enjoy the benefits of nearby opportunity as well as new investments in transit infrastructure, like the Central Link light rail line discussed below, which means even more of Cortright's 'green dividends' will circulate through the local economy.

Beyond the flows themselves, there is a related inequity associated with mobility spaces and unsustainability problems. As Modarres and Dierwechter (2015, p. 90) report in their recent analysis of how the interstate highway system has significantly reshaped the social and economic geographies of the Greater Seattle area:

> [C]ontrary to common assumptions regarding the concentration of manufacturing, large warehousing, and trucking firms near freeways, it is the FIRE (Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate), retail trade, wholesale trade, and public administration sectors that dominate the areas within half a mile of freeways. In fact, the FIRE sector has the shortest average distance to the freeways, compared to others. These economic sectors contribute minimally, if at all, to the maintenance and improvement of the highway system they help populate with commuters; instead, they pass the cost to others, including their own employees. In other words, it is the commuters who, by purchasing fuels and paying the associated federal and state taxes, contribute to infrastructure maintenance.

8.3 Shifting Greater Seattle's Mobility: Transit in Labor Space[1]

Smart city-regionalism across Seattle, as discussed throughout this book, is partially constructed "from below" (by municipalities and counties who develop policy plans) but also "from above" (by state government, who oversees this effort). In addition, the chief regional-scale institution with the capacity to integrate land-use, transportation, environmental, and economic policies is the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC). In theory, Washington's Growth Management Act (GMA) empowers the PSRC "to stop transportation projects that are not consistent with the regional plan" (Trohimovich, 2002, p. 20). In practice, the PSRC deploys formal regulatory powers over transportation policies through seemingly mundane

[1]Parts of this section of the chapter are adapted from a previously published journal article in *Geoforum* and is used with permission from Elsevier and Science Direct (Dierwechter, 2013).

but often "respectfully negotiated" oversight techniques like the (de)certification of local transportation elements within municipal plans, particularly when they conflict with, or directly undermine, other development goals both locally and regionally (Storrar, 2012). Other powers associated with the PSRC include its role as a federally designated metropolitan planning organization (MPO). This is important in a place judged worthy of policy valorization from above—or what Andy Jonas (2012a, p. 289), developing Pauline McGuirk's (2010) work on Sydney, sees as the process of "strategically selecting particular city-regions as sites for infrastructural investments and urban regeneration policies."

An example of this "strategic selection" is the PSRC's (2010) participation in the Obama's administration's renewed urban agenda for sustainability and regional transit policy. Domestic policies in the first Obama administration (2009–2013) disappointed many planning activists. Anticipating the Great Recession as an historic moment for a historic period of policy reform, in particular, urban progressives had imagined something like a "Green New Deal"—a robust urban-environmental agenda.

That said, the Obama administration, albeit before the Tea Party-enriched Republicans won back control over the House of Representative in 2010, inter alia, created a new White House Office of Urban Affairs focused on regional approaches to urban policy (2010); committed nearly $1 trillion in macro-economic stimulus spending, some in neo-Keynesian support of green infrastructure outlays (Katz, 2010); rekindled Clinton-era environmental initiatives in abeyance during the George W. Bush administration (Hall & Jennings, 2011); strengthened the role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations under MAP-21 legislation (Moving Ahead for Progress in the Twenty-First Century); and finally, in mid-2009, relaunched Sustainable Communities (SC) programs in the form of an interagency partnership between three major federal players: the Environmental Protection Agency, Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Transportation (Puget Sound Regional Council, 2011b).

This partnership can be understood from several perspectives (Howard, 2013, February 7). Administratively, the federal goal of the new SC program was/has been to coordinate fragmented housing, transportation, and environmental investments by the federal government (Environmental Protection Agency, 2009), itself an expected product of the contentious interactions among the different "ordering arrangements" associated with each institution (Chifos, 2007). Financially, Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Secretary Shaun Donovan committed $100 million in local grants for FY2011, although Congress axed this grant program for 2012–2013. Philosophically, as seen also in the 2012 MAP-21 legislation, the Obama administration justified these initiatives in the language of the new regionalism; this further suggests a strong measure of "federal steering" with respect to mass transportation funding and regional policies in major metropolitan areas of the country:

> At HUD, and across the Administration, we believe that the 'future of the city' is tied to the future of the region—the cities, suburbs and rural areas that surround them, and that America's ability to compete and create jobs in the 21st century depends on our metro

> regions. [. . .] Our new Sustainable Regional Planning Grant program for regions [seeks to] integrate economic development, land use, and transportation investments (Environmental Protection Agency, 2009, p. np).

The Seattle city-region was a successful applicant; as one regional planner noted,

> We already had good planning in place, and I think that probably mattered to [the Obama administration]. They wanted us to apply for the grants; they basically said, 'look, you guys should really apply for this [money]. That was not true everywhere [in the country]. We had Vision 2040, for example—all the regional planning had been done. Transportation 2040 too. We were ready for implementation (Bakkente, 2012).

Regional implementation has meant ongoing efforts to occasion "transit communities" within the metropolitan hierarchy of urban places—a process of planning and investment that originated even before the rise of the GMA planning system in the early 1990s. "Containment" has not only meant per capita reductions in land conversion rates it has also meant policies to improve the integration of production, consumption, and reproduction within this newly contained space—that is to say, smarter urban growth that appears in the form of transit-oriented corridors anchored by mixed-use, walkable, human scaled nodes which, taken as a whole, as one PSRC document simply puts it, "advances equity" (Puget Sound Regional Council, 2011a). Seattle's use of HUD's Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant has therefore edified other regional policy initiatives that, for example, focus on leveraging Choice Neighborhoods and Community Challenge grants, DOT transit projects, and EPA resources that advance both Brownfields Planning and Smart Growth Technical Assistance.

As the lead entity for the city-regional-level consortium formed to access and to implement the new Federal program, the PSRC has focused on fine-tuning extant regional plans for sustainability and on jump-starting "catalytic projects. . .of considerable significance to the implementation of [these] regional plan[s]" (Puget Sound Regional Council, 2010, p. 2). Overall, Transportation 2040, the PSRC's regional mobility vision that undergirds the urban growth management and economic development plans, includes designs for $100 billion in new transit investments, a 100% increase in bus services, and 68 new miles of light rail (Puget Sound Regional Council, 2010). Federal assistance helps the PSRC "break down implementation barriers to regional plans and test innovative approaches to advance equitable transit-oriented development in communities along the region's planned light rail corridors" (Puget Sound Regional Council, 2010).

The near-term effort to grow transit-communities has focused on "economic catalysts" of core areas like downtown Tacoma, in Pierce County; and the Northgate Shopping Center-Seattle and Bellevue CBD, in King County, all "strategic nodes" tied together by a city-regional geography of light rail investments and "equitable" activity corridors (Puget Sound Regional Council, 2011a). Seattle's city-regional efforts to leverage revived Federal discourses (and funds) from the Obama administration around sustainable communities has necessarily confronted a complex mosaic of local, often competing, sometimes obdurate, planning

administrations only partially rebuilt "from above" by the Washington state legislature (Puget Sound Regional Council, 2011a). But all scales of formal government (federal, state, city-regional, and local) ostensibly seek to contain new urban growth and to strengthen transportation choices.

The empirical question, then, is how this attempted regulatory alignment of state intentions, in an era of ideological and institutional fragmentation and spatial path-dependencies, "syncs" with extant labor geographies, wherein the politically preferred transit nodes of the smart city-region are subsumed within the wider space-economies of work?

One way to address this question is compare proposed transit-oriented development zones with local job space and industrial specialties. Figures 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7 provide visuals with which we might consider the presumed effects of specific lines of transit investment, or what might be called the various planning "logics" of nascent transit spaces. Figure 8.5, for example, maps the East Link light rail extension currently being built from Seattle to Bellevue-/Overlake within the context of Bellevue's strongest industrial competences, i.e., those with relatively high location quotients (LQ). As discussed in Chap. 4, LQs measure the industrial specialization of a place, e.g., a city, relative to a larger area, e.g., a county or state. A municipality with a LQ of 1.0 in a specific sector, for instance, means that it is not particularly specialized in this sector; a LQ of 1.5–2.5 or more implies specialization—that the industry in question, e.g., finance, is part of the "base" economy of a city, "exporting" surplus goods and services beyond local needs.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, Seattle is relatively "self-contained," but its strongest external labor connections are with Bellevue and Redmond, even as Seattle itself remains a key destination for Bellevue and Redmond workers. Bellevue's status as an "edge city," where the population of the municipality goes up rather than down during the day, is clearly manifested in the high concentration of employment opportunities, not only within the central core area, but all across the local space-economy. Much of the city's extant labor geographies, then, cannot be reached by a single regional light rail system, but would also require superior local bus and/or tram/trolley services akin to historic European cities (if the strategic goal of sustainability is, of course, post-automotive mobility).

Bellevue's relative industrial strengths as measured by high LQs relative to both King County and Washington state as a whole include real estate; finance; administration and business support services; corporate management; and professional, technical and scientific services—which all illustrate Modarres and Dierwechter's thesis that these sectors already "dominate the areas within half a mile of freeways" (op. cit.). The extension of transit infrastructure arguably simply these spaces of accessibility for these dominant industries, expanding the mobility choices of already well-off workers, even as *shifting* well-paid workers steadily away from private commutes contributes to regional carbon mitigation.

This is not necessarily an equity issue, however, if the proposed system *also* facilitates the mobility of less well-off workers—a major policy point made many times by the Puget Sound Regional Council, King County, Sound Transit, and multiple federal agencies (Strategic Economics, 2013). In other words, the point of



Fig. 8.5 Proposed transit changes into Bellevue, with local job space and industrial specialties (source: rendered by author from http://onthemap.ces.census.gov)

shifting resources to public transit is that it benefits everyone, that space is both fair and efficient, that it is progressively ecological, competitive and ultimately just. In theory, a necklace of mixed-income transit villages across the wider city-region, "villages" that could/should also evolve over time into some of the USA's first real



Fig. 8.6 Top 100 census tracts where the rich and poor work across Greater Seattle. *Note: this maps shows the top 100 census tracts most populated with wealthy and poorer workers specifically in terms of where these workers work rather than live*

"green TODs" (op cit.), might indeed provide transit alternatives for all classes of workers, while taking at least some pressure off mandatory car usage on modernist era highways while reducing the long-distance commutes of workers. And while



Fig. 8.7 Top 100 census tracts where most rich and poor LIVE across Greater Seattle. *Note: this maps shows the top 100 census tracts most populated with wealthy and poorer workers specifically in terms of where these workers live rather than work*

Bellevue specializes in high-paid workers in real estate, finance, administration and business support services, corporate management, and professional, technical and scientific services, it also needs less-well paid workers too, as shown in Fig. 8.6 below. Many census tracts attract high numbers of *either* mostly rich or mostly poor workers, but most of the key employment tracts across the wider city-region require a healthy range of workers. Put more simply: it appears as if the rich and the poor largely *work* together. This is seen in Seattle and the Eastside, including Bellevue.

However, coworkers increasingly do not *live* together. Regional housing markets increasingly segment people along class lines, notwithstanding some of the local policy efforts to ensure housing affordability, as in Redmond and other places discussed in Chap. 7. These geographies of labor power are mapped in Fig. 8.7, which shows a "core zone" of wealthier residents, from Seattle especially to the upscale Eastside that includes Bellevue, surrounded increasingly by an extruded periphery of lower-income workers, notably in south Seattle and toward the south in King County heading into Pierce County (cf. Benko, 2011).

None of this is an argument against transit investments, TOD, or regional approaches to planning and sustainability policies. Rather it is a sober illustration of the profound *geographical* challenges that Greater Seattle faces as it seeks to pursue urban sustainability through smart growth plans. Such challenges, once again, are examples of the intercurrence of numerous institutions as they literally take shape across time and space; as regional economies are (re)shaped by public policies; as public policies in turn respond to both old and new regional economies; as multiple actors at various scales of authority respond to diverse incentives and motivations and problems; as local housing markets diverge from federal and regional transit policies; as global economies favor some workers over others, while local municipalities differently seek (or not) to iron out the endless number of contradictions.

Greater Seattle is hardly alone in experiencing these challenges, whether understood empirically or theoretically. Similar patterns of global city-regionalization now characterize a whole family of "high-tech" regions within the USA. This include many cities with remarkably similar green policy agendas, like the San Francisco Bay area, that call for cognate smart growth spatialities. Indeed, part of the core challenge in the Bay area and Greater Seattle is developing "green TODs" that are not only high-density, ecologically resilient, and locally multifunctional, but also no less significantly class and race "integrative." Benko (2011, p. 15) aptly summarizes the nature of this challenge in Seattle and the region as a whole:

> The adjacency of development to light rail stations magnifies its potential impact on the character of neighborhoods. Unfortunately, the high cost of development near transit often means the resulting projects cater exclusively to affluent people and often leads to gentrification of previously low-income or diverse neighborhoods. However, policy makers are recognizing that TOD can address some of the goals of mixed-income housing and vice versa (and see also Jones & Ley, 2016).

Parallels with the Bay area are instructive. San Francisco is increasingly discussed as "an image of Seattle's future," at least with respect to housing (un) affordability driven by high-tech industrial specialization, albeit not quite (yet) as

extreme (Rosenberg, 2016). In addition, San Francisco has a longer experience with regional transit planning across unevenly developed metropolitan spaces and complex territorial jurisdictions. All this is relevant to Greater Seattle. Without pushing the parallel too far, moreover, Oakland has shivered in San Francisco's economic and policy shadow in ways broadly reminiscent of how Tacoma has struggled with Seattle. Like porcupines on a cold night, both sets of cities benefit from the warmth of propinquity, but bristling quills often make for uncomfortable bedfellows.

In particular, lessons might be drawn from the variegated TOD experiences of the Bay Area Rapid Transport Authority (BART), which started in 1972 and now has 45 stations along six major lines crossing the entire city-region. As discussed in both Chaps. 5 and 6, Sound Transit, which serves three of the four counties win the Greater Seattle area, formed in the mid-1990s and is perhaps 20–25 years behind BART in terms of transit coverage, political and popular clout, and urban-developmental experience. Though many and perhaps most TODs associated with smart growth theories reflect the same challenge Benko highlights for Seattle, scholars draw attention to communities like Fruitvale, located just south of Oakland in the Eastbay, as an exemplar of the kind of urban outcomes that state-progressive policy-makers seek (Francisco Sandoval & Herrera, 2015). According to the U.S. Federal Transportation Authority, for example, Fruitvale shows how to incorporate "environmental justice principles into the planning and design" of a transit village. Francisco Sandoval and Herrera (2015, p. 72) specifically argue that Fruitvale shows how transit policy can, under certain circumstances, contribute to "neighborhood-based equity outcomes in terms of providing access to regional transportation and affordable housing; supporting local businesses; and increasing access to social services."

For Sound Transit, urban sustainability is "achieved" by reducing car trips through improved transit ridership, which requires parallel support for "smart regional growth," TOD, greener projects, and more efficient fleet operations (Sound Transit, 2016, pp. 2–8). Accordingly, urban sustainability is based on institutional support for state, regional, and local growth plans that emerge through new "relationships" focused not only on shifting workers to transit ridership (the synoptic goal) but also on economic development as well balanced housing developments that include both market-rate and affordable units (ibid.). Such relationships have less to do with design and preferred urban forms and much more to do with skillful processes of decision-making, participatory-yet-efficient planning, and the creation and effective mobilization of civic capital and local trust—or what Patsy Healey (2006) "relational resources."

On the positive side, transit ridership across the system has increased 50% since 2010 and is, more importantly, expanding much faster than population growth. In addition, 85% of Sound Transit's energy use (thus far) has been from renewable sources, mostly hydropower inherited from large-scale capital investments made originally in the 1930s during the New Deal. Taken together, Sound Transit estimates that the growth of transit ridership just this decade has already mitigated about 400,000 tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions (ibid.). Paradoxically, though, Sound Transit's GHG emissions will actually *rise* in the coming years as the

system's overall expansion, which is a central component of the "smart city-region," will mostly occur in the geographic service territory of Puget Sound Energy and Snohomish County Public Utility District, both of which are "more carbon-intensive energy sources than Seattle City Light" (Sound Transit, 2011, p. 3). Reforms to these energy institutions largely lie outside Sound Transit's own controls, and are obviously subject to different timelines, different professional cultures, different funding models and routine, and different political rationalities. Synchronizing such institutional viabilities is neither easy nor quick.

In addition, and perhaps more importantly to my analysis here, as Sound Transit works to build out transit-oriented developments like those shown in Fig. 8.5, for example, with other institutional players, including the PSRC, various local governments and multiple private partners, it will encounter—and arguably reproduce in most cases—the *inherited socioeconomic geographies* forged by the still-obdurate metropolitan era of highway mobility. For much (if not all) of the region-wide system runs parallel with highway infrastructural patterns, so while efforts to shift commuters away from cars to rail *will mitigate carbon*, they will also, ironically, struggle to reshape a space-economy that, under conditions of neoliberal globalization, have increased inequality and privileged certain economic sectors and their well-paid workers over others. At the same time, extending services to low-income and more diverse areas, places more like Fruitvale or Fife and less like Bellevue or Redmond, will require countervailing policies that mitigate the powerful market forces of gentrification associated with concentrated urban investments from both public and private players. Such countervailing policies will not only depend of the agenda of local governments, many of whom, in an era of fiscal stress, may be far more interested in retail dollars than affordable housing goals; it will also depend on Federal policies that do not shift away from supporting sustainability, transit, or green revitalization, to say nothing of the ongoing commitment by local voters who, as discussed in Chap. 5, waver back and forth on just how much to support regional transit policies.

8.3.1 Conclusions

Contemporary citizens of Rome, Milan and Turin continue to use roadways built by the ancient Romans, who first "fixed" in place the transformative space-economy of the Mediterranean world and much of Western Europe through massive public works projects and highway building. We are all Romans still, in some ways. It is little surprise that contemporary citizens of Greater Seattle, with much less historical geography to engage, struggle to break free of the movement flows and broad patterns of diffused, low-density, oil-based, car-dependent economic life established during earlier periods of development, most notably the metropolitan period of auto-dependent suburbanization and highway-based mobility.

History creates cavernous lines in space, often quite literally, which directly structure how "change" can occur. As I argued originally in Chap. 3, but worth

repeating here, Orren and Skowronek (2004) note that "Cycles and other patterns found in American political history are of special interest in assessing relations of continuity and change because they suggest that breakpoints themselves sometimes take the form of patterned events . . . [where] the mode of change itself suggests a certain kind of continuity" (p. 10). In consequence, any given "site," whether historical (e.g., the 1990s), institutional (e.g., a policy network), or indeed geographical (e.g., a city-region), is likely composed of "multiple orders" that "overlap and counteract and layer upon one another simultaneously" (p. 20). Any given "site" of multiple orders is always "in the process of becoming" (p. 19); it displays "all the tensions and contradictions of prior construction" (p. 21) as it collides daily with contemporary and imminent political dynamics.

As further discussed in Chap. 5 and again illustrated here, jobs have "regionalized" beyond the core cities of Seattle and Tacoma, where once most laborers either walked or took street cars to work. While jobs are literally now everywhere, however, a discernable and sticky spine of employment opportunities runs through the middle of the wider region, along the modernist highways, even as a core theatre of accumulation connects Seattle with Bellevue and Redmond. Paradoxically, the space-economy of highway-base mobility has "fixed" in place its own spatialities of labor, and thus specific social geographies of wealth and poverty. The highway system, as Modarres and Dierwechter (2015) argue, favors specific industries that help to reproduce uneven patterns of opportunity which, in turn, have *long* characterized the regional development story of Greater Seattle, most especially the peripheral and in some ways almost neo-colonial character of Pierce County with King County. Just focusing on the top 100 employment tracts in the region, King County, and especially Seattle and Bellevue, dominate the region in ways that press down on the pursuit of urban sustainability through smart growth, in general, and the shift to transit mobility, in particular.

The shift to transit mobility does represent, in my view, a "new order," part and parcel of how the multitiered state now imagines *the ideal* of urban sustainability will actually unfold over time and across space, as—piece-by-piece, parcel-by-parcel, meeting-by-meeting—"transit-oriented developments" steadily restructure work-life dynamics in the service of carbon mitigation. In some ways, equity is coming in "through the back door," as Bollens (2003) suggests. But that new order is experiencing "all the tensions and contradictions of prior construction" (op cit.). To what extent is Sound Transit's important work simply "overlapping" the "old" order of automobility, shifting mobility incrementally but not dramatically, and failing to "counteract" inherited contradictions of wealth and poverty, of Spanaway and Seattle, of uneven regional development, of capricious voters used to cars and skeptical of planning, while also still calling for more control over development, traffic and growth? Such questions require us to step back a bit from planning theories per se—from smart growth as a planning doctrine in and of itself—and into the world of geopolitical-economy, without necessarily reducing planning to the functionalist handmaiden of capital or the ready instrument of local Nimbyism and protectionism. And so, it is into this wider world that I now turn, drawing the book both to its larger conclusions and future challenges.

References

Anas, A., Arnott, R., & Small, K. (1998). Urban spatial structure. *Journal of Economic Literature*, *36*(3), 1426–1464.

Bakkente, B. (2012, April 23). [Interview].

Basolo, V. (2003). US regionalism and rationality. *Urban Studies*, *40*(3), 447–462.

Benko, E. (2011). Overcoming resistance to density and desegregation in Seattle: Developing a model for high-density integrative transit oriented development (Unpublished masters thesis). University of Washington, Seattle.

Bogart, W. (2006). *Don't call it sprawl: Metropolitan structure in the 21st century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bollens, S. (2003). In through the back door: Social equity and regional governance. *Housing Policy Debate*, *13*(4), 631–657.

Brenner, N. (2001). Decoding the newest "Metropolitan regionalism" in the USA: A critical overview. *European Planning Studies*, *9*(7), 813–826.

Bullard, R. (2007). Growing smarter: Achieving livable communities, environmental justice, and regional equity. (R. Bullard Ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT press.

Chifos, C. (2007). The sustainable communities experiment in the United States. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *26*(4), 435–449.

Coffey, W., & Shearmur, R. (2002). Agglomeration and dispersion of high-order service employment in the Montreal Metropolitan Region, 1981-96. *Urban Geography*, *39*(3), 359–378.

Cortwright, J. (2007, July). *Portland's green dividend CEOs for cities*. Chicago, IL.

Dierwechter, Y. (2013). Smart city-regionalism across Seattle: Progressing transit nodes in labor space? *Geoforum*, *49*, 139–149.

Dierwechter, Y., & Wessells, A. (2013). The uneven localisation of climate action in metropolitan Seattle. *Urban Studies*, *50*(7), 1368–1385.

Dooling, S. (2009). Ecological gentrification: A research agenda exploring justice in the city. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *33*(3), 621–639. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2009.00860.x.

Environmental Protection Agency. (2009). *HUD, DOT and EPA partnership: Sustainable communities*. Washington, DC: EPA. Retrieved from http://www.epa.gov/smartgrowth/pdf/dot-hud-epa-partnership-agreement.pdf.

Etherington, D., & Jones, M. (2009). City-regions: New geographies of uneven development and inequality. *Regional Studies*, *43*(2), 247–265. doi:10.1080/00343400801968353.

Flemming, J. (2016). Pierce county: Profile. From Employment Securiity Department, State of Washington. Retrieved from https://fortress.wa.gov/esd/employmentdata/reports-publications/regional-reports/county-profiles/pierce-county-profile

Francisco Sandoval, G., & Herrera, R. (2015). Transit-oriented development and equity in Latino neighborhoods: A comparative case study of MacArthur Park (Los Angeles) and Fruitvale (Oakland) (NITC-RR-544). Transportation Research and Education Center, Portland.

Frisken, F., & Norris, D. F. (2001). Regionalism reconsidered. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, *23*(5), 467–478. doi:10.1111/0735-2166.00101.

Green Leigh, N., & Hoelzel, B. (2012). Poverty:'s blindside: Sustainable cities need productive urban industrial land. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, *78*(1), 87–103.

Gregory, J. (2015). Seattle's left coast formula. *Dissent*, *62*(1), 64–70.

Grow, D. (2014, April 9). SeaTac, Wash., fast becoming epicenter of 'livable wage' debate. *Minneapolis Post*. Retrieved from https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2014/04/seatac-wash-fast-becoming-epicenter-livable-wage-debate

Hackworth, J. (2005). Emergent urban forms, or emergent post-modernisms? A comparison of large U.S. metropolitan areas. *Urban Geography*, *26*(3), 484–519.

Hall, J., & Jennings, E. (2011). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). *Public Performance and Management Review*, *35*(1), 202–226.

Hayword, C., & Swanstrom, T. (2011). *Justice and the American Metropolis*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Healey, P. (2006). *Collaborative planning: Shaping places in fragmented societie*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Howard, C. (2013, February 7). [Personal communciation].
Jonas, A. (2012a). City-regionalism as a contingent 'geopolitics of capitalism'. *Geopolitics*, *18*(2), 284–298.
Jonas, A. (2012b). City-regionalism: Questions of distribution and politics. *Progress in Human Geography*, *36*(6), 822–829. doi:10.1177/0309132511432062.
Jonas, A., & Pincetl, S. (2006). Rescaling regions in the state: The new regionalism in California. *Political Geography*, *25*(5), 482–505.
Jones, C. E., & Ley, D. (2016). Transit-oriented development and gentrification along Metro Vancouver's low-income SkyTrain corridor. *Canadian Geographer*, *60*(1), 9–22. doi:10.1111/cag.12256.
Katz, A. (2010). The reverse commute. Retrieved from http://prospect.org/article/reverse-commute-0#.TxljdlTJPn8.mailto
Katz, B. (Ed.). (2000). *Reflections on regionalism*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Krueger, R., & Savage, L. (2007). City-regions and social reproduction: A 'place' for sustainable development? *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *31*(1), 215–223. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2007.00716.x.
Leslie, T. (2010). Identification and differentiation of urban centers in Phoenix through a multi-criteria Kernel-density approach. *International Regional Science Review*, *33*(2), 205–235.
McGuirk, P. (2010). The political construction of the city-region: Notes from Sydney. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *31*, 179–187.
Modarres, A., & Dierwechter, Y. (2015). Infrastructure and the shaping of American urban geography. *Cities*, *47*, 81–94.
Orren, K., & Skowronek, S. (2004). *The search for American Political Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Paton, D. (2009, November 20). New economy cities: A Seattle slew of advantages. *Christian Science Monitor*. Retrieved from http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2009/1120/new-economy-cities-a-seattle-slew-of-advantages
Perlman, B. J., & Jimenez, J. (2010). Creative regionalism: Governance for stressful times. *State and Local Government Review*, *42*(2), 151–155. doi:10.1177/0160323x10380616.
Portney, K. E. (2003). *Taking sustainability seriously: Economic development, the environment, and quality of life in American cities*. Boston: MIT Press.
Puget Sound Regional Council. (2010). *Sustainable communities inititive: Growth Management Policy Board*. Seattle: Puget Sound Regional Council.
Puget Sound Regional Council. (2011a). *Corridor action strategy: South*. Seattle: Puget Sound Regional Council.
Puget Sound Regional Council. (2011b). *Plan Review Report and Certification Recommendation for the CITY OF BONNEY LAKE 2006 COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, including related 2010 amendments*. Seattle: Puget Sound Regional Council.
Rosenberg, M. (2016, June 28). Will Seattle really become the next San Francisco? *Seattle Times*. Retrieved from http://www.seattletimes.com/business/will-seattle-really-become-the-next-san-francisco/
Soja, E. (2000). *Postmetropolis*. London: Sage.
Sound Transit. (2011). *2011 sustainability plan—progress report*. Seattle: Sound Transit.
Sound Transit. (2016). 2015 sustainability proress report: Building a better tomorrow. Seattle.
Storrar, J. (2012, October 31). [Email communication].
Strategic Economics. (2013). *Implementing equitable transit communities: Regional & local recommendations for the Central Puget Sound Region*. Seattle: Puget Sound Regional Council.
Swanstrom, T. (2001). What we argue about when we argue about regionalism. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, *23*(5), 479–496.

Swanstrom, T. (2006). Regionalism, equality, and democracy. *Urban Affairs Review*, *42*(2), 249–257.

Swanstrom, T., & Banks, B. (2007). *Going regional: Community-based regionalism, transportation, and local hiring agreements* (Working paper 2007-17). Berkeley, CA: Institute of Urban and Regional Development.

Trohimovich, T. (2002). The Growth Management Act (GMA) after more than 10 years: Another look & a response to criticisms. Retrieved from Seattle.

Vogel, R. K., Savitch, H. V., Xu, J., Yeh, A. G. O., Wu, W. P., Sancton, A., . . . Zhang, F. Z. (2010). Governing global city regions in China and the West. *Progress in Planning, 73*, 1–75. doi:10.1016/j.progress.2009.12.001.

Williamson, T. (2011). Justice, the public sector, and cities. In C. Hayward & T. Swanstrom (Eds.), *Justice and the American Metropolis*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Wilson, R. (2014, June 2). Seattle to enact $15 minimum wage. *Washington Post*. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/06/02/seattle-to-enact-15-minimum-wage/?tid=a_inl

Chapter 9
General Conclusions: Contributions, Limitations, Agenda

It will come right in the end. If it doesn't, it's not the end.

—African proverb

9.1 Recapitulations and Contributions

Gazing up from a deeply troubled earth into the endless heavens, just after the unspeakable human-made catastrophe of World War II, Enrico Fermi and his colleagues wondered if the sounds of silence they heard all around them were evidence of our poignant isolation. There was no concrete evidence of extraterritorial life because, perhaps, there simply *were* no forms of advanced life actually capable of communicating their presence to distant others. Advancing life along, in other words, might well be universally harder than we think it is. As discussed in Chap. 1, all forms of life harvest energy and eventually create entropic disorder through local ecological decay. Self-extinction may be in the natural order of things.

But maybe Fermi was wrong. Maybe his "paradox" has many solutions. Maybe it is still possible to pass through the "bottleneck" of unsustainability, to unlock the interlocking crises of ecological decay, economic underdevelopment, and social injustice. Maybe, as the African proverb elegantly has it, problems "will come right in the end." If so—and it must be so—then learning as much as we can about the philosophies, politics, policies, and projects associated with planning for sustainability in and through city-regions will be a part of that journey (Fig. 9.1 below).

This book explores the broader pursuit of urban sustainability through the specific institutional and policy lens of multi-scalar planning for smart growth within Greater Seattle from the perspective of a critical urban geographer. Rather than dismiss or celebrate smart growth *tout court*, the book attempts to offer a fresh geographical interpretation of the variegated, uneven spatialities of key planning policies focused collectively on sustainability by arguing through the central theoretical concept of "intercurrence," imported from the neo-Weberian field of American Political Development (APD). As stated in Chap. 3, intercurrence draws attention to the simultaneous operation of multiple orders, and can be understood in

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Dierwechter, *Urban Sustainability through Smart Growth*, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54448-9_9

Fig. 9.1 Mount Rainier from urbanized Commencement Bay (Source: Yonn Dierwechter)

both ideational and institutional terms, as public discourses and conflicted modes of territorial and social authority intersect with markets and other domains in civic society.

No one has attempted to theorize smart growth in this way. Nor have many scholars analyzed urban sustainability as the abutting and grading of the hypothesized "orders" that intercurrence invariably produces through time and across space. The book is also one of the few monographs that interpret Seattle in a city-regional context. This is a wider lacuna in urban studies. We tend to have histories of sub-metropolitan spaces, i.e., municipalities, but lack compelling treatments of the kinds of global city-regions that firms, workers, and managers now actually inhabit. The *city* of Seattle—famous for its sustainability culture (Sanders, 2010)—should be embedded analytically within the wider geographies of city-regional history, city-regional accumulation patterns, city-regional policy commitments, and city-regional institutional tensions. Seattle, I have argued, cannot explain itself, *even as* the wider city-region and its constituent places (Tacoma, Bellevue, Redmond, Everett, Renton, Snoqualmie, Spanaway, etc.) cannot be explained without Seattle. The book therefore supports the work of other scholars who insist on the "city-region" as a relevant territorial form, even as this always requires

multi-scalar investigations that consider various relational spaces (Etherington & Jones, 2009; Jonas, 2012b; Jonas & Ward, 2007; Segbers, 2007; While, Gibbs, & Jonas, 2013). Many of the examples given here—in different municipalities through different policies—have attempted to illustrate this approach to understanding the inchoate production of the city-region as a relational and territorial product.

In particular, the book supports the view that the contested and open political construction of city-regions through disputed policy choices *matters* (Jonas, 2011). City-regions do not snap into place either because local business coalitions, though powerful, wield the state like a hammer, nor because the global economy demands city-regions as platforms of accumulation. Both forces are at work, constantly, as shown in various chapters, but the politics of regional planning for sustainability are shaped by a more complex calculus, wherein, in part, the ecology and distribution of growth—of housing units, of transport nodes, etc.—reflect past problems of class and race segregation, originating in colonialism, as well as resurgent concerns with resiliency, conservation and justice. Building on themes developed in Chap. 2, for example, Chap. 5 interpreted the development of the Seattle city-region as the intercurrence of three overarching orders: segregated accumulation; state-progressivism, and radical counter-movements. Space gathers together these contradictory forces, producing multiple stories of both change and constancy, and specifically change through constancy.

The scholarly and professional literature on urban sustainability is vast, not just in the USA, but all across the experimenting urban world. That makes perfect sense. Where once cities were seen as the major environmental problem, today they are seen as the only plausible solution (Levine & Yanarella, 2011). Post-Fermi, the fate of *Homo sapiens* now hinges on what Thrift and Amin (2002) once called "reimaging the urban." More than that, the planning profession, particularly at the city and regional levels, has paradoxically emerged in most countries, including (at least parts of) the USA, as a favored arena through which urban sustainability is organized. While the acceleration of digitized globalization since the 1990s has, the evidence suggests, too often favored capital over labor, markets over states, accumulation over resiliency, and inequality over justice, planning systems at various institutional levels have nonetheless become the "arms and legs" of sustainability values and pragmatic policy agendas. It is sometimes easy to read these systems as supine in the face of these trends. It is also a mistake. Intercurrence, I have also claimed in this book, particularly in Chap. 3, opens up theoretical space to consider how and why this might be so. Here the analysis further supports work in urban politics and territorial governance that has made considerable recent effort to engage APD themes, notably intercurrence, and/or broadly neo-Weberian sensitivities (Fortner, 2015; Lucas, 2015; Rast, 2015; Stone & Whelan, 2009). Geographers should join this conversation.

Smart growth is but one "species" in a global "genus" of otherwise diverse and rapidly evolving planning movements influenced theoretically and practically by the global sustainability agenda. While American-style discourses of smart growth have apparently diffused to other countries, many antecedent policy developments

in other countries—from "compact cities" in Europe (Jabareen, 2006) to anti-apartheid urbanism in South Africa (Dewar, 1995; Harrison, Todes, & Watson, 2008)—anticipated by many years the preferred spatialities that most smart growth programs in U.S. city-regions like Seattle seek to produce over time: viz., contained growth on the periphery; compact urban development; mixed-uses; walkable-bikeable spaces; eco-regionalism; a shift to improved transit-orientation, and so on. Taken together, these various movements represent a major and, in my view, *geopolitically* important rejection of modernist-style urbanism, viz. segregated land-uses, automobile-dependency, low-density development, carbon-intensive urbanism (Jonas, 2012a).

That said, as I have repeatedly argued throughout this book, ideas and institutions encounter a world of prior construction, as the APD scholars Orren and Skowronek (2004) put it, a world where older and often different theories, norms, practices, habits, cultures, and routines steadily occlude the spatial and eventually deep and transformative territorialization of trendy ideals and even whole institutional experiments. As I suggested especially in Chap. 2, "orders" are likewise philosophical in nature. They play out in loco over long periods of time, as the historical geography presented in Chap. 5 also attempted to show. As a strategy of urban sustainability, then, planning for smart growth, as discussed in Chap. 6, channels contested ideologies of political economy. The shift to regional transit discussed in Chap. 8, for instance, embodies the stickiness of extant highway routes, and the industrial clusters those routes favor, but also the parallel effort to reduce carbon loads and deemphasize low-density automobility. As elaborated in Chap. 7, moreover, the region's important effort to contain sprawl behind strong growth boundaries both reinforces and disrupts inherited social geographies of housing.

Although, by and large, I ultimately see the smart growth movement in Greater Seattle (if not everywhere in the USA) as broadly reflective of what I have called "state-progressive" traditions of political economy, then, the recent impacts of "market-liberal" ideals and institutional reforms are clearly evident, as many other scholars have documented in other regions too (Krueger & Gibbs, 2008). Such market-infused values may well keep smart growth in Greater Seattle, for instance, from ever really maturing from "weak" to "strong" forms of ecological modernization, from a region whose multitiered state arguably reflects green values to a region governed by what Eckersley (2004) calls a "green state." Then again, as Polanyi hypothesized, the corrosion of market-liberalization may set in motion a popular counter-reaction, which he famously (if abstractly) called the double movement. Some evidence of that movement was discussed here, especially in Chap. 5, although a full flowering of Polanyi's thesis suggests a considerable break with smart growth as presently institutionalized.

This last point highlights some of the key limitations and challenges of this book. I discuss a few of these limitations and challenges below before concluding this chapter (and the book) more positively with a research agenda for future work.

9.2 Limitations and Challenges

Any given book on urban sustainability necessarily telescopes a large-scale geo-historical process of transformation into a manageable space. This book's focus on what I take to be some of the new regional geographies of smart growth, and even more narrowly on illustrative projects, programs, and developments within a single case study in one country, leaves a multitude of questions unasked and therefore unanswered.

Yet as stated in Chap. 2**,** urban sustainability is not simply about preserving the biophysical capacity of the natural world to endure; nor only about managing economic systems so that we can live off the dividends of shared resources; nor even, from a sociocultural perspective, about steadily increasing the standard of living of the poor or expanding the choices of those with few opportunities in life. At a minimum, it is about how these various societal aspirations are (re-) territorialized in real places with imperfect institutions and insufficient reservoirs of civic and fiscal capital; about the presumed geographies that such aspirations seem to require; and about how vibrant democratic life at various scales of authority and responsibility can help to occasion such geographies over time. Smart growth has emerged, I believe, because it provides an inherently *syncretic* policy framework within which the contradictions and tensions of such wider aspirations can be contained if not, of course, resolved.

The attraction of thinking about smart growth through the lens of American Political Development, in general, and the core concept of intercurrence, in particular, is that it directly speaks to these central problems. Moreover, APD's clear emphasis on institutions and the tools of long-term institutional action (plans, laws, policy commitments, public projects, etc.) as well as the strong path-dependencies of *history* offer nice correctives to policy work that might otherwise overemphasize a kind of loose pluralism wherein competing interests deploy planning systems for their immediate interests—as if playing on a featureless, ahistorical surface, as if the past is fascinating enough but not terribly relevant to problems of future goals. That said, APD is not built naturally for the spatial disciplines and their research agenda. Although APD has started to influence new work in urban politics, for instance, few geographers, planners, architects, landscape architects, etc. have expended much *theoretical* labor on how APD themes might help explain the architectonics of urban life or indeed specific planning theories *as actually practiced* programs for space. Space cannot be treated as an empty room into which historical change occurs. Space has to be *constitutive* of how intercurrence emerges, how specific orders are stabilized over time, and ultimately how desirable change occurs, even when that change looks more like repetition than replacement. The spatialization of APD has just started.

"Smart growth," moreover, is itself evolving, or at least merging in complex new ways with a wider policy agenda around the so-called "smart cities," especially as this involves claims about how to occasion urban sustainability. Some of this is the normal product of academic fashion, and while work on smart growth per se will

likely give way over time to more work on smart cities, if it has not done so already, the core concerns of smart growth, such as with *regional development*, will not. Moreover, as I have argued in another piece:

> One vision of the smart city is imagined and marketed by large and powerful corporations like IBM, Cisco, Siemens, Oracle, Microsoft and Intel, which see unending business opportunities and profitability in selling to the world's some 500,000 municipalities (and mayors) what Hill elsewhere calls a new "urban intelligence industrial complex" (cited in Hollands, 2015, p. 68). In this not-so future world that these corporations appear to promise, a comprehensive embedding of digital information in the urban fabric—technically urbanizing the already expanding 'internet of things'—will help compute away seemingly intractable urban problems like climate change, traffic congestion, workforce training, and declining public health (Dierwechter, 2017).

The home of Microsoft, high-tech and highly educated Seattle is at the animating center of such claims, and various state-market experiments in "smartness" across Greater Seattle are likely shifting urban spaces in key ways (e.g., White House, 2015). But precisely how a "vision of the smart city" so rendered actually relates to community planning visions of smart containment, transit-oriented development, comprehensive planning, public housing justice, and so on, are by no means clear. This book did not engage these problems. Smart growth might be an increasingly limited way of thinking about "smartness," then, but I would counter-argue that smartness discourses which isolate technology from the planned governance of our material life will not tell us very much. In particular, work on smart cities will need to regionalize in ways that reflect the existing physical concerns of smart growth, particularly where these intersect with democratic decision-making that is rarely as efficient as the algorithms of traffic sensors.

Yet the smart cities literature, if sufficiently regionalized, offers fascinating opportunities to help rectify the limitations of much smart growth research, including the research reported here. While I disagree that smart growth is only a market-oriented planning theory, that it is effectively "neoliberal planning," for instance, in fact counter-arguing that it is by and large "state-progressive" across Greater Seattle nonetheless carries its own problems, particularly when theorized through neo-Weberian frameworks focused on "bringing the local state back in" (Erie & Mackenzie, 2009). In particular, it tends to occlude an adequate exploration of society-based social movements, those pushing state and economy as a whole, often radically, from well outside the "accepted" institutional channels and modes of political authority, such as electoral referenda (Chap. 5), mayoral memos (Chap. 8), federal funding streams (Chap. 6), or legislative policy-making (Chap. 7). Care must be taken with this arena, though, as not all social movements are necessarily progressive; contemporary populism is Janus-faced, with both nativist and emancipatory sides vying for our collective attention.

In his work on smart cities, Townsend (2013) seeks to redirect the purpose of "Big Data" through activists, entrepreneurs, and hackers operating politically all across society. Smart cities are much more than hooking up traffic lights with sensors, or analyzing the latest apps of ambulent (overly white, male, young) hispsters in search of trendty restaurants, potential dates, and available parking

spots. Like Lewis Mumford in the 1930s, Townsend draws sustenance—as we might—from the heterodox planning giant, Patrick Geddes, who over a hundred years ago developed a transformative, bottom-up theory of "civics," a rolling citizen engagement in the creative production of new forms of knowledge about how to improve the regional environment. Geddes was, in Townsend's view, a hacktivist *avant la lettre*, reinventing ways of planning and imagining cities. "Geddes," he suggests, "would no doubt approve of how today's smart city-builders are applying technology to urban challenges and seeking to develop a new, rigorous empirical science of cities [even as he] he also understood the limits of science" (p. 283). Such limits take us into inner city public housing crises, post-suburban extrusion, poor services, and over-engineered rivers.

9.3 Agenda and Ongoing Questions

The wider "smart turn" in urban and regional affairs, as in other fields, thus represents an important new challenge for ongoing investigations of the planning for, and geographies of, urban sustainability. In particular, what are the emerging relationships between those smart growth spaces (contained suburban growth, TOD, mixed-use districts, etc.) unevenly diffused across complex metropolitan regions and recent smart *city* initiatives, and moreover how should we be thinking through these relationships going forward? In his engagement with the smart turn in urban affairs and planning studies, Gordon MacLeod (2013) reflects on the seemingly unlikely impacts of US-style smart growth and New Urbanism in Scotland. He highlights tensions between planning and democracy in a world of mobile policies and evangelical urbanism. This raises questions about what are, for him, the "post-politics" of an ambulant technocracy.

But there are many other questions as well. The deployment of APD themes in this book was firmly predicated, after all, on a strong neo-Weberian theoretical commitment that, as stated originally in Chap. 3, assigns more "causal weight" *to variations in state structures* (Skocpol, 1985), implying that such variations are also geographical variations *that matter*, rather than simply contingent forms of accumulation (Lewis & Neiman, 2009). More than that, as Stephen Amberg (2008, p. 164) once again usefully notes, in the decentralized American polity, "many combinations of state-market relationships have emerged." The ideas that inform Amberg's provocative claim have major implications, in my view, for how we study smart growth as a geographically variegated affair. In principle, diverse models of smart growth have emerged across the USA—to say nothing of international differences with, for example, Canada or Scotland. So, much work remains.

As with the notable dearth of sufficient histories of whole metropolitan regions, including Greater Seattle, we still lack sufficient work on the emerging geographies of highly variegated US planning regimes and territorial experiences, notwithstanding the outstanding recent work by scholars, albeit working in different theoretical traditions in disagreement about many issues, such as: Dan Trudeau (Trudeau,

2013a, 2013b; Trudeau & Molloy, 2011) on New Urbanism, especially in the Twin Cities, Minnesota; Elliot Tretter (2016) on smart urbanism in Austin, Texas; Tassilo Herrschel on smartness in the Pacific Northwest (Herrschel, 2013); Rob Krueger and David Gibbs (Krueger, 2010; Krueger & Agyeman, 2005; Krueger & Gibbs, 2008) on smart growth, especially in Boston, Massachusetts; and Andy Jonas (Jonas & McCarthy, 2009; Jonas & Pincetl, 2006) on sustainable city-regionalism, especially in Southern California, to name only a few key contributors without whom this book's key ideas would not have been possible (although differences in interpretation naturally remain). This book represents, I can only hope, a modest contribution to this emerging body of stimulating urban scholarship.

References

Dewar, D. (1995). The urban question in South Africa: The need for a planning paradigm shift. *Third World Planning Review*, *17*(4), 407–419.

Dierwechter, Y. (2017). The smart state as utopian space for urban politics. In A. Jonas, B. Miller, K. Ward, & D. Wilson (Eds.), *The Routledge handbook on spaces of urban politics*. London: Routledge.

Eckersley, R. (Ed.). (2004). *The Green State*. Boston: MIT Press.

Erie, S., & Mackenzie, S. (2009). The L.A. school and politics noir: Bringing the local state back in. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, *31*(5), 537–557.

Etherington, D., & Jones, M. (2009). City-regions: New geographies of uneven development and inequality. *Regional Studies*, *43*(2), 247–265. doi:10.1080/00343400801968353.

Fortner, M. J. (2015). Straight, no chaser: Theory, history, and the muting of the urban state. *Urban Affairs Review,* online before print. doi:10.1177/1078087415608007.

Harrison, P., Todes, A., & Watson, V. (2008). *Planning and transformation: Learning from the post-aparthied experience*. London: Routledge.

Herrschel, T. (2013). Sustainability AND competitiveness: Can smart growth square the circle? *Urban Studies*, *50*(11), 2332–2348.

Hollands, R. G. (2015). Critical interventions into the corporate smart city. *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, *8*(1), 61–77. doi:10.1093/cjres/rsu011.

Jabareen, Y. R. (2006). Sustainable urban forms. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *26* (1), 38–52.

Jonas, A. (2011). Region and place: Regionalism in question. *Progress in Human Geography*, *36* (1), 1–10.

Jonas, A. (2012a). City-regionalism as a contingent 'geopolitics of capitalism'. *Geopolitics*, *18*(2), 284–298.

Jonas, A. (2012b). City-regionalism: Questions of distribution and politics. *Progress in Human Geography*, *36*(6), 822–829. doi:10.1177/0309132511432062.

Jonas, A., & McCarthy, L. (2009). Urban management and regeneration in the United States: State intervention or redevelopment at all costs? *Local Government Studies*, *35*(3), 299–314.

Jonas, A., & Pincetl, S. (2006). Rescaling regions in the state: The new regionalism in California. *Political Geography*, *25*(5), 482–505.

Jonas, A., & Ward, K. (2007). Introduction to a debate on city-regions: New geographies of governance, democracy and social reproduction. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *31*(1), 169–178. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2007.00711.x.

Krueger, R. (2010). Smart growth and its discontents: An examination of American and European approaches to local and reigonal sustainable development. *Documents d'anàlisi Geogràfica*, *56* (3), 409–433.

Krueger, R., & Agyeman, J. (2005). Sustainability schizophrenia or "actually existing sustainabilities?" Toward a broader understanding of the politics and promise of local sustainability in the US. *Geoforum*, *36*(4), 410–417. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2004.07.005.

Krueger, R., & Gibbs, D. (2008). 'Third wave' sustainability? Smart growth and regional development in the USA. *Regional Studies*, *42*(9), 1263–1274.

Levine, R. S., & Yanarella, E. J. (2011). *The city as fulcrum of global sustainability*. London: Anthem Press.

Lewis, P., & Neiman, M. (2009). *Custodians of place: Governing the growth and development of cities*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Lucas, J. (2015). Urban governance and the American Political Development approach. *Urban Affairs Review*. doi:10.1177/1078087415620054

MacLeod, G. (2013). New urbanism/smart growth in the Scottish Highlands: Mobile policies and post-politics in local development planning. *Urban Studies*, *5011*, 2196–2221. doi:10.1177/0042098013491164.

Orren, K., & Skowronek, S. (2004). *The search for American political development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rast, J. (2015). Urban regime theory and the problem of change. *Urban Affairs Review*, *51*(1), 138–149. doi:10.1177/1078087414559056.

Sanders, J. (2010). *Seattle and the roots of urban sustainability: Inventing ecotopia*. Pittburgh: University of Pittburgh.

Segbers, K. (Ed.). (2007). *The making of global city-regions*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Skocpol, T. (1985). Introduction. In P. Evans, R. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol (Eds.), *Bringing the state back in*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stephen, A. (2008). Liberal market economy or composite regime? Institutional legacies and labor market policy in the United States. *Polity*, *40*(2), 164. doi:10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300096.

Stone, C., & Whelan, R. (2009). Through the glass darkly: The once and future study of urban poltiics. In R. Dilworth (Ed.), *The city in American Political Development*. New York: Routledge.

Thrift, N., & Amin, A. (2002). *Cities: Reimagining the urban*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Townsend, A. M. (2013). *Smart cities: Big data, civic hackers, and the quest for a new utopia* (1st ed.). New York: W.W. Norton.

Tretter, E. (2016). *Shadows of a sunbelt city*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Trudeau, D. (2013a). New urbanism as sustainable development? *Geography Compass*, *7*(6), 435–448. doi:10.1111/gec3.12042.

Trudeau, D. (2013b). A typology of new urbanism neighborhoods. *Journal of Urbanism*, *6*(2), 113–138.

Trudeau, D., & Molloy, P. (2011). Suburbs in disguise? *Geographies of New Urbanism Urban Geography*, *32*(3), 424–447.

While, A., Gibbs, D., & Jonas, A. E. G. (2013). The competition state, city-regions, and the territorial politics of growth facilitation. *Environment & Planning A*, *45*(10), 2379–2398. doi:10.1068/a45210.

White House. (2015). Administration announces new "smart cities" initiative to help communities tackle local challenges and improve city services.

Glossary

Term	Predominant usage in this book
Urban sustainability[12, 13, 15]	The economic transformation of nature into ecologically resilient, democratically vibrant, and socially just societies whose daily spaces of production and reproduction reflect the material and immaterial requirements of a now predominantly urbanized and interconnected human population
Smart growth	A planning theory that calls for shifting new development away from low-density residential and commercial sprawl into well-serviced cities and suburbs using tools like containment, mixed-use, transit, and stronger regional coordination (e.g., Portland, Oregon's urban growth boundaries)
Intercurrence[1, 2, 11]	Multiple orders in simultaneous action, i.e., a world of "ordered disorder," where relatively independent institutions move in and out of alignment with one another in patterns of both continuity and change (e.g., Community Investment Act)
Institutions[2, 7]	Rules, organizations, laws, or practices that inform or delimit actions (e.g., the Growth Management Act of Washington State)
Order[2, 7, 8]	An institutionalized governing arrangement of people, places, and/or natures, such as the following:
Segregated accumulation	An order that perpetuates patterns of race and class segregation while facilitating geographies of wealth (e.g., through traditional zoning)
State-progressivism	An order that seeks to redress patterns of social discrimination and ecological overconsumption through the uses of state power at various scales of public authority (i.e., through expanded bus services)
Radical-societal	An order, typically weak, which uses organizations and practices to critique and/or challenge as "countermovement" the first two orders, principally first outside the formal state apparatus (e.g., through protest)

(continued)

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Dierwechter, *Urban Sustainability through Smart Growth*, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54448-9

Term	Predominant usage in this book
City-regions[3, 12]	Dense agglomerations of firms, workers, infrastructures, and otherwise fragmented governments that bind together metropolitan areas and their various ecological hinterlands (e.g., Greater Seattle)
Geopolitics[4, 14]	The contested politics of how space ought to be and actually is organized, *at all scales* (e.g., suburban resistance to affordable housing programs)
Territorialize[4, 12]	To "cement" in space specific interests, values, fears, and desires (e.g., bike lanes, gated communities, public parks, a sanctuary city)
Non-simultaneity[2, 7]	The reality that institutions, which tend to persist, are typically built at different times in different places for specific reasons (e.g., US Constitution, recent gun background checks)
Other-directedness[2 ,7]	The attempt to control, shape, or direct behaviors or dynamics through formalized institutions, often as explicitly territorial strategies (e.g., community policing, "alcohol impact" zones)
Temporalities[1, 17]	The tendency for history to play out in many different "times" rather seeing change as simply the unitary, chronological passing of events
Layering[7, 11]	The tendency for institutions to entangle rather than completely efface each other as historical composites over different periods of time in particular places (e.g., local development codes)
Scale[5, 17]	The spatial "reach" of a particular social phenomenon or policy (e.g., a "state-*wide*" law versus a "*local* tax" for street improvements)
Spatialities[6, 17]	Social relations "stretched out" across space; the spatial arrangements for life that a specific society reproduces over time (e.g., Boeing subcontracting relationships in a "hub-and-spoke" system, or sprawl)
Planning[9, 13, 15]	The state-mediated regulation of a specific territory's public and private development patterns—its "collective spatial concerns"—in order to achieve socially agreed upon goals over a long period of time
Ecological modernization[10]	The view that environmental problems are politically, economically, and technologically "solvable" within the context of existing institutions, power structures, and ongoing economic growth
Abductive research[16]	A pragmatic mixed-method approach using qualitative and quantitative data that accepts philosophically a "real world" but that also thinks individuals have their own unique interpretations of that world

Informed by

1. Rodgers, D. (2005). The Search for American Political Development (review). *Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 36*(2), 275–276.
2. Orren, K., & Skowronek, S. (2004). *The search for American political development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

3. Scott, A. (2001). Globalization and the rise of city-regions. *European Planning Studies, 9*(7), 813–826.
4. Cox, K. (2011). From the new urban politics to the new metropolitan politics. *Urban Studies, 48*(12), 2661–2671; see also, Yacobi, H. (2009). Towards urban geopolitics. *Geopolitics, 14*(3), 576–581.
5. Law, J. (1992). Notes on the theory of the actor-network: Ordering, strategy and heterogeneity. *Systems Practice, 5*(4), 3790–3793.
6. Massey, D. (1994). *Space, place and gender*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
7. Orren, K., & Skowronek, S. (1996). Institutions and intercurrence: Theory building in the fullness of time *Nomos XXXVII, Political Order*.
8. Fukuyama, F. (2013). Political order and political decay. New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux.
9. March, A. (2010). Practising theory: When theory affects urban planning. *Planning Theory 9*(2), 108–125.
10. Bailey, I., Gouldson, A., & Newell, P. (2011). Ecological modernisation and the governance of carbon: A critical analysis. *Antipode, 43*(3), 682–703.
11. Widestrom, A. (2011). *The political development of public policy: Institutions, intercurrence, and the Community Reinvestment Act*. Paper presented at the Western Political Science Association 2011 Annual Meeting. Retrieved from SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1767096
12. Jonas, A. (2015). Beyond the urban 'sustainability fix': Looking for new spaces and discourses of sustainability in the city. In D. Wilson (Ed.), *The politics of the urban sustainability concept*. Champaign, IL: Common Ground.
13. Campbell, S. (1996). Green cities, growing cities, just cities? Urban planning and the contradictions of sustainable development *Journal of the American Planning Association, 62*, 296–312.
14. Robinson, J. (1997). The geopolitics of South African cities: States, citizens, territory. *Political Geography, 16*(5), 365–386.
15. Berke, P. R., & Conroy, M. M. (2000). Are we planning for sustainable development? *Journal of the American Planning Association, 66*(1), 21–33.
16. Harwell, M. (2011). Research design in qualitative/quantitative/mixed methods. In C. Conrad & R. Serlin (Eds.), *The Sage handbook for research in education*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
17. Thrift, N., & Amin, A. (2002). *Cities: Reimagining the urban*. Cambridge: Polity.

Index

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Y. Dierwechter, *Urban Sustainability through Smart Growth*, The Urban Book Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54448-9